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Abstract 
 
This research is about how development practice is produced by 
development bureaucracies. In 2001, the Mexican Congress enacted a 
new national law called Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable 
(Sustainable Rural Development Act) seeking to produce the radical 
change that the Mexican rural sector needed to improve the social and 
economic conditions of the rural population. Its policy design was 
based on the dominant paradigm of rural development, of which ideas 
such as sustainable livelihoods, decentralisation and community 
participation compose the core elements. Ten years since the launch of 
this policy it has not triggered the expected changes in social and 
economic conditions in rural Mexico.  
 
This work seeks to provide grounded explanations about why some 
‘good’ development policies produce unexpected outcomes. The 
research focus is on understanding how development bureaucracies 
translate the directives of development programmes. It is possible to 
see their influence on policy outcomes and in the rationale behind the 
decisions made by bureaucratic actors in the implementation arena.  
 
Making use of actor-oriented approaches, this thesis develops a case 
study that describes how, responding to multiple realities, bureaucratic 
actors make their decisions in the implementation arena. It analyses 
the different rationales by which bureaucracies at different levels 
interpret and produce meaning from the notions of decentralisation 
and community participation in the process of the implementation of 
Mexico’s Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. 
 
The case study shows that development bureaucracies play a key role 
in the generation of policy outcomes. It shows that Mexican 
development bureaucracies have a particular rationale that is 
significantly different from the implicit assumptions made in the design 
of the planned intervention and in which informal institutions such as 
compadrazgo and clientelism are used strategically by bureaucratic 
actors to produce development practice. The main conclusion of the 
thesis is that understanding development bureaucracies’ rationales 
provides coherent explanations about the apparently contradictory 
outcomes produced by novel policy approaches in developing 
countries. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This research is about how development practice is produced by 
development bureaucracies. During the last seven years I have closely 
observed how huge amounts of public resources have been spent in the 
name of a ‘new’ paradigm of sustainable rural development in Mexico – 
in 2010 alone the annual budget for this purpose was 21 billion US 
dollars (Federación, 2010). In the course of these ten years I have also 
witnessed how social and economic conditions in rural Mexico have not 
changed as expected as a result of this public expenditure. 
 
Mexico is a country that has tested several development paradigms. 
From the 1950s to the 2000s, the country’s rural development policies 
have been shaped by different development ideas such as the 
modernisation of production processes, the transformation approach, 
economies of scale, redistribution with growth, induced innovation, the 
Green Revolution, food security, environmental sustainability, free 
markets, small-scale economies and sustainable livelihoods, among 
many others (Kay, 1989; 2001; Caballero, 1990; 2006; Pérez and 
Caballero, 2003). Several policy instruments and administrative models 
were designed to implement such approaches including government 
programmes based on micro-credit, price compensations, subsidies for 
supplies, technology transfer, the liberalisation of agricultural product 
pricing, cash transfers, seasonal jobs, capacity building and land reforms 
(Tello, 1990; Caballero, 2006). However, despite all of these attempts 
they have not produced the social and economic change needed in the 
rural sector to reduce poverty and improve the quality of life. In general, 
the rural sector has maintained its historical trend in social and 
economic development. The industrialisation of the Mexican economy 
and the new social dynamics it came with have also created new 
challenges for rural development policies (Aboites, 1989).  
Chapter 1. Introduction  
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In 2001, the Mexican Congress enacted a new national law called Ley de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (the Sustainable Rural Development Act) 
seeking to produce the radical change that Mexico’s rural sector needed 
to improve the social and economic conditions of the rural population. 
Its policy design was based on the dominant paradigm of rural 
development and it contains ideas such as sustainable livelihoods, 
decentralisation and community participation at its core. Ten years after 
this policy was launched, it has not triggered the expected change to the 
social and economic conditions of rural Mexico. As a study by Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2012) points out, 
the economic, productive and social indicators of the Mexican rural 
sector reveal great inequality in both the social and the economic-
productive sphere of the rural sector.  
 
This trend of Mexican rural development policies make me ask several 
questions regarding to why these poor policy results have been 
systematic in Mexico over the years.  Specifically in relation to the Law 
enacted in 2001, I decided to find out why after 10 years did this reform 
achieved so little in the way of public comment or protest. This issue 
arise as a real ‘puzzle’ in terms of finding explanations to understand the 
way development outcomes are produced and the way actor’s involved 
with the rural development policy see the policy process. I show that 
focusing on bureaucratic practices we can get comprehensive 
explanations through the analysis of the way bureaucratic actor’s make 
decisions and produce development outcomes. 
 
Research problem and questions 
David Mosse (2004) observes trends in other development policies in 
the international realm similar to that observed in Mexico: that is to say 
development policies based on novel approaches that do not seem to 
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have produced the expected outcomes even when there are apparently 
no negative funding or operational issues. As a counter-response to 
instrumental-normative analytical approaches, Mosse raises the 
following questions: ‘What if development practice is not driven by 
policy? What if the things that make for good policy are quite different 
from those that make it implementable?’ (Mosse, 2004: 640; 2005: 2) 
Taking Mosse’s questions as starting point, this research seeks to 
provide grounded explanations about why some ‘good’ development 
policies produce unexpected outcomes. Thus rather than focusing the 
analysis on ideas or paradigms of development I focus on understanding 
the processes through social actors produce development practice. My 
main interest is in one particular actor: the bureaucracy. 
 
Thus the research focuses on understanding the way development 
bureaucracies translate the directives of development programmes to 
implement them. In doing so it investigates their influence on policy 
outcomes and the rationale behind bureaucratic actors’ decisions in the 
implementation arena. The research stresses the relevance of 
understanding development bureaucracies’ practice to comprehend 
some development outcomes. 
 
The implementation of the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable is used in 
this work to illustrate how development bureaucracies translate 
development ideas to produce development practice. In the context of 
this research, bureaucracy is understood as the network of actors 
embodied in an organisational system and legally bound to the 
implementation of a development policy or program. Thus the main 
research question is How does Mexico’s development bureaucracy produce 
development practice and influence the outcomes in rural Mexico? 
 
I have selected the case of the Programa de Adquicisión de Activos 
Productivos (PAAP), a federal rural development programme designed 
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according to the principles of the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable, to 
illustrate how bureaucratic actors in different institutional settings in 
rural Mexico produce development practice in the context of a new 
development policy. Making use of the actor-oriented research approach 
of Norman Long (2001), I develop a case study that shows how 
bureaucratic actors respond to multiple realities when making their 
decisions in the implementation arena. It exposes the different rationales 
on which bureaucracies at every level interpret and produce meaning 
regarding two key development ideas of the new policy: decentralisation 
and community participation. 
 
The following subsidiary research questions inform the main research 
question:  
 
I. What are the theoretical assumptions underlying Mexico’s rural 
development policy? What is the expected role of bureaucratic 
structures, according to the policy design? These questions seek to learn 
the perspective of policy makers on development and the expected role 
of bureaucratic actors in the policy implementation. These questions are 
addressed in Chapter 2. 
 
II. How do bureaucratic actors translate rural development policy to 
produce development practice? How do they interact in implementing 
development policy, and what is the result of their interactions? These 
questions seek to discover how bureaucratic actors transform policy 
directives into development practice. Answering these questions will 
allow us to know whether the bureaucracy, as an actor, really influences 
the outcomes of rural development policy, and to what extent 
bureaucratic practices shape such outcomes. These questions are 
addressed in Chapter 5 and 6. 
 
III. Why do bureaucratic actors make decisions in the way they do? What 
Chapter 1. Introduction  
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factors account for the practices of the Mexican bureaucracy in the 
implementation of rural development policy? Answering these questions 
will show first which and what kind of inner factors shape the decisions 
of the individuals that compose the bureaucracy, and second, the 
rationale behind particular decisions that produce unexpected outcomes. 
These questions are addressed in Chapter 7, using the conceptual 
framework exposed in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
By addressing these questions I expect this research to contribute to a 
better understanding of how the so-called developing countries produce 
their development outcomes. Acknowledging that development ideas 
and paradigms are important, the message of this research is that 
understanding development bureaucracies matters more than is usually 
recognised or studied in the field of development studies. Development 
processes and interactions may have different meanings for the diverse 
actors involved in the policy process, who therefore may understand and 
negotiate the normative components of a development policy differently 
(Mosse, 2004). Moreover, not only normative components can be 
understood in different ways but also the social structure: the 
institutional, cultural and organisational settings that frame actors’ 
decisions may have different meanings in particular circumstances for 
each actor (Long, 2001: 3).  
 
Research approach 
The research questions address two domains of study. On one hand, it is 
the domain that reveals how bureaucratic actors transform policy 
directives into development practice. For this domain, the research 
approach is based on actor network theory, known by its acronym as 
ANT. Under ANT’s lens, outcomes of Mexico’s rural development policy 
can be seen as the result of a series of interpretations by bureaucratic 
actors as a consequence of their interactions with other network’s 
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actors. A key feature of this approach is that some of the actors are not 
humans: objects in the material world and even intangible entities in a 
social setting can be also seen or analysed as actors of the network. Each 
actor might interpret or give a different meaning to each component of 
the actors’ network differently; hence development outcomes can be 
understood by knowing how the network’s actors are interlocked.  
 
Actor Network Theory has great potential for showing how development 
practice is produced as a consequence of a broad chain of interpretations 
or translations in the process of a particular development policy. Thus I 
use ANT to investigate who produces development practice, which 
actors influence it and how they interpret one another to make 
decisions, what those decisions are and how they produce development 
outcomes. However, what ANT does not tell us is why some human 
actors make decisions in the way they do. It tells us very little about the 
rationale behind their decisions; it just describes how actors are related 
to each other across the whole network and how they interact to 
produce the network’s outcomes. 
 
The other domain of study seeks to understand the rationale behind 
development bureaucracies’ decisions. For this purpose I use the actor-
oriented approach developed by Norman Long (2001) which seeks 
explanations for ‘how the meanings, purposes and powers associated 
with differential modes of human agency converge to shape the 
outcomes of emergent social forms’ (Long, 2001: 4). Long’s approach 
allows study of the outcomes of development policies in light of the 
diverse cross-cutting discourses, institutional constraints and processes 
of objectification that take place in the implementation arena. To 
understand the processes through which individuals interpret and 
implement development policies, he proposes the concepts of social 
fields, social domains and social arenas to contextualize the spaces in 
which actors’ decisions take place 
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A fundamental reason for using Long’s actor-oriented approach is its 
potential for understanding situated social action, which in this research 
is used to get to know the ‘lifeworlds’ of Mexico’s development 
bureaucracy. Using this notion of lifeworlds as an analytical referent 
allows the researcher to explain individuals’ actions in terms of their 
‘effective or meaningful network of social relations [with] at the same 
time a glimpse of the personal constructs with which the person 
categorizes, codes, processes and imputes meaning to his or her 
experiences – past and present’ (Long, 2001: 54). 
 
Both research approaches are used here as complementary explanatory 
frameworks via which to answer the main research question holistically; 
on the one hand as a macro analysis to understand how development 
bureaucracies produce development practice and on the other, as a 
microanalysis to learn about the rationale for such practice. As a whole, 
the research was expected to provide insights into how understanding 
development bureaucracies can inform development outcomes. 
 
The interpretations and strategies can be as diverse as the number of 
actors that compose the network of actors participating in rural 
development policy, who include peasants, small farmers, agribusiness 
farmers, farmers’ and peasants’ organisations, federal government 
agencies for rural development, state governments, municipal 
governments (Municipios) and non-human actors such as regulations 
and historic facts. 
 
The research methodology is based on the development of a case study 
of Mexico’s development bureaucracy in the context of the 
implementation of the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. In 2000, 
after the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Revolutionary 
Institutional Party, PRI) lost the federal presidential elections for first 
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time in 70 years, the new federal government created this national law 
to address the historical problems of the rural sector. The Ley de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable was seen by specialists in the matter as a 
milestone in the rural development of Mexico due to the ‘novel’ policy 
principles on which its design is based. The LDRS explicitly recognises 
that rural livelihoods transcend agricultural and livestock activities and 
so non-agricultural activities must also be included in the definition of 
rural development. The other key aspect that defines the new law is its 
implementation strategy, which is based on decentralisation and 
community participation.  
 
Two research methods were mainly used to collect data: semi-structured 
interviews and participative. Nearly 86 interviews were carried out in 
formal and informal settings, and participative observation was also 
carried out, not just during the interviews but also at public events 
linked to the operation of rural development programmes. I was given 
permission to join FAO’s staff as observer of their fieldwork, where I 
made notes of important aspects that could complement my research 
data. I selected discourse analysis as the method by which to analyse and 
process the information gathered during my fieldwork. 
 
Findings 
The case study developed in Chapters 5 and 6 shows that development 
bureaucracies play a key role in shaping policy outcomes, so 
understanding the rationale behind bureaucratic actors’ decisions is 
fundamental to explain development outcomes. The case study shows that 
the bureaucratic body responsible for carrying out the directives of the 
Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable is not a monolithic entity or a huge 
machine that works steadily to implement. On the contrary; Mexico’s 
development bureaucracy is composed of a diversity of administrative 
units which are themselves composed of a diversity of actors such as 
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operators, supervisors, managers, directors and external personnel who 
all respond to different organisational, political and personal interests. 
Moreover, it was possible to observe that even people in similar 
positions used different rationales to make their decisions. 
 
Thus a key finding is that not all the bureaucrats understand the policy 
or the programme’s directives in the same way, and they may represent 
different things to each other, shaping bureaucratic practice via a chain 
of independent interpretations of the development programmes’ 
directives. For example the upper bureaucracy is moved by particular 
political-electoral interests represented in the political aspirations and 
career of the Federal Secretary for Agriculture and Rural Development, 
while middle and lower bureaucrats are seeking to satisfy their 
organisation’s needs in order to keep their jobs and fulfil personal 
commitments made in the implementation arena. 
 
The evidence contained in the case study confirms previous findings on 
the influence of politics in the development arena (Ferguson,1992; 
Escobar, 1995; Chhotray 2011). In Mexico political-electoral factors 
linked to informal institutions such as clientelism have been identified as 
well as others non-political drivers that influence bureaucratic actors. 
These other drivers respond to organisational, cultural and personal 
reasons which are at the same time influenced by historic informal 
institutions such as compadrazgo –both clientelism and compadrazgo 
explained in Chapter 2. 
 
I observed that decentralisation and community participation have not 
produced the expected results, because the implementation process has 
not been carried out intentionally according to the spirit of the Ley de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. Decentralising decisions about the 
allocation of federal rural development resources implies a weakening of 
the political position of the federal upper bureaucracy and opens a door 
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to the transfer of political power to state and municipal governments 
and that is a price that the federal bureaucracy is not willing to pay. Thus 
the notion of decentralisation and community participation as a 
development approach is used strategically in public discourse, by 
federal upper bureaucracy, to create the image of a responsible and 
reformist federal government. In practice, all strata of bureaucracy – 
upper, middle and lower federal, state and municipal governments – 
behave strategically according to their needs, whether political, 
organisational, cultural or personal; in doing so they pretend that the 
implementation is going well, but the outcomes are not as intended in 
the design of the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. 
 
Considering that the LDRS was enacted in times where a political 
transition took place –the political party that ruled continuously Mexico 
for 70 years lost the presidential elections, the research provides 
insights on how understanding development bureaucracies help us 
explain continuity and change in the Mexican state. A clear example of 
this is the way that new federal government of 2000 tried to change the 
mechanisms to allocate public resources using general technical criteria, 
but at that moment sub-national and local governments took advantage 
of such mechanisms to promote their political image, so the federal 
government had to go back to the old traditional practices of PRI’s 
governments as a way to maintain their political capital in rural Mexico. 
However, not all the bureaucratic practices must be considered as a 
continuity of the old regime, many practices identified are linked to a 
new political competition that make government more accountable and 
transparent to the society.  Not just policy outcomes driven by political 
interests but also by organisational, cultural and personal are explained 
in this work. 
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Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 provides a general background to the political context in 
which Mexico’s rural development policy was created and is currently 
implemented. The first section presents a historical review of the 
development of Mexico’s political system since the Mexican Revolution 
(1910-1921). The Mexican Revolution is an important reference from 
which to understand the approach behind Mexico’s rural development 
policy, because after the Revolution the peasantry, as a social group, had 
an important place in the official discourses of post-revolutionary 
governments. The second section stresses how two particular informal 
institutions, clientelism and compadrazgo, were respectively created and 
reinforced; today they are still important factors in the decisions taken 
by actors in the public sector. The third section reviews the development 
concepts and technical rationale behind the design of the Ley de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable and the key points in its operational rules. 
This chapter explains how political institutions in Mexico work and how 
they have shaped many decisions made in the development arena. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the relevance of studying development 
bureaucracies and reviews key works in the sociology of organisations 
and political science fields that have provided the theoretical 
foundations of what is known as theories of bureaucracy. The first 
section explores theoretical debate in the fields of the anthropology and 
sociology of development about how implementers of development 
policies produce development practice in the context of a planned 
intervention. The second section reviews the idea of the anti-politics 
machine in development practice, emphasising development 
bureaucracies’ use of political discourses and resources in the 
implementation of development policies. The last section reviews 
traditional approaches to the theories of bureaucracy used in public 
administration and political science. This latter section offers an 
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interdisciplinary perspective to enrich traditional frameworks used in 
the field of development studies to understand development practice. It 
is an attempt to interweave the fields of development studies and 
theories of organisations. 
 
The review focuses on how scholars from fields other than development 
studies explain the unplanned consequences of implementation of a 
public policy. Why is it important to study bureaucracies in the context 
of development policies? What makes bureaucracies an interesting 
object of study when seeking explanations for development outcomes? 
What can theories of bureaucracy can tell us about the influence of 
bureaucratic structures on policy outcomes? These three questions lead 
the contents of Chapter 3. All the reviewed works reveal not just which 
factors may influence policy outcomes but also the relevance of knowing 
what happens in the implementation arena to understand the outputs of 
a policy. Particular attention is paid to the role of bureaucracies in the 
implementation of a planned intervention. 
 
Chapter 4 explores theoretical approaches based on actor-oriented 
perspectives. It explores ANT and its ontological foundations, 
instrumental principles and potential for understanding outcomes of 
development policies. ANT can be a powerful theoretical approach to 
finding out how development practice is produced as a consequence of 
broad chain of interpretations made by the actors taking part in the 
implementation of a particular development policy. This chapter also 
explores Long’s actor-oriented approach, also known as the sociology of 
development, where the questions are not restricted to asking what and 
how actors produce development practice but also try to understand the 
rationales behind some actor’s decisions which may appear illogical in 
the context of a specific policy design. Actor-oriented approaches are 
presented in this chapter as an alternative to the so-called managerial 
approaches to understanding development practice and outcomes. 
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Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are devoted to building the case study of 
Mexico’s development bureaucracies in the context of the 
implementation of the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. They 
deconstruct the way the Mexican bureaucracy understands and 
implements the notions of decentralisation and community participation 
in the context of the country’s rural development policy. They offer 
comprehensive explanations based on the actor-oriented approach that 
account for the practices of Mexican development bureaucracy. This case 
is particularly interesting, since its policy design is based on the 
dominant ideas about rural development currently fostered by 
international organisations. However, in practice, these dominant ideas 
are barely working in the Mexican realm, even when enforced by 
Mexican law. This demonstrates how the bureaucrats’ practices are far 
from the spirit of the policy as a consequence of the diverse chain of 
bureaucratic interpretations. 
 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter and examines the key aspects of the 
case study developed to understand Mexico’s development bureaucracy 
in the context of the implementation of the Ley de Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable.  The first section points out the relevance of development 
bureaucracies in the implementation of development policies. It shows 
the most important facts obtained from the case study to emphasise the 
relevance of bureaucratic actors in delivering development. The second 
section reflects on the potential of actor-oriented approaches in the 
quest to understand development practice. It returns to the arguments 
presented in Chapter 3 to observe the kinds of findings this research 
approach allowed. The third section presents the dichotomy observed 
between the political and non-political drivers that influence 
bureaucratic actors’ decisions in the implementation arena. It 
emphasises how development outcomes are the product of diverse 
interpretations on the part of bureaucratic actors which however also 
Chapter 1. Introduction  
 15 
depend also on a wide range of motivations shaped by political, cultural, 
social, organisational and personal factors in Mexico’s rural setting.  
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Chapter 2. Foundations of the Mexican Ley de Desarrollo 
Rural Sustentable: A historical review of the political 
and institutional setting in rural Mexico  
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a general view of the political context in which 
Mexico’s rural development policy was created and is currently 
implemented. The first part presents a historical review of the 
development of the Mexican political system since the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1921). The Mexican Revolution is an important 
reference by which to understand the development approach behind 
Mexico’s rural development policy, because after the revolution the 
peasantry, as a social group, had an important place in the official 
discourses of post-revolutionary governments. This historical review 
provides a basic background and the historic facts necessary to 
understand some local institutions, and must not be considered a 
comprehensive dissertation on the history of the Mexican Revolution, 
which is not the purpose of this research. 
 
The second section stresses how two informal institutions, clientelism 
and compadrazgo, were respectively created and reinforced during the 
post-revolutionary period and today still appear to be important factors 
in the decisions of actors in the public sector. So this section presents 
some of the informal institutions of the rural sector that function as 
decision frameworks for bureaucratic actors. In the empirical chapters 
some of this institutions that have a strong historical background will 
explain why some decisions took a specific direction.  
 
The third section reviews the development concepts and technical 
rationale behind the design of the rural development policy called Ley de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (the Sustainable Rural Development Act, 
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LDRS) and the key points in its operational rules.  
 
In general terms, this chapter explains how the political institutions of 
the rural sector in Mexico work and how they can influence some of the 
decisions made in the development arena. 
 
2.1 Historical background of the rural development discourse in 
Mexico: The legacy of the Mexican Revolution 
Before the Mexican Revolution began in 1910, the total population of the 
country was 15 million, with 11 million (73 per cent) living in rural areas 
and 62 per cent of the national labour force engaged in agricultural 
activities. The time before the revolution was characterised by 
contradictory economic and social settings. Macroeconomics indicators 
suggest that the previous 30 years were the most prolific ones since 
independence times, with annual growth in the industrial sector of 12 
per cent and annual export growth 6 per cent, showing the degree of 
industrialisation and urbanisation in that period (Meyer, 2010; Gonzalez, 
1976). In 1887 there was a rail network of just 460 km, which by 1910 
had been extended to 19,000 km (Cosío, 1973).  
 
The social sphere was characterised by huge inequity: this economic 
growth had brought better economic conditions for only a small elite of 
Mexicans and foreign investors. In 1910 most of the 11 million people 
living in rural areas were living in poverty. The peasants can be divided 
into two main groups: the poorest, who had been excluded since colonial 
times, who spoke only their indigenous language and were totally 
dependent on landlords and merchants in a relationship similar to 
slavery; and peasants living in subsistence conditions with well-
established labour relations with the hacendado – the owner of a big 
agricultural unit of production called hacienda – where they lived and 
provided the labour force and specialised agricultural skills as part of a 
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production system. These latter did not only depend on the hacendado; 
some were smallholders, owning on average less than a hectare of land 
on which they developed subsistence agriculture and complemented 
their income by as pieceworkers on the hacienda or outside of the 
hacienda. 
 
The Mexican revolution broke out in 1910 due to a crisis induced by 
social inequality and the lack of a democratic political system. One of the 
most important armed rebel forces was led by the insurgent Emiliano 
Zapata. It was not the biggest insurgent army or the one with the most 
financial resources, but it was made up of combative and idealistic 
peasants. Although peasants from all regions of Mexico fought in various 
rebel armies in the Revolution, the Zapatista wing represented many of 
the peasantry’s ideals of social justice. Its slogans were: “The land 
belongs to those who work on it” and “Land and freedom”, defining their 
expectations of the outcomes of the revolution (Ulloa, 1976; Meyer, 
2010). In practical terms, Zapata intended to redistribute land more 
equally through the elimination of haciendas and latifundios (large 
landed estates). The movement sought social justice for peasants 
dispossessed by past government confiscation of their land (Meyer, 
2010: 93). 
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Figure 2.1: Peasantry participating in the Mexican Revolution (Anonymous, 1913) 
 
However, the Zapatista wing had to deal with other revolutionary forces 
that did not pursue the same ideas and were less idealistic and more 
pragmatic about seeking political power. These forces were aware that 
the peasantry would be a key source of legitimisation for the victors of 
the revolution, so even the leaders of armies that did not belong to or 
represent peasants agreed to include their concerns, particularly land 
reform, in their revolutionary political agenda. They saw the peasantry 
as a means of legitimating their involvement in the Mexican Revolution 
and governing the nation. According to Meyer (2010), the lack of 
political space for the peasantry sector in Porfirio Diaz’s regime was a 
key factor in the 1910 political crisis. 
 
When the Mexican Revolution came to an end in 1920, the tangible 
outcome was the new Constitution of 1917. For the peasantry this 
represented the hope of a new relationship between the rural sector and 
the new national government. The new constitution explicitly set out the 
government’s commitment to return to peasants land confiscated during 
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Porfirio Diaz’s regime. Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution sets out two 
key points in relation to the land reform: a) it will provide land and 
water to all citizens that do not own any or do not have enough to satisfy 
their human needs. These citizens will immediately become the owners 
of that land. This redistribution should not affect small private 
properties currently used for agricultural production; and b) all the 
latifundios should be eliminated and replaced by the new model of 
medium-sized estates. 
 
Thus, the rural sector, protagonist in the Mexican Revolution, became a 
national symbol of the post-revolutionary era. The political discourse of 
development suddenly took the peasantry and rural poverty as flags of 
the new post-revolutionary regime, which promised to seek social justice 
for the poor and to modernise México. Paradoxically, none of the top-
level functionaries in the post-revolutionary government were from the 
rural sector; many had participated in the old regime as military officials 
or bureaucrats while others were middle- and upper-class intellectuals. 
 
The 1917 land reform gradually eliminated the latifundios and haciendas 
and assigned the land to peasants who owned none through ejidos – 
common land shared by members of a community. However, this 
redistribution did not bring the expected social impact. One reason for 
this was that the redistributed land was not the most productive. The 
best land was kept by the hancendados using tricky legal manoeuvres to 
keep it under a legal modality called the small property regime, which 
allowed citizens to keep smallholdings of different sizes depending on 
the type of activity developed on them. For example, 100 hectares were 
allowed for land with an irrigation system; 300 hectares were allowed 
for land used to produce sugar or bananas and 500 hectares could be 
kept for land used for livestock purposes (Krause, 1997: 98). The 
hacendados manipulated the small property regime by asking relatives’ 
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and friends’ permission to use their names to register several 
smallholdings in order to retain a large estate. 
 
Mendieta y Nuñez (1978) gives two main reasons why land was not 
redistributed in the spirit of the 1917 Constitution: a) many hacendados 
were generals or politicians, so state governors did not want to upset 
them and cause military or political conflict in the region; and b) state 
governments were not willing to use their scarce resources on 
expropriating land for distribution among the peasants. 
 
In summary, the land redistribution did not reflect the 1917 
Constitution’s commitment to it. The expected agrarian reform only 
produced a slight adjustment to rural property rights with minor 
impacts. Peasants who had participated in the revolution ended up in a 
worse economic and social situation than before, and the majority, who 
had not participated in the civil war, were also negatively affected 
(Meyer, 2010: 122). Nevertheless, the new post-revolutionary regime 
would reserve a special place and role for the peasantry in a newly-
engineered political system.  
 
From 1920 to 1929 was a settling-down period for the post-
revolutionary government, in which ambitions to gain political control of 
the nation produced a series of violent takeovers of the Mexican 
presidency. President Alvaro Obregon, killed in 1928, was the last of 
three presidents murdered in this period. In 1924 President Plutarco 
Elias Calles began engineering what would become a stable political 
system which, years later, the Nobel prize-winner Mario Vargas Llosa 
called the ‘perfect dictatorship’.1  
 
                                                     
1The winner of the 2010 Nobel Prize for Literature called the Mexican political system ‘the perfect 
dictatorship’ in 1990 because authority does not rest in persons but in a political party that has ruled all 
political activity in Mexico since 1929. 
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The post-revolution political system was based on one political party: 
the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party 
(PNR)), a political instrument that gradually integrated all the different 
social sectors and interests of post-revolution Mexico through the 
creation of centrally-administrated national organisations with local 
offices. The urban working classes were organised and represented 
through a national organisation called Confederación de Trabajadores de 
México (Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM)); the peasantry sector 
was represented by the Confederación Nacional Capesina (National 
Confederation of Peasants (CNC)) and the rest of society, including the 
bureaucracy, artisans and merchants, by the Confederación Nacional de 
Organizaciones Populares (National Confederation of Popular 
Organisations (CNOP)). 
 
The PNR brought order and discipline after the anarchic revolutionary 
period. It set basic rules about the occupation of government positions 
and participation in elections, with all roads pointing to the PNR as the 
only mean to participate or be part of the government. It created a 
system of incentives for social organisations to show loyalty to the PNR, 
where loyal leaders could eventually achieve a position in state or 
National Congress or even in the public administration. Anyone 
challenging the new status quo was punished by the system. 
In the following years the PNR changed its name to Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (Revolutionary Institutional Party, PRI), a 
name that raises the question of how a party can be both revolutionary 
and institutional at the same time. Its ideology was based on the legacy 
of the Mexican Revolution, but its functionality was based on a strong 
institutional arrangement that set the basic rules of the political system 
as well as on organisations – public and social – that integrated all the 
sectors of Mexican society. The change of name changed neither the 
party’s essence nor the structure of its political power distribution. The 
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highest authority in the PRI was the President of the Mexican Republic, 
from whom the chain of command in the hierarchical pyramid of 
political power in Mexico stemmed. 
 
As mentioned, the rural sector became one of the most important 
symbols of the Mexican Revolution and the new post-revolutionary 
regime reserved a special place for the peasantry in the political system. 
The PRI assigned a specific number of seats to members of the CNC in 
the National Congress as congress-people (Krause, 1997). Specific 
government programmes were created to subsidise CNC members’ 
agricultural activities. It was taken for granted that all peasants were 
represented by the CNC. At the beginning of the post-revolutionary era, 
the government underestimated the peasantry’s capacity for improving 
their economic and social conditions themselves and adopted a 
paternalistic approach. 
 
However, despite the post-revolutionary symbolism of the peasantry, the 
development of the rural sector was not included in the new 
government’s development perspective. The influence of Western 
societies caused Mexico to aim for industrialisation as its economic 
development policy, with the PRI intending a change to the national 
economic structure in the 1940s.  
 
A second wave of land redistribution took place in 1935, this time with 
18 million hectares of the remaining haciendas split up to form ejidos for 
low-income peasants (Peschard, Puga and Tirado, 1998: 36). The 
agricultural sector was no longer an economic priority for the 
government; Mexico looked towards industrial development for its 
economic future. Many hacendados lost interest in agriculture and 
decided to move their business to the industrial sector with the support 
of the federal government. Others who owned highly productive land 
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kept their properties by manipulating the small property regime. 
  
A new economic development model called the import substitution 
model was implemented to develop and protect local industry from 
external markets. The industrialisation of the Mexican economy 
registered good figures of economic growth – from 1948 to 1968, 
average annual growth was 6 per cent, and 8 per cent in the industrial 
sector. However, as Peschard, Puga and Tirado (1998: 34) point out: 
 
…the economic growth, industrialisation and urbanisation did not 
necessarily represent a better level of life for the population […] the 
statistics show that the household income of 90 per cent of Mexicans did 
not undergo any substantial modification and actually dropped in the 
following years with almost 50 per cent of the national income 
concentrated in a small sector. That is to say, conditions for the poor, 
mainly the peasants, did not change while the fortunes of a small group of 
rich people rose. 
 
Thus the economic outcome of many years of fostering industrialisation 
was not as expected. The industrial development approach brought great 
change to the social structure. The rural population decreased as the 
urban population increased in industrial areas, with important migration 
from rural areas to the cities, mainly Mexico City (Peschard, Puga and 
Tirado, 1998; Valenzuela Feijóo and Jíménez Ricárdez, 1986). 
Government policy based on industrialisation clearly differentiated 
between the two worlds in the Mexican rural sector – low-income 
peasants in ejidos and farmers well-established in an agribusiness model 
based on the small property regime (Meyer, 2010). These different 
realities in rural Mexico received different attention from the 
government, which did not necessarily seek to reduce the social and 
economic gap between these two strata of the rural population.   
 
2.2 Shaping rural development policy: the PRI politics machine 
As discussed in the previous section, the formation of the PRI and the 
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political system that it created was the main outcome of the Mexican 
Revolution. The PRI’s political system influenced social and economic 
development in Mexico in the following years. Several adjectives have 
been used to describe the PRI regime such as ‘institutional authoritarian 
period’ (Crespo, 1999), ‘imperial presidentialism’ (Krause, 1997) and 
‘perfect dictatorship’ (Vargas Llosa, 1990), all of which refer to a political 
system in which the political power was concentrated in the figure of 
one person, the President of the Mexican Republic. Presidential power 
was based on informal institutions that gave one person control over the 
National Congress and the courts, as well as strong influence over state 
governors’ decisions. It was called a ‘perfect dictatorship’ because the 
power did not rest in one person but in one political party for 70 years.  
 
All this political power concentrated in the figure of the president was 
based on metaconstitutional faculties, as the 1917 Mexican Constitution 
clearly stated that Mexico is a federal state composed of sovereign states, 
which warrants a vertical separation of power; as well as by three 
supreme powers, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, which 
warrants a horizontal separation of political power (Rodriguez, 1999: 
56). The president’s metaconstitutional power was actually based on a 
set of unwritten rules giving him the last word on judicial and electoral 
issues and the power to amend the Constitution, legislate and appoint 
and dismiss congresspersons, state governors and municipal authorities 
(Garrido, 1989; 424).  
 
This political system based on the figure of the president solved many of 
the chronic problems that the Mexican Revolution had sought to 
alleviate. For example: a) it solved the problem of violent changes of 
elected authorities by installing presidential elections every six years 
with no chance of re-election; b) it developed institutions such as 
peasants’ and workers’ associations to include the masses in political 
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decisions; c) it subordinated the armed forces to the power of the 
president; and d) it was able to incorporate critics and detractors of the 
PRI system, creating an image of pluralism (Crespo 1999: 48). All of this 
helped to create the illusion of a democratic regime, although in practice 
the President of the Republic had the final word on all decisions. The 
high institutionalisation of the Mexican political system generated an 
image of a vanguardist system compared to the existing ones Latin 
America in those times, which were mainly military dictatorships. It was 
even seen by some in the international community as a model for the 
development of Latin America (Crespo 1999: 48).  
 
The PRI regime developed mass institutions, which allowed the integration 
of a wide range of social sectors [e.g. workers’ unions, peasants’ unions and 
bureaucracy] in politics, although in a controlled and limited way. This is 
what gave [the political system] the characteristic of ‘inclusion’ […] it 
succeeded in bringing together mass participation and highly concentrated 
power. Institutions that allowed the expansion of participation at the same 
time worked as devices for political control that hinder the opposition to 
achieve risky levels [of political power] for the continuity or hegemony of 
the [PRI] regime.. (Crespo, 1999: 46) 
 
This explains the continuity of the PRI regime in comparison to purely 
authoritarian regimes. The PRI system was openly conceived as a politics 
machine based on the discipline of all the actors of which it was 
composed. The leaders of social organisations such as the CTM, the CNC 
and the CNOP were not ashamed to openly support the president’s 
decisions. Their loyalty was to the head of the state and their social 
organisations saw themselves as part of that state. From the 1940s to the 
1970s the PRI was a hegemonic party with support in all social sectors. 
Although the political system rested on the democratic basis of free 
elections, at this time there was no strong opposition threatening the PRI 
in elections. 
 
The PRI regime created a strong and complex institutional setting in 
which the rural sector played a key role in legitimising the national 
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government. During this regime peasants were the keepers of social 
peace, in exchange, the government gave prerogatives to peasant 
organisations, such as public resources in the form of subsidies for 
supplies for their productive activities. Although it did the same with 
other sectors such as industry and the army, the rural sector had a 
historical symbolism that made it different from the rest. This symbolic 
relevance was important in the economic and social development of 
rural Mexico as well as its political setting.  
 
Keeping the social peace in the rural sector required an institutional 
arrangement based on specific rules of exchange between the 
government and the rural population. However, as mentioned, this 
population comprised two main categories: peasants living in poverty 
and engaging in subsistence agriculture and were agricultural producers 
profiting from internal or external markets. In between were peasants in 
transition who were beginning to produce a small profit to be invested 
for the gradual growth of their business. These different strata received 
different treatments from the government which became institutions in 
the rural development arena. One strata, the peasantry, were treated as 
the government’s political-electoral clientele and the other, the 
agribusiness farmers, took advantage of their personal relations with 
politicians to receive special treatment in the allocation of public 
resources. The names of the informal institutions that describe these 
behaviours are clientelism and compadrazgo respectively. 
 
The following sections, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, describe how these institutions 
shape the political setting of the rural development arena in Mexico. In 
the context of this research, institutions should be understood as the 
prescriptions that individuals use to organise all forms of repetitive and 
structured interactions, including those within families, markets, firms, 
private associations and governments at all scales (Ostrom, 2005). Thus 
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institutions comprise information about the consequences of certain 
decisions in specific contexts or circumstances. Institutions are decision-
making frameworks that provide them with certainty about the different 
outcomes that can be produced based on different choices in specific 
situations. 
 
In the case of clientelism as an institution of the rural development 
arena, I show how the set of rules created between the peasantry and the 
government about delivering public goods and services has been 
strongly internalised by both actors; hence resistance has developed on 
both sides to changing the rules of exchange between peasantry and 
government. I also show how compadrazgo greatly influences the 
allocation of public resources because there are personal commitments 
that shape decisions of public functionaries and farmers in rural Mexico.  
 
2.2.1 Clientelism as an informal institution in the rural development 
arena 
At the beginning of the PRI regime agricultural policy for the peasantry 
was based on the government’s paternalistic relationship with the 
peasants, for whom it provided supplies for agricultural production such 
as seeds, fertilisers, machinery, tools and so on. It sought to satisfy even 
their everyday needs, opening subsidised government convenience 
stores in rural communities. The peasantry’s vulnerable social condition 
and lack of economic opportunities to achieve a better quality of life 
made this sector highly dependent on such governmental aid and 
peasants became used to seeing it as an obligatory legacy of the Mexican 
Revolution, as did the PRI government for many years. At this point the 
relationship between the government and the peasantry had not taken 
the form of clientelism and was more paternalistic on the part of the 
federal government. 
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However, in the 1980s an economic crisis hit Mexico, directly impacting 
on government spending. By this time the macroeconomic indicators 
showed that the industrialisation policy implemented in the 1940s had 
failed. Trade deficits had been the trend for the last ten years with a huge 
government deficit with debts in external markets. The economic crisis 
affected the political hegemony of the PRI and opposition groups arose 
in civil society promoting political alternatives. In rural areas, 
independent organisations were created to demand governmental 
support for agriculture. 
 
In 1988, for first time since its creation, the PRI had to face a competitive 
election for the presidency. Dissidents from the PRI got together with 
left-wing parties to support a very competitive candidate. The PRI had to 
make use of its politics machine for the elections and of public resources 
to influence and manipulate the election results. According to an official 
statement, the electoral counting system failed for several hours, and 
when it was reinstalled the PRI candidate had won the election. There 
was speculation about the manipulation of results while the counting 
system was down and the election was strongly questioned in civil 
society (Crespo, 1999; Alonso Sanchez, 2000). As the electoral system 
was so precarious there were no mechanisms for verifying the accuracy 
of the results, at least according to existing law.  
 
The new social and political scenario of 1988 forced the PRI to use an 
electoral strategy comprising practices to compel votes in its favour, 
some of which were neither ethical nor legal. That was the case on how 
public resources were used in electoral times; for example, one irregular 
practice was based on asymmetrical information about the electoral 
process, where people linked to PRI –e.g. public functionaries, 
employers, journalists – generate a fatalistic views between colleagues 
about the risks of loosing jobs in case other party different to PRI win the 
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presidential election; even some menaces about firing people were used 
as a resource to influence the vote in electoral times (Alonso Sanchez, 
2000; Ortega Ortiz, 2008).  
 
Local and state government and civil organisations linked to PRI were 
used as a network through which to exchange goods or money from 
public funds in exchange for PRI votes. The distribution of public 
resources in the electoral process took different forms, from very 
discreet legal channels to highly illegal practice. It could involve a 
payment in kind, such as a rural development programme or a direct 
payment from a PRI representative in exchange for proof of voting for a 
PRI candidate (Alonso Sanchez, 2000; Ortega Ortiz, 2008). All of the 
practices described so far were not exclusive to the presidential election; 
they also occurred at local state and municipal elections. Then a 
reshaping of the relationship between the government and the peasantry 
from a paternalistic to a clientelistic relation occurred. 
 
The economic crises, the corruption scandals involving public 
functionaries and the lack of public resources to fulfil the social demands 
of all sectors of population put pressure on the PRI regime to change the 
electoral system and contributed to electoral clientelism (Crespo, 1999). 
Society’s specific demand was for an electoral system that would allow 
other political forces to compete against the official party in fair 
conditions. In 1990 the Instituto Federal Electoral (Electoral Federal 
Institute (IFE)) was created as a specialist federal governmental agency 
to organise and conduct federal elections. In 1996 the IFE would become 
independent of the federal government. A council of citizens acted as the 
institute’s directive board. 
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Party/Federal Election 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000* 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) 20 51 101 119 207 
Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) 
196 298 262 300 208 
Left-wing parties (various) 21 50 137 81 67 
Others 0 1 0 20 18 
Table 2.1 Composition of the National Congress: Number of Congresspersons by 
Political Party. 
Source: Estadísticas Instituto Federal Electoral (1988-2012) http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/sisept 
/default.aspx?t=mgob17&s=est&c=22187 retrieved May 2013 
*The PRI loses the presidential election. The PAN candidate was the winner 
 
Although the new electoral system represented a step forward in 
strengthening political rights in Mexico, the IFE was only effective in 
reducing uncertainty in the voting and vote-counting processes and 
eradicating many illegal election day practices; however, the clientelistic 
use of public resources to influence voting has not yet been fully 
resolved. 
 
Vicky Randall (2007) distinguishes two main forms of clientelism; the 
first is a system of patronage linking leaders and subordinates within a 
political party. In the Mexican case this is called corporativismo 
(corporatism), referring to a system whereby leaders of social civil 
organisations controlled by the PRI compelled their members to be loyal 
to the party, as the welfare of the organisation depended on it. In the 
immediate post-revolutionary era the rural sector leaders found it easy 
to build social organisations loyal to the PRI such as the CNC, the CTM 
and the CNOP. However, when the so-called democratic transition began 
in 1988, the rules changed and new civil organisations appeared, some of 
which opposed the PRI regime. It was no longer possible to control all 
social organisations and workers’ unions. 
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Thus in a context of a real electoral competition the PRI regime had to 
adopt a different approach to maintaining society’s support in elections. 
This is the second form of clientelism, identified by Randall (2007) as an 
exchange of favours for votes or of support between party 
representatives and citizens at large. ‘Whilst the nature of such favours 
varies, with the expansion of competitive party politics, the long-term 
trend appears to be for greater concentration on “electoral clientelism”, 
or outright vote-buying’ (Randall, 2007: 646). The PRI had to adapt to 
the new political rules quickly, as the civil society organisations that it 
controlled were no longer representative of all sectors of the society or 
of most of the country’s population.  
 
Originally the clientelistic relationship between PRI government and the 
population was created through the strategic allocation of public 
resources at election times. For example, in campaign events – whether 
for a local or a state position – it was common to see authorities in 
working hours appear in electoral events to openly express support for 
the PRI candidate; even as part of the event the authorities allocate 
resources of a public program to the population of the community in 
which electoral event took place. For example, six months before the 
elections the governor promised the community tractors to a rural 
community, so its electoral strategy was to deliver the tractors one or 
two weeks before the election. 
 
It was also common for local and state governments to transfer 
resources from public funds to the party to buy goods to give to the local 
population on behalf of the candidate. The population therefore expected 
to receive kitchen implements, food, construction materials and so on 
during a campaign event. The more competitive the elections, the greater 
the creativity and complexity of the clientelistic strategy. Opposition 
parties were unable to compete against this mobilisation of financial 
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resources in campaigns. In fact a common complaint of the opposition 
was that the PRI made political profit from the poor, who with their 
lower educational level and greater economic needs are a highly 
manipulable population. 
 
The IFE created rules against political clientelism and to some extent 
these helped to eradicate certain practices. Many of the regulations 
prohibited using the names of political parties in official government 
events or the implementation of government programmes. However, 
clientelism was now an institution in Mexico. Those living in poverty 
quickly got used to demanding that political contenders reward them for 
voting for them. This behaviour was based on the people’s lack of trust in 
politicians; they wanted at least to receive something at times the 
election, because they were convinced that they would receive nothing 
when their candidate won the election.  
 
The evolution of the democracy in Mexico also represented an evolution 
in public policies. The PRI had to innovate to create programmes that did 
not look clientelistic, so they had to think about programme design to 
reduce discretional decisions about the allocation of public resources. In 
1990, still leading the Mexican Republic, it created a social and rural 
development programme called Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 
(Solidarity National Programme, PRONASOL) to help the country’s 
poorest communities to generate physical infrastructure to urbanise 
their communities. The programme allocated resources to the 
community and allowed the citizens to decide what to invest them in. 
They could choose to build pavements, a road, sports facilities, a 
sewerage network and even a local church, among many other things.  
 
This programme generated great political capital for President Carlos 
Salinas, whose election had been questioned at the beginning of his term 
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in office. PRONASOL sought ways of allocating public resources for social 
development in order to restore the PRI’s political legitimacy in a 
process of macro-structural adjustment promoted by President Salinas’s 
administration (Dresser, 1991; Cook et al., 1994; Cornelius et al., 1994; 
Fox, 1994). Its policy directives fostered the emergence of a new 
generation of community leaders that would bypass the rigid and 
corrupt traditional political system of elites and party cadres (Rap and 
Wester, 2013). 
 
However, PRONASOL was dissolved in the following administration 
because President Ernesto Zedillo broke his political relationship with 
president Salinas and eliminated all links between the former 
government and the programme’s beneficiaries. Thus in 1997 Programa 
de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (Programme of Education, Health 
and Food, PROGRESA), a program of universal access for people living in 
poverty, was created. While in PRONASOL community representatives 
could select where to apply the programme, with PROGRESA there was 
no such empowerment of the community, so every person fitting the 
parameters of poverty set by the government received an income 
transfer. 
 
Proudly Zedillo’s government explained that PROGRESA was a move 
away from clientelistic programmes, as indeed it was; at least it 
represented a new way of allocating public resources in Mexico. The 
problem was that PROGRESA was the only federal programme operating 
under such technical principles while other programmes continued to 
operate on a clientelistic basis.  
 
In 1993 the Secretariat of Agriculture and Rural Development (now 
Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development (SAGARPA)) 
created a programme called Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo  
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(Programme of Direct Support for the Farms, PROCAMPO), the aim of 
which was to provide an income transfer to all peasants and farmers 
whose income could be negatively affected by Mexico signing the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a commercial agreement 
between the governments of Canada, Mexico and the US. The agreement 
came into force on January 1st 1994 and many agriculture producers 
were expected to be affected due to the low productivity levels of small 
and medium producers in the rural sector. PROCAMPO was a 
compensation programme to help rural producers to take the necessary 
measures to improve their productivity so that within ten years they 
could compete in fair conditions with Canadian and US farmers. 
 
PROGRESA and PROCAMPO represented a secure and steady income for 
Mexican peasants as most fit the target population of both programmes. 
In monetary terms PROCAMPO provides US$60 a year for each hectare 
the beneficiary owns, and PROGRESA around US$30 a month per family. 
This money transfer by the Mexican government moved the programme 
beneficiaries to just above the UN poverty line (Skoufias, 2005). The 
rural poor were happy to receive money from the government and the 
government was happy with the impact of the programmes on the 
national poverty statistics. Once again, opposition criticism called them 
populist programmes created to reach the masses with a low impact on 
development. 
 
SAGARPA also had another important rural development programme, 
Alianza para el Campo (the Farming Alliance), created in 1994 to help 
peasants and farmers to strengthen their physical capital such as 
agricultural machinery and tools. The programme focused on all 
producers in the rural sector, rich and poor. However, its allocation of 
resources followed a trend similar to that of PROGRESA and PROCAMPO, 
the poor, individually or as production units, receiving very small 
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benefits. For example, they received subsidies of US$100 on average to 
acquire inexpensive productive assets in contrast to agribusiness 
farmers, who received subsidies of US$2000 on average to modernise 
their productive units. One explanation of this difference is that the 
beneficiary had to make a partial investment to be eligible for the 
subsidy, and since peasants generally live in subsistence conditions they 
could not make such an investment. Another reason is that kinship 
relations between politicians and public functionaries with agribusiness 
farmers are a strong determinant in the allocation of public resources, as 
described in the following section.  
 
The prevalence of clientelism was very relevant to the performance of 
the PRI in times of political crises; it provided a second chance for the 
party in a new national democratic setting. But this is not a just a matter 
of political parties; as Randall (2007) points out, developing countries’ 
societies are typically heavily prone to clientelistic practices of one kind 
or another: 
 
 
This is true of all the main regions of the developing world and almost all 
the countries, though not all parties within them. Explanations often 
distinguish between demand and supply factors, with poverty and 
dependence as part of the former and the absence of a professionalised 
state bureaucracy contributing to the latter, but these may also be 
exacerbated by political institutional arrangements. (Randall, 2007: 646) 
 
The PRI’s clientelistic development approach shows that it was capable 
of attending to the immediate subsistence needs of the rural poor but not 
of addressing the roots of poverty. The new democratic scenario in the 
1990s created a new institutional setting for maintaining political power 
and the PRI had to adjust its political system to the new electoral rules in 
which the use of modern clientelistic practices seemed to be key to win 
election. Such clientelistic practices were quickly internalised and 
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became an institution that strongly influences the efficacy of 
development policies. 
  
Randall (2007) considers that clientelism can play a positive role in 
party-building and linking parties with their social roots, especially in 
the early stages. However, it tends to undermine longer-term processes 
such as the regularised processes of internal decision-making and 
supporters’ identification with a party or its platform (Randall, 2007: 
646). This applies in the Mexican case: once conditions for electoral 
competence were established the potential voters asked not about the 
political ideas of each party but what kind of goods they offered in 
exchange for their vote. The more developed the electoral system, the 
more the peasant sector was seen as clientele rather than as the 
government’s children, as previously.  
 
Peasants started to think strategically about how to maintain their 
benefits from the government and how to ask for more public resources. 
When aid did not come as they expected they organised action pressure 
the government. New independent peasant organisations arose to 
complain to the regime about the rural development policy, which, from 
their perspective, had made the rural sector more vulnerable. These 
organisations used several strategies to put social pressure on the 
government; for example road blockages, the closure of public offices, 
the occupation of Mexico City’s main square, in El Zócalo, and 
demonstrations in the City’s main avenues. Although some of these acts 
were illegal the government did not apply the law against them as, after 
all, they are the ‘sons of the Mexican revolution’. 
 
2.2.2 Compadrazgo as an informal institution in the rural development 
arena 
The term compadrazgo does not come from Mexican political 
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terminology but from the social-religious sphere. However, there is a 
way in which compadrazgo has been developed in the political 
environment and it is important to explain the implications of a 
relationship of this type in a political setting. Compadrazgo is a system of 
ritual fictive kinship resulting in reciprocal relationships between two 
families. The tradition of compadrazgo comes from colonial times 
(López, 1999); it arose in Mexico through the conversion of the 
indigenous population to Catholicism, which required baptismal 
sponsorship according to the Roman Catholic doctrine, although today 
sponsorship is used for a variety of sacramental occasions such as first 
communion, confirmation and weddings. 
 
The sponsors are called padrinos by the sponsored child and compadres 
by the child’s parents – that is why the relationship is called 
compadrazgo. The key role of the padrinos is to look after the sponsored 
child – called ahijado if he is male or ahijada if she is female – and 
encourage him/her to live the life as a good Catholic. The padrinos are 
expected to take on the parents’ role of the in their temporary or 
permanent absence. In the latter case, the padrinos must provide shelter, 
education, healthcare and love just as if the child was their own. 
Although padrinos are not biological relatives they are seen as chosen 
family with the same rights and obligations as biological family members 
(Gill-Hopple and Brage-Hudson, 2012: 118). 
 
Unlike godfathering of other parts of the world, in the Mexican 
compadrazgo the sense of belonging, identity and obligation associated 
with kinship is very strong and very functional in the goal of securing 
reciprocal support and trust (Durston, 2001: 13). ‘Not only should 
compadres respect each other and reciprocate the term in conversation; 
the tie is semi-sacred, stronger than that between first cousins and often 
compared to that between brothers’ (Friedrich, 1965: 195). Once two 
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individuals are linked by this ritual or fictitious kinship, reciprocity in 
the relationship can go beyond the compromises acquired with the 
ahijado or ahijada. It represents a new source of work opportunities, 
loans and help in difficult economic and social circumstances. 
 
The compadre link has also political functions. In their community or 
working environments compadres tend to vote together and to ally 
themselves at public meetings (Friedrich, 1965 : 196). In Mexico there 
has been a diversion of the term compadrazgo in the political arena, 
where it refers to a strong relationship created between two individuals 
in order to take advantage of political position to reproduce and extend 
their political or economic power. For example, one individual can set up 
a compadrazgo relationship with several others and at the same time his 
own compadre can have others compadrazgo relations with other 
individuals, all of these relationships creating a network of indirectly-
connected individuals. One of the aims of compadrazgo for an individual 
is to create new alliances of support and obligatory respect rather than 
reinforcing those for which such behaviour is axiomatic, such as with 
relatives (Friedrich, 1965 : 196).  
 
In recent years the connotation of compadrazgo in the political arena has 
changed. It not only refers to a relationship formalised by religious 
ritual; it can also be a strong friendship between two individuals 
represented by loyalty in the political arena. The lack of other forms of 
social capital in Mexico makes the compadrazgo a valuable source of 
trustworthy relations. However, in the political arena these relations of 
reciprocity and trust are commonly used to carry out corrupt and 
unethical practices in the public sector and compadrazgo has acquired a 
negative connotation. This is one of the main reasons why the PRI 
regime is seen as corrupt. 
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As reviewed in section 2.1, the redistribution of land was only partially 
successful as the generals and politicians maintained their right to the 
most productive land in Mexico. Others who were not politicians or 
generals were protected by politicians through a compadrazgo relation. 
Any compadrazgo relationship implies reciprocity, so the protected 
normally pay the compadre back, whether with financial resources for 
his political career or other services. 
 
In the implementation of rural development programmes, the 
compadrazgo relationship has produced non-technical allocation of 
public resources. Thus the resources of a programme such as Alianza por 
el Campo have been given to productive units that do not need a 
government subsidy to be productive or profitable because there is a 
compadrazgo relationship between the agribusiness farmer and the 
public functionary or politician. Another example of the allocation of 
public resources based on compadrazgo is the conditioned allocation of 
resources, where several producers receive benefits from a specific 
programme under the informally-agreed condition that they buy the 
subsidised assets from a specific provider: a compadre of the public 
functionaries or politician. The problem arises when the asset provided 
by the politician’s compadre is of low quality or overpriced. 
Compadrazgo relations in the political arena have produced inefficiency 
in the allocation of public resources and therefore low impact in rural 
development programmes. 
  
On October 24 2010, La Prensa newspaper ran the headline, ‘el 
amiguismo y compadrazgo dañan el sistema político’ (Friendship 
relations y compadrazgo hurt the political system), reporting the feelings 
of opposition leaders in relation to the President of the Republic’s 
appointment of Secretaries of State who did not have the correct 
technical and political profile to develop the responsibilities of the post 
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successfully. The opposition leaders claimed that the appointments were 
based on the President’s friendship and compadrazgo with the appointed 
officials and demanded political reform to ensure that the Senate must 
approve all appointments at that level (García Heredia, 2010). The 
interesting thing about this story is that one of the opposition leaders is 
presenting the PRI’s official view, which means that even when the PRI 
lost the presidency in 2000 the current Partido Accíon Nacional (PAN) 
government seems to be reproducing the old compadrazgo practices. 
 
2.3 New government, new paradigm: the Ley de Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable 
I have described how the PRI regime was built and shaped Mexico’s 
political system in the twentieth century and explained some of the 
factors that allowed that regime to create strong political stability for 
many years. However, in the early 1980s its political hegemony started 
to break down as a consequence of the economic crisis that hit the 
country and of the regime’s corruption (Crespo, 1999). In 1996 a period 
of democratic transition began during which a fair electoral system was 
gradually constructed.  
 
President Zedillo saw the democratisation of the political regime as 
necessary in order to avoid a deeper political and economic crisis in 
Mexico, so he broke with the traditional PRI practice of fixing local 
electoral processes (Crespo, 1999). As a consequence the opposition 
began to win local elections and the PRI suffered several losses, until in 
1995 it lost the elections for the states of Baja California, Jalisco and 
Guanajuato and in 1997, in the states of Queretaro, Nuevo León and 
Mexico D.F. and many municipal elections (Rodriguez, 1999). At the 
same gradual pace a plural political composition of the Congress and  
municipal governments was created. For the first time in 60 years the 
political map changed and the PRI regime did not look as hegemonic as it 
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had in the past, and in 2000, for first time in 70 years, a presidential 
candidate from a political party other than the PRI was elected.  
 
The new president, Vicente Fox, was nominated by PAN, a right-wing 
party linked to religious conservatives and big national corporations. In 
his political campaign the candidate promised to eliminate the corrupt 
PRI system and eliminate clientelism, compadrazgo and nepotism from 
public administration. The development discourse of PRI’s detractors, 
including PAN, was little different from that currently prevailing in other 
developing countries. Its main argument rests on the idea that the poor 
have historically been the victims of governments’ political manoeuvres, 
which has exacerbated their vulnerability, so it is necessary to create and 
implement ‘politics-free’ development policies (Crespo, 1999; Medina, 
1994).  
 
One of the first of the new government’s changes to public policy was its 
rural development policy reform. In 2001 a new law was passed to 
address the historical problems of the rural sector from a new 
development perspective. The bill for the Ley de Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable (the Sustainable Rural Development Act, LDRS) was strongly 
supported by members of the Mexican Congress and the President, 
receiving 412 out of 500 votes in favour in Chamber of Deputies and 102 
out of 128 in the Senate. In December 2001 the LDRS was enacted, and 
since then has ruled public policy on the rural sector. 
 
Representatives of both the ruling party and the opposition had only 
compliments for the new law and saw it as a milestone in Mexico’s rural 
development. A Congress technical commission analysed the bill in 2001 
and its chairman, Silvano Aureoles, found that it left no room for the 
allocation of public resources to groups linked to political interests; in 
his words, ‘It is a great base to satisfy de demands of the rural sector 
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without clientelism, corporatism or political party interests’ (Teherán 
and Lelo, 2001). The Secretary of SAGARPA asserted that the creation of 
this law represented a historic moment for the Mexican rural sector as it 
provides a ‘vital instrument for the full development of the sector’ 
(Teherán and Lelo, 2001). 
 
These compliments rest on the ‘novel’ policy principles on which its 
design is based. First, the LDRS explicitly recognises that rural-sector 
livelihoods go beyond agriculture and livestock and therefore non-
agricultural activities as well as other types of assets that form part of 
rural life must be considered central in the definition of rural 
development. Second, it states that development must be seen from a 
territorial perspective; that is, problems must be defined in terms of 
causes and effects that are common in particular regions and not just in 
terms of geographical or political boundaries. Third, the development of 
the rural sector, whether applied to productive processes or to rural 
livelihoods, must be attached to the notion of sustainability. Finally, 
another key aspect that defines the LDRS is its implementation strategy, 
which is based on decentralisation and democratic governance and 
includes the participation of citizens in the planning and allocation of 
public resources as well as the convergence of federal, state and 
municipal governments to carry out rural development programmes and 
actions across the country. 
 
The following section presents the key aspects of the design of the LDRS, 
which account for its theoretical foundations and explain its goals and 
the assumptions behind the policy design, its implementation strategy 
and the actors involved in its implementation. 
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2.3.1 Features of the LDRS 
Objectives   
The LDRS is shaped by several development objectives and courses of 
action. Its general objective is:  
 
... [to] steadily and sustainably improve the life conditions of the population 
in the rural sector by fostering productive activities and social development 
activities in the diverse regions of the rural sector, promoting the optimal 
use, conservation and improvement of natural resources and addressing 
the diversification of productive activities in the sector, including non-
agricultural activities; [and to] improve the productivity, profitability, 
competitiveness, income and employment of the rural population.. (LDRS, 
2001: Article 4) 
 
The specific objectives of the LDRS are stated as actions by the Mexican 
state to: 
 
…foster public policies, actions and programmes in the rural sector as 
priorities for the development of the country, with the following objectives: 
1. Promote the social and economic welfare of producers, their 
communities, workers of rural sector and agents of rural society in general 
through the diversification and generation of jobs, including non-
agricultural jobs, in the rural sector, as well as higher incomes; 2) Eliminate 
the disparities in regional development by paying particular attention to 
backward regions with integral action by the State to boost their 
transformation and productive and economic reconversion [to feasible 
crops or cattle], using a sustainable and productive rural development 
approach; 3) Contribute to the food security and sovereignty of the nation’s 
food production by boosting agricultural production in the country; 4) 
Foster the conservation of biodiversity and improvement of the quality of 
natural resources through their sustainable use; and 5) Respect all the 
various economic, environmental, social and cultural functions of all the 
different manifestations of national agriculture. (LDRS, 2001: Article 5) 
 
  
These objectives match several of the development objectives set by 
international development agencies such as the World Bank. For 
example, the World Bank’s development agenda (see 
www.worldbank.org) includes agricultural education and training, 
extension, research, risk management and agricultural trade; 
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biodiversity, climate change, community-based rural development, 
fisheries and aquaculture, forests and forestry, gender and rural 
development, land policy and administration, land resource 
management, livestock and animal resources, rural finance, rural 
livelihoods, rural transport, rural water supply and sanitation, and water 
resource management. Along the same lines, the US and the UK 
governments’ international development agencies, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department for 
International Development (DFID), state similar policy aims and 
instruments based on the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
This trend in development thinking is in the LDRS clearer where it 
addresses specific topics. Article 7 states:  
 
The State must foster the capitalization of the sector through infrastructure 
projects and productive projects as well as cash transfers to producers, 
allowing them to make the necessary investments to increase the efficacy of 
their productive units, improve their income and strengthen competitiveness.  
 
Thus according to the LDRS these investments in productive 
infrastructure should: 
 
 improve economic efficiency; 
 improve the position of producers commercialising their products; 
 increase, diversify and reconvert production to satisfy domestic 
demand, strengthen and expand the national market and improve 
terms of economic exchange with external markets; 
 increase productive capacity to strengthen the peasant economy, 
self-sufficiency and the development of regional markets to help 
the rural population access food and food market exchange; 
 foster sustainable use of productive natural resources to increase 
and diversify sources of employment and income; 
 improve the quantity and quality of services available to the rural 
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population. 
 
In the same direction, according to the LDRS the orientation of the 
development policy instruments for sustainable rural development must 
be linked to the following topics: 
 
 research and technology transfer; 
 training and technical assistance; 
 sustainable and productive reconversion; 
 capitalisation, income compensation and cash transfers; 
 water management infrastructure, electrification and rural roads; 
 rural enterprises: formation, consolidation and productivity 
improvement; 
 plant health; 
 the certification of agricultural products; 
 commercialisation; 
 financial systems for rural development; 
 risk management; 
 information systems of economic and productive indicators; 
 attention to social welfare and marginal zones;  
 sustainable rural production; 
 food security and sovereignty. 
 
At this point it is possible to see the basic aims of the LDRS and the 
rationale behind them. The general objectives give the impression that 
the main aim is to improve the quality of rural life, but the specific 
objectives and topics make it clear that it goes beyond this to target not 
just the vulnerable rural population but also agribusiness. At some 
points it looks like a combination of social objectives for the rural poor 
with productive objectives for agribusiness.  
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The target population is defined in the LDRS as ‘...ejidos [productive units 
based on common land], communities and national, regional, district, 
municipal or community organisations or associations of producers in 
the rural sector [...] and in general all persons, whether individually or as 
group, who are mainly engaged in activities in the rural sector’ (LDRS, 
2001: Article 2). This definition covers anyone living in a rural area or 
performing a productive activity in the rural sector, who can apply to 
receive public resources from rural development programmes ruled by 
this law. Hence while the LDRS is not as focused on the rural poor as the 
discourses used in its creation, it also rules public resources to 
agribusiness.  
 
This distinction is accentuated in parts of the LDRS where there is a 
mixture of development approaches linked to social justice versus 
economic-efficiency arguments. For example, principles linked to social 
justice are expressed in the following terms: [Actions under the LDRS] 
‘must be carried out according to criteria of social equity and gender 
equity, inclusion, productivity and sustainability, and can involve the 
participation of social and private sectors’ (LDRS, 2001: Article 6); all 
governmental action must be oriented to ‘regions and zones with the 
highest levels of social and economic backwardness [...] fostering links 
between rural and urban spaces’ (LDRS, 2001: Article 8); ‘Programmes 
and governmental action for sustainable rural development executed by 
the federal government and in agreement with other levels of 
government [...] must specify and recognize the socio-economic and 
cultural heterogeneity of the subjects of this Law [...] it must consider the 
availability and quality of natural resources as an aspect of social, 
economic, cultural and environmental nature.’ (LDRS, 2001: Article 9). 
Understanding the dichotomy between the social and economic spheres 
of development is important in the development of the case study in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
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The LDRS implementation strategy: from decentralisation to community 
participation 
The previous section described the LDRS’s aims and target population. 
This section presents the implementation strategy set out in its policy 
model, which is based on a democratic governance implementation 
model resting on two notions of development: decentralisation and 
community participation. Thus the implementation model enforces the 
idea of taking the monopoly out from federal government of planning 
and implementation of federal rural development programmes.  
 
The LDRS creates alternative decision-making spaces to the formal ones 
that have prevailed in the past for the allocation of public resources for 
rural development. These alternative spaces rest on the roles of civil 
society actors, peasants, producers’ organisations and some private 
agents in tripartite local councils called Sustainable Rural Development 
Councils. This is a community-driven approach that empowers society to 
decide on the allocation of public resources for rural development. On 
the other hand, it aims to establish intergovernmental and interagency 
relations under the notion of concurrent planning and collective effort, 
which decentralises the planning, the definition of priorities in different 
regions and the execution of federal programmes. 
 
The decentralisation strategy for implementing the LDRS 
As explained earlier, Mexico has had a federal political system since 
1917; however, in practice political power has been centralised in the 
figure of the President of the Republic (Carpizo, 2002:167). According to 
Victoria Rodriguez (1999: 35), the Mexican decentralisation process 
would respond to a mixture of administrative and political reasons. 
From 1982 to 1988 the political aspect of decentralisation was evident in 
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one of the most popular declarations of the president of the time: 
‘Decentralising is democratising, and democratising is decentralising’. 
With this declaration he was responding to the opposition and civil 
society’s pressure for political equity. In 1994, President Zedillo called 
for renewed federalism to ‘support a healthy economy, a tidy democracy 
and transparent justice’ (ibid).  
 
All of these efforts to foster administrative and political decentralisation 
at the national level was seen by scholars such as Rodriguez (1999), 
Crespo (1999) and Bailey (1994) as the PRI regime’s attempt to maintain 
its power base and recover its credibility; in other words, to recover its 
political legitimacy. However, the main arguments for decentralisation in 
official discourse rested on technical arguments addressing 
governmental efficiency and efficacy criteria.  
 
The decentralisation of rural development programmes was seen as a 
source of strength for federalism in Mexico. In several official documents 
and discourses (see Ruiz Garcia, 2006) the technical justification for 
decentralising the operation of federal programmes was based on four 
assumptions: 1) the use of existing sub-national government 
administrative structures in programme implementation would reduce 
red tape at the national level; 2) sub-national governments would feel 
compelled to professionalise their administrative structures, i.e. build 
their capacity, in order to be able to implement programmes; 3) sub-
national governments know their own local problems best, so it would 
be a more effective allocation of programme resources; and 4) the 
proximity of sub-national governments to the population would create 
more effective accountability for bureaucratic decisions. All of these 
assumptions clearly reflect the various theoretical arguments of the 
proponents of decentralisation (see Bardhan, 2002; Cheema and 
Rondinelli, 1983; Faguet, 2004; Gershberg, 1998; Rondinelli, Nellis, and 
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Cheema, 1983). 
 
The effort to base the LDRS on a decentralised mode of operation is 
expressed in article 23 of the LDRS, which states that ‘the federalism and 
decentralisation of public management will be the main criteria in 
implementing programmes intended to foster sustainable rural 
development’ (LDRS, 2001: 11). The LDRS further states that federal, 
state and municipal governments must sign formal agreements defining 
the responsibility at each level of government for carrying out actions to 
implement federal programmes, i.e. programmes that are funded from 
federal government resources.  
 
To decentralise the management of rural development programmes, the 
LDRS established a State Council for Sustainable Rural Development in 
each state. Each council is composed of representatives of the federal 
and state secretaries and departments related to the management of 
rural development, and of representatives of civil organisations that 
represent the interests of the rural population. It is recommended that 
the governor of each state chairs his or her own council. The way in 
which these state councils are defined in the LDRS presents them as 
spaces for planning rural development from the bottom up.  
 
Theoretically, state councils should prioritise the investment of public 
resources according to the problems faced in each region and 
incorporate them all in the Programa Especial Concurrente – 
(Concurrent Special Programme, PEC), which is intended to be the lead 
budgetary document used by federal government to organise the budget 
for rural development according to the technical profile of each 
secretariat of state. The Concurrent Special Programme seeks to avoid 
duplication or contrapositioning between federal programmes 
addressing rural development issues. Once the Concurrent Special 
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Programme is approved by the Mexican Congress it is the turn of the 
federal, state and municipal governments to participate in the 
implementation of the decentralised federal programmes, with 
SAGARPA coordinating all rural development.  
 
In the Mexican context, the basic idea of providing federal resources to 
sub-national governments and giving them the power to decide on their 
allocation was in itself an important step towards reducing the country’s 
historical dependency on central government and fostering a truly 
federalised state. Behind this notion of decentralisation is the aim of 
reducing the influence of clientelism and compadrazgo in the allocation 
of public resources. However, in practice decentralisation as a policy 
model has produced diverse results in Mexico, some contradicting 
theoretical assumptions. The case study presented in Chapter 5 is based 
on SAGARPA’s Programa para la Adquicisión de Activos Productivos 
(Programme for the Acquisition of Productive Assets, PAAP) and 
illustrates how the decentralisation of federal rural development 
programmes was implemented and the translation of the notion of 
decentralisation into practice by the network of bureaucratic actors 
involved in implementing this rural development programme.  
 
Community participation and community-driven development in 
the LDRS 
Just as decentralisation can be seen as one pillar of the LDRS 
implementation strategy, community participation is the other. Both are 
closely related, as purists of decentralisation would consider community 
participation the last link in the decentralisation of decision-making 
processes. However for analytical purposes, in this work the notion of 
decentralisation is associated with the delegation of decisions on the 
allocation of public resources from federal government to state and 
municipal governments and with the notion of vertical coordination at 
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different levels of government to produce collective action.  
 
On the other hand, the notion of community participation is constrained 
to the involvement of civil society in some actions that in the past were 
exclusively the responsibility of governmental operational structures. As 
mentioned, the LDRS incorporates Sustainable Rural Development 
Councils as a mechanism by which to decentralise the planning of rural 
development programmes in Mexico. However, these councils were also 
conceived as spaces for the convergence of different levels of 
government and civil society. According to article 24 of the LDRS, 
Sustainable Rural Development Councils ‘are participation spaces for 
producers and other agents of rural society to define regional priorities, 
plan and distribute the resources that federal government, state 
governments and municipal governments provide for productive 
investment and for sustainable rural development in general…’ (LDRS, 
2001: 12).  
 
The strategy of introducing the participation of civil society in public 
decisions was conceptualised by Sustainable Rural Development 
Councils embedded at four administrative levels at which bureaucratic 
structures operate the rural development programmes: the council at 
national level; 32 councils at state level; and other potential councils at 
municipal and district or regional level, according to the specific needs 
or circumstances. The LDRS states that Sustainable Rural Development 
councils must incorporate members of civil society, who may be 
representatives of civil organisations pursuing social or economic aims 
in the rural sector. This measure also sought to reduce the potential for 
clientelism and compadrazgo to influence the allocation of public 
resources. Examples of organisations that are considered suitable to take 
part in the councils are a national tomato producers’ association; a local 
women’s group fighting for gender equity; a cooperative managing local 
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fisheries; a regional maize producers’ association; an association of 
young farmers, and so on. These representatives take part, according to 
their size and the origin of their group or association, in Sustainable 
Rural Development Councils at national, regional, district or municipal 
level. 
 
 
Theoretically, the councils should work like any democratic body. One 
member, the mayor, chairs the council; a co-chairperson performs as 
council secretary and the rest of the members comprise government 
representatives at different levels and civil society representatives. All 
council members have the same right to vote on propositions posed in 
the council. As it was conceptualised, this mode of operation aims to 
empower representatives of civil society to directly, and in a formal 
space, influence public decisions on the allocation of governmental 
resources for rural development. The case developed in Chapter 6 
describes how the notion of community participation has been 
interpreted by implementers to deliver rural development. 
 
In operational terms, the main distinction between decentralisation and 
community participation in the LDRS is that the former addresses 
coordinated action at different levels of government to implement 
federal rural development programmes, while the latter was intended as 
a space in which to gather opinions from civil society about the priorities 
and types of rural development projects to be addressed by federal 
programmes based on the LDRS. 
 
Conclusion  
The historical review presented in the first part of this chapter has 
addressed the influence of the Mexican Revolution on the development 
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of rural development policy in Mexico. The Revolution took place in 
1910-1920 and at its end the peasantry were given a very important 
place in Mexico’s political outlook. Post-revolutionary governments 
included the peasantry in all official discourses, acknowledging that they 
are the most vulnerable population as a result of all the social injustices 
they have historically faced, and creating an image of a country that is 
indebted to this social sector. However, the immediate post-
revolutionary government did not reward the peasantry. There was no 
change in property rights to agricultural land, which was the peasants’ 
main demand.  
 
Changes to land rights took place 20 years after the Mexican Revolution 
when the federal government decided to base the national economic 
development model on industrialisation rather than, as previously, 
agriculture. So the change in land rights was not a measure to right the 
historical backwardness of the peasantry but appears to have been a 
populist move by the federal government to strengthen the ideological 
discourse about the relevance of the rural population. Moreover, the 
rural development policies of the 1920s to 1990s were strongly oriented 
towards perpetuating poverty in the rural sector rather than improving 
the quality of rural life. Peasants organised themselves into unions to 
seek public resources in order that social peace might be maintained; 
this was the origin of the Confederación Nacional Campesina, a national 
peasants’ organisation that in the 1960s and 1970s was a very strong 
political arm of the PRI government. The development of the Mexican 
political system around the figure of the peasantry created political-
electoral clientelism between the latter and the federal government. 
Peasants’ organisations exchanged their support for the regime for the 
allocation of public resources to their organisations in the form of rural 
development programmes. 
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Thus the electoral-political clientelism created during the PRI regime 
was consolidated into a national institution that set the rules for political 
interaction between the peasantry as a social sector and the federal 
government. Another important institution presented in this chapter is 
the compadrazgo, which in the political arena refers to a strong 
relationship between two individuals, exploiting their political position 
to reproduce and extend their political or economic power. The lack of 
other forms of social capital in Mexico makes the compadrazgo a 
valuable source to access to trustworthy relations. However, in the 
political arena these relations of reciprocity and trust are commonly 
used to carry out corrupt or unethical practices in the public sector, 
giving compadrazgo a negative connotation linked to corruption.  
 
The chapter has discussed how in the PRI’s implementation of rural 
development programmes, compadrazgo led to the allocation of public 
resources based on non-technical decisions under programmes such as 
Alianza para el Campo (the Farming Alliance), in which resources were 
allocated to many productive units that did not need government 
subsidy to be productive or profitable, This part of the chapter explains 
how the Mexican Revolution shaped the development discourse of 
Mexico’s rural development policy and the two important institutions 
that influence the actors’ decisions in the rural development arena. As I 
will show, these institutions are not a deterministic structure but a very 
influential set of rules that give actors involved in the implementation 
arena room to play them strategically to achieve their aims, which 
sometimes contradict those set by the policy-makers. 
 
In 2000, after the PRI regime lost the federal presidential elections for 
first time in 70 years, the new federal government created a national law 
to address the historical problems of the rural sector. The new law, the 
Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (Sustainable Rural Development Act, 
Chapter 2. Foundations of the Mexican Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable:  
a historical review of the political and institutional setting in rural Mexico 
 
 
 
 56 
LDRS), was enacted with the full support of the Mexican Congress. Many 
specialists in the matter saw the new law as a milestone in the rural 
development of Mexico due to the ‘novel’ policy principles on which its 
design is based. The LDRS explicitly recognises that rural livelihoods 
transcend agricultural and livestock activities and so non-agricultural 
activities must also be included in the definition of rural development. 
Another key aspect that defines the new law is its implementation 
strategy, which is based on decentralisation and community 
participation, including citizens in planning and the allocation of public 
resources and the concurrence of federal, state and municipal 
governments in carrying out rural development programmes and action 
across the country.  
 
The second part of the chapter has described the development paradigm 
behind the LDRS. It shows how the design of Mexico’s new rural 
development policy rests on dominant development approaches and 
appears to address historical problems such as clientelism and 
compadrazgo in its implementation strategy. All the key features of the 
LDRS described in this chapter create a clear idea of what the policy-
makers were seeking with its enactment. However, development 
practice can take a different course to that expected by policy-makers, as 
the case study presented in Chapters 5 and 6 shows. 
 
The third part of this chapter has provided a general view of the design 
of the LDRS. The law implicitly acknowledges the existence of such 
undesirable practices as clientelism and compadrazgo and therefore 
seeks to improve the efficiency of federal programmes for rural 
development through a decentralised mode of operation and the 
incorporation of community participation. A big question answered by 
the case study is whether a country that is so close to a centralised mode 
of operation can understand the technical rationale of the decentralised 
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mode of operation, and how the implementation is done in the practice. 
This, and the observed consequences of the implementation of the new 
rural development approach, is explored in the case study developed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 3. Bureaucracies and Development 
 
Introduction 
In 1985, the main topic of a United Nations international conference, 
held in Indonesia, was development organisations. The purpose of the 
conference was to make clear the fact that development organisations 
are part and parcel of development problems and not just neutral actors 
in the development arena (van Ufford, 1988: 7). The main aim of the 
conference was to stop the use of mechanical approaches to planning 
development, as there is strong empirical evidence that development 
policy is constructed and reconstructed by development organisations. 
 
Most development studies research has focused on the nature and 
perspectives of development, with less attention paid to the 
implementation of development plans. Few studies have investigated 
how the actors involved in the implementation process produce 
development practice (Bebbington et al., 2007; Heeks and Stanforth, 
2011). This research is concerned with the role of development 
bureaucracies in the development arena, and this chapter presents a 
review of theoretical approaches that can be useful in understanding 
how development bureaucracies produce development practice. 
 
The first section explores theoretical debate in the fields of the 
anthropology and sociology of development about how implementers of 
development policy produce development practice in the context of a 
planned intervention. The second section reviews the idea of the ‘anti-
politics machine’ in development practice. Emphasis is placed on 
development bureaucracies’ use of political discourses and resources in 
the implementation of development policy. The last section presents a 
review of the traditional approaches to theories of bureaucracy used in 
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public administration and political science. This latter section provides 
an interdisciplinary perspective that brings together the fields of 
development studies and organisation theories and could enrich the 
approaches used in the field of development studies, reviewed in the 
previous sections, to understanding development bureaucracies. 
 
The theoretical review presented in this chapter investigates past and 
current developments relevant to this research. In general, it focuses on 
how scholars in different fields account for unexpected outcomes of 
development policy, and analyses the influence of the implementers. All 
the works reviewed reveal not only what factors might influence policy 
outcomes but also the relevance of understanding how different actors 
make implementation decisions in the context of planned interventions 
aiming to reach development objectives. Those works reinforce 
implicitly the argument of this thesis: understanding the rationale 
behind bureaucratic actors’ decisions is fundamental to explain 
development outcomes. 
 
3.1 Unexpected outcomes of planned interventions: the need to 
focus on development bureaucracies 
The term development was introduced by Harry S. Truman in 1949 and 
has been subject to several interpretations.2 Gustavo Esteva (1992) 
argues that the way Truman employed the term created the dichotomy 
of the developed world versus the underdeveloped world. Suddenly, two 
thirds of the world’s population was marked as underdeveloped (Esteva, 
1992: 6). Independently of the particularities that shape the definition of 
development in different governmental or academic spheres, the basic 
notion addresses the need to reduce the gap between these two ‘worlds’.  
                                                     
2 Harry S. Truman stated in a speech that the ‘old imperialism,’ understood as exploitation for foreign 
profit, was no longer a US aim. Instead, he envisaged a program of development based on ideas of 
democratic fair dealing, where the US could share the benefits of their scientific advantages and industrial 
progress for the improvement and growth of ‘undeveloped areas’ (Truman, 1967). 
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Truman’s discourse represented a trigger for a new global race to 
transform ‘undeveloped’ countries into ‘developed’ ones. In the following 
years ten years of Truman’s discourse several organisations devoted to 
development were created and internal administrative units of 
governments and international organisations were restructured for the 
same purpose. In 1961 the US created the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID); in 1963 the United Nations created the United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD); and the 
World Bank, after facilitating post-war reconstruction, underwent a 
radical internal restructuring, replacing its homogeneous staff of 
engineers and financial analysts with a multidisciplinary staff including 
economists, public policy and sector experts and social scientists, with 
the sole aim of fostering development. 
 
At the beginning the ‘gap’ between the developed and undeveloped 
world was posed in economic terms; later a social dimension was 
integrated, and recently the environmental dimension has been included 
in the international development agenda.3 However, after 50 years of 
development policy, there is still a gap. Huge human and financial 
resources have been deployed to achieve development goals. The results 
of most policies fall short of their original goals, and so adjustment of 
their design or the amount of financial resources has become common 
practice in the international development arena. 
 
The traditional approach of governments and international 
organisations to reducing the gap between the developed and 
undeveloped world has been based on the idea of planned interventions, 
that is, a set of actions that may change undesirable trends in economic, 
social or environmental social indicators. Planned interventions rest on 
                                                     
3 The extent of development goals nowadays can clearly be seen in Millennium Development Goals set by 
the United Nations. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 
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the basic assumption that social change can be induced, a theory of 
change (see Anderson, 2005). Policy-making processes are usually 
attached to the instrumental analyses (e.g. technical, political, economic, 
financial, etc) of several potential courses of action to solve a public 
problem. These courses of action are commonly structured or integrated 
in a logical way means to an end into governmental programmes to 
achieve specific development goals; together such courses of action 
compose a public policy. 
 
Most research in the field of development studies focuses on the nature 
and perspectives of development and little attention has been paid to the 
process by which implementers produce development outcomes 
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Heeks and Stanforth, 2011). Heeks and 
Stanforth (2011: 2) illustrate this trend by reviewing research published 
in seven leading development studies journals from 2000 to 2010.4 Their 
review identifies just five works investigating the specific practice of 
development project implementation and management 
 
A stream of development anthropologists and sociologists have: 
 
…engaged with development instrumentally. They have been enrolled as 
‘applied’ researchers, consultants, managers, or bureaucrats […] Such 
anthropologists have often been compelled to adopt the instrumental 
‘means-end’ rationality that characterises these policy worlds, paying their 
way with knowledge products that are normative/prescriptive, predictive, 
and usable in enhancing development effectiveness., (Lewis and Mosse, 
2006: 3) 
 
As counterpart to this, there is a stream of development anthropologists 
who: 
…refuse to frame the relationship between development intentions and 
outcomes, policy and practice in simple instrumental terms and instead pay 
equal attention to the social processes of policy and the informal 
                                                     
4 Heeks and Stanforth review World Development; Journal of Development Studies; Development and 
Change; Development Policy Review; European Journal of Development Research; Studies in Comparative 
International Development  and Third World Quarterly. 
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relationships and real-life situations of development workers.. (Lewis and 
Mosse, 2006: 3) 
 
Scholars of the latter are represented by Norman Long, (1989; 2001), 
James Law (1997), Bruno Latour (1999; 2005), David Mosse (2004; 
2005), Oliver de Sardan (2005) and David Lewis (2006) among many 
others.  
 
Norman Long (2001) argues that following several disappointments 
associated with the poor outcomes of various development policies it is 
necessary to demythologise planned interventions. This means accepting 
that policy practice can differ greatly from the presupposed practices of 
the policy model.  A development policy model is expressed through the 
policy-making and implementation processes of development policy, 
programmes and projects. The traditional view of the policy model is 
that of a linear process, a step-by-step progression from policy 
formulation to implementation to outcomes followed by an ex post facto 
evaluation to establish how far the original objectives have been 
achieved (Long, 2001: 31). It is under this notion that planned 
development has its roots in testing theoretical models through planned 
interventions.  
 
Long’s central research problem is understanding the process by which 
interventions enter the lifeworlds of the individuals and groups affected 
and contribute to the resources and constraints of the social strategies 
they develop.  
 
In this way so-called external factors become ‘internalized’ and come to 
mean different things to different interest groups or to different individual 
actors involved, whether they be implementers, clients or bystanders. 
 
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the concept of 
intervention needs deconstructing so that we recognize it for what it 
fundamentally is, namely, an ongoing socially constructed and negotiated 
process, not simply the execution of an already-specified plan of action with 
expected outcomes. (Long, 2001: 31) 
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To understand the outcomes of development policy one must accept that 
planned development does not rest only on ideas and paradigms of 
development but also on the sphere of implementation, in which a 
network of actors interact to carry out the actions put forward in the 
policy design. Planned interventions are highly dependent on the actors 
involved, whether they formulate policy instruments or carry out 
specific actions. This research focuses on bureaucracies as key actors in 
the arena of development policy. 
 
Why bureaucracies? Bureaucracies are par excellence the public policy 
implementation body; they have the legitimacy and authority to carry 
out the will of the elective authorities. Whether federal, state or local, the 
main responsibility of bureaucracies is to directly or indirectly carry out 
the will of elected officials. It is direct when they use existing or newly-
created infrastructure to produce goods and services that require 
implementation of a policy, and indirect when their role is to coordinate 
and distribute resources among private or social actors in the 
implementation network. Whatever role it plays, bureaucracy is a key 
actor in the implementation of planned interventions. 
 
The ambiguity in the meaning of the term development combined with 
the complexity of bureaucratic organisations creates a particular 
research arena in the field of development studies. In 1985 the main 
topic of a United Nations international conference held in Indonesia was 
development organisations. The purpose of the conference was to point 
out that development organisations are not just neutral actors in the 
development arena but themselves contribute to development problems 
(van Ufford, 1988: 7). The main call at the conference was for 
development organisations to stop using mechanical approaches to 
planning development, as there is strong empirical evidence that these 
both construct and reconstruct development policy.  
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Philip Q. van Ufford (1988:20) points out that the fast succession of 
development fashions and priorities in comparison to the slow 
developmental change can only be understood by understanding the 
changing arenas in which these policies are made. He calls for a study of 
the links between definitions of development and policy design – the 
theoretical and policy models of development – and the policy process, 
particularly in relation to bureaucratic organisations.  
 
James Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, 
Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (1994) is one of the 
seminal works to present an original analysis of the key role of 
development bureaucracies in the implementation of development 
policy. As explained in the following section, Ferguson use the term the 
anti-politics machine to show the strategic use that development 
bureaucracies make of the apparently politics-free standpoint of 
development discourses, paradoxically to reinforce their political 
position in the decision-making arena in Lesotho.  
 
David Lewis and David Mosse’s Development Brokers and Translators: 
The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies (2006) presents a set of studies that 
stress the relevance of aid organisations and agencies in producing 
development outcomes. The emphasis is on how development practice is 
constructed as a consequence of the different rationales, nature, 
experience and knowledge of the actors involved in implementing 
development policy. The authors’ explanations about how some policies 
take a path different to that which was planned offer a novel and fresh 
approach to how development policy can be analysed from the actors’ 
perspective. 
 
These alternative approaches to studying development practice offer 
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interesting analytical frameworks which take development research to a 
different level to understand development practice from different angles. 
Most such attempts are embedded in the tradition of anthropological 
studies and there is room to incorporate other social disciplines in this 
research approach that might enrich the case study built in this research 
as well as combining smoothly with the knowledge fields of development 
and bureaucracies. 
 
In the field of Mexican rural studies, there is vast literature about the 
development of the rural sector from the economic and political 
perspective. There is plenty of literature on the peasantry and its 
connection with Mexican Revolution, as seen in Chapter 2. Mexican rural 
development policy has been widely studied, mainly from an economic 
perspective. However, the role that bureaucratic structures have played 
influencing development outcomes is not an issue that has been explored 
with the same attention. In this sense, there are few representative 
works that have linked the influence of bureaucratic structures on 
development outcomes from a policy analysis perspective. The work of 
Jonathan Fox (1993; 1994) has provided important insights about the 
bargaining relations between rural development agencies and grassroots 
indigenous movements in Mexico. He has widely explored the clientelism 
as a factor that hinders the effectiveness of rural development and 
proposes the instauration of state-society relations in order to create a 
real citizenship as in developed democracies.  The focus of Fox has been 
put on understanding Mexico’s political system and historic institutions 
that are part of the setting in which development policies are 
implemented. 
 
Another key work that accounts for the links between bureaucratic 
actors and development practice in Mexico is the one developed by 
Norman Long (2001) which uses the case of the irrigation organisation 
in rural Mexico to illustrate how various actors or parties organise 
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themselves around the problems of water management and distribution 
in the agriculture sector. His analysis goes beyond the physical and 
technical properties of the different systems of irrigation to consider 
how different interests, often in conflict, attempt to control water 
distribution or to secure access to it and to other necessary inputs for 
irrigated agriculture (Long, 2001: 26). Long’s work accounts for the 
encounters between the different groups and individuals involved in the 
processes this particular planned intervention in which the study of 
peasant-based development initiatives and the ways in which local 
actors –including bureaucratic ones – attempt to create room for 
manoeuvre in pursuit of their own ‘projects’ –interests. Although the 
main objective of Long (2001) is to present an analytical approach, the 
illustrations reveal some of the drivers of development bureaucracies to 
produce development practice. 
 
Applying the actor-oriented research approach proposed by of Norman 
Long (2001), there are the works of Edwin Rap, Phillipus Wester and Luz 
Nereida Pérez-Prado (2004) and Edwin Rap (2006) in which is analysed 
the Mexican policy of Irrigation Management Transfer. Their analysis 
focuses on contrasting the process of policy-making that generated the 
policy model or irrigation management and development practice. In 
doing so, the researchers found out the high influence of the local 
political system to produce development practice as well as the 
identification of bureaucratic actors in the interpretation of policy 
directives. Edwin Rap (2006) main conclusion is that the success of a 
policy model rest on the cultural and ideological understanding of the 
policy network rather than on straightforward management 
performance improvements. This particular work of Rap (2006) is one of 
the few that explicitly gives special attention to the relation of 
development bureaucracies and development practice 
 
As mentioned before, the aim of the present work is to show how 
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development practice in produced by bureaucratic actors in the context 
of the implementation process of Mexico’s Ley de Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable. The main difference with the works of Fox (1993; 1994; 
1996), Long (2001); Rap, Wester and Pérez-Prado (2004) and Rap 
(2006) is the focus on development bureaucracy from the beginning and 
the exhaustive analysis of different drivers that shape bureaucratic 
decisions at different levels to influence development outcomes.  
 
The following two sections review two theoretical frameworks that 
represent interesting conceptual bodies to study development 
bureaucracies. First, the idea of an anti-politics machine in the context of 
the role of development bureaucracies in implementing of development 
policy is explored. As mentioned, this idea was originally applied to 
development studies by James Ferguson (1994), and it has recently been 
enriched by Vasudha Chhotray (2011) with strong conceptual political 
science foundations. Second, a review of the disciplines of organisational 
studies and public policy in relation to theories of bureaucracies is 
presented. The section below explores the main scholarly streams that, 
regardless of the type of policy, provide an explicative framework for 
why bureaucratic organisations behave in specific ways. 
 
3.2 The idea of the anti-politics machine 
James Ferguson (1994) used the term the anti-politics machine to 
describe the complex institutional arrangement that he discovered in his 
analysis of the policy process behind a large-scale development project 
in Lesotho's Thaba-Tseka district in 1975-1984. The policy model for the 
project had set, as expected outcomes, improving the economy of low-
income farmers in the district through commercial agriculture and 
eventually exporting their produce. The intermediate goals of the 
planned intervention were to improve crop and livestock-keeping 
productivity, improve the commercial infrastructure and 
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decentralisation of the projects to include community participation in 
some project decisions.   
 
In his analysis of Lesotho’s donor-driven development project Ferguson 
(ibid) observes that even when the project design was based on rational 
models and technical discourses of development, such politics-free 
discourse was used strategically by implementers to strengthen their 
own bureaucratic power:  
  
One striking feature of the ‘development’ discourse on Lesotho is the way in 
which ‘development’ agencies present the country’s economy and society 
as lying within the control of a neutral, unitary and effective national 
government, and almost perfectly responsive to the blueprints of planners. 
The state is seen as impartial instrument for implementing plans and the 
government as machine for providing social services and engineering 
growth […] The state is taken to have no interests except ‘development’: 
where ‘bureaucracy’ is seen as a problem, it is not a political matter, but the 
unfortunate result of poor organisation or lack of training. (Ferguson, 1994: 
178) 
 
This quote illustrates the idealistic image that development discourses 
have created around the agencies, public and private, responsible for the 
implementation of development policy. Ferguson shows that politics 
influences all the decisions of development agencies, observing that 
development projects and the activities to implement them represent a 
very important political instrument by which governmental actors 
reproduce their bureaucratic power.  
 
Ferguson describes how the project outcomes in Lesotho were not as 
expected in the policy design. He points out: 
 
[The project] did not transform crop farming or livestock keeping, but it did 
build a road to link Thaba-Tseka more strongly with the capital; it did not 
bring about ‘decentralisation’ or ‘popular participation,’ but it was 
instrumental in establishing a new district administration and giving the 
Government of Lesotho a much stronger presence than it had ever had 
before. The construction of the road and the ‘administrative center’ may 
have a little effect on agricultural production, but they were powerful 
effects in themselves. (Ferguson, 1994: 252) 
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That is to say the policy did not produce the expected outcomes but the 
unexpected outcomes performed an important function in reinforcing 
and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power. Ferguson 
expresses this idea in the following terms: 
 
The ‘development” apparatus in Lesotho is not a machine for eliminating 
poverty that is incidentally involved with the state bureaucracy; it is a 
machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state 
power, which incidentally takes ‘poverty’ as its point of entry – launching 
an intervention that may have no effect on the poverty but does in fact have 
other concrete effects. Such a result may be no part of the planners’ 
intentions – indeed, it almost never is – but resultant systems have an 
intelligibility of their own. (Ferguson, 1994: 255-256) 
 
Vasudha Chhotray (2011) uses the notion of Ferguson’ anti-politics 
machine to analyse the case of a watershed development project in India. 
Chhotray goes beyond the general notion of politics exposed by 
Ferguson: she found that actors manage different notions of politics in 
the implementation of a development policy, most of which were 
associated with negative connotations: 
 
Politics was being referred to as shorthand for all manner of distasteful but 
widely prevalent activities, ranging from corruption to factionalism to 
violent conflict […] It was also directed against the involvement of elected 
political representatives in watershed development. (Chhotray, 2011: xvi) 
 
For Chhotray, the negative connotation that politics has acquired in the 
development arena is the result of the influence that neoliberal thinking 
has had on international development agencies. Neoliberal economists 
have used their rational-instrumental approach to promote the idea that 
development policy must and can be determined and implemented using 
politics-neutral arguments. In this economists’ view there is no room for 
politics in the development policy process, where decisions should 
respond only to technical arguments that seek the maximisation of utility 
under the rules of the market (Chhotray, 2011:23). Chhotray points out 
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that the dissociation of politics from development is an artificial 
construction of neoliberal economists which has produced a 
stigmatisation of politics in the context of development policy, with the 
result that all decisions not based on rational choice models are seen as 
distasteful by the advocates of this neoliberal stance. Chhotray (2011) is 
against the reduction of politics to a disgraceful activity as it has a very 
important function in reducing conflict, achieving consensus and making 
governments accountable – a positive view of politics endorsed by the 
field of knowledge known as political science. 
 
Both Ferguson (1994) and Chhotray (2011) show how in Lesotho and 
India, respectively, the depolitisation of development discourse has 
strengthened the power of state bureaucratic apparatus to influence 
decisions about resources for development. Both make clear that politics 
is part and parcel of the development policy arena and must not be 
neglected when seeking to understand development practice. Both 
arrive at the general conclusion that the use of anti-politics arguments 
nullifies the institutional channels that politics provide to solve social 
conflict. That is to say, each country has its own political setting based on 
formal and informal institutions that shape the actors’ decisions and that 
give certainty to social actors about the outcomes that they can achieve if 
they make specific decisions (Ostrom, 2005; North, 1990). However, 
when a new policy design is based on assumptions that neglect or avoid 
existing channels aimed at reducing conflict, the policy output may be 
nullified by traditional practices associated with established institutions.  
 
Thus under the logic of anti-politics discourse there is no room for 
political negotiation in development policy. The decision-making, then, 
rests in the hands of the technocrats that deliver development as a new 
source of legitimisation for public decisions (Ferguson, 1992; Harriss, 
2002: 12; Chhotray; 2011). This is why Ferguson (1992) names this 
phenomenon the ‘anti-politics machine’.  In the context of this research, 
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Ferguson’s notion of anti-politics is relevant in explaining some practices 
of development bureaucracies in Mexico, as the author poses the 
problems associated to planned development in the realm of local 
politics.  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, in Mexico the notion of anti-politics has been 
used to try to influence public decisions. It was introduced into public 
discourse during the country’s democratic transition, which involved 
reforming the electoral system. The anti-politics discourse was used to 
criticise the development policy and practices of the Partido 
Revolucionario Institutional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party), the 
party that ruled Mexico from 1929 to 2000. Opposition parties and 
critics argued that since the Mexican revolution the PRI had created a 
political clientele amongst the citizens based on mutual exchanges at the 
time of elections. The mechanics of this political exchange system were 
characterised by the provision of governmental resources from specific 
programmes to specific social groups in exchange for votes for specific 
candidates in specific elections. In a broader sense, the public 
administration system under PRI could be called a political machine, as it 
was created to provide not only public services but also the basic rules to 
reduce social conflict and to make effective public decisions (Crespo, 
1999). 
 
The opposition to PRI promoted a politics-free view as the antithesis to 
PRI’s so-called populist policies. Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (the 
Sustainable Rural Development Act, henceforth LDRS) was enacted in 
2001 by a federal government ruled by a different political party to PRI, 
the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN, National Action Party). Attempting to 
separate politics from public action is idealistic from the perspective of 
some scholars (see Ferguson, 1994; Harriss, 2002; Chhotray, 2011), who 
note that in dominant development discourses, fundamental political 
issues are articulated or framed in an apolitical idiom, creating the idea 
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that development should be divorced of politics in which non-political 
interests of social actors should shape development policy (Chhotray, 
2011: 2).     
 
The case study presented in Chapters 5 and 6 shows how development 
practice is produced in the context of a new policy model of rural 
development in Mexico. It illustrates how in Mexico the development 
discourse of political neutrality has been used by several bureaucratic 
actors to create a public image that there is no political-electoral 
approach to the design and implementation process of rural 
development policy. However, in practice several bureaucratic actors 
have been driven by political interests, sometimes such interests closer 
to a negative and at other times to a positive political connotation.  
 
One of the key aspects of this analysis developed using the notion of the 
anti-politics machine is the focus on identifying all the factors influencing 
bureaucratic actors’ decisions, where it is expected that politics play an 
important role as Ferguson (1992) and Chhotray (2011) found in 
developing countries. In doing so, it pays particular attention to the 
institutional setting, both formal and informal, linked to the Mexican 
political system, that explains the current status of prevailing 
institutions in the development arena related to the implementation of 
the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable in Mexico. 
 
3.3 Theories of Bureaucracy: views of public administration and 
public policy disciplines 
When scholars of development studies began to turn their attention to 
organisational processes and focus on development bureaucracies it 
opened the way to explore what other disciplines can contribute to the 
field of development studies to understand the influence of bureaucratic 
actors on development. However, so far the inclusion in the field of 
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development studies of theoretical frameworks from knowledge areas 
beyond political science has been narrow. This section presents a 
conceptual review of what authors writing on disciplines linked to 
theories of organisations and public administration have said about how 
bureaucracies produce their outcomes, with the aim of finding whether 
these conceptual frameworks can provide plausible explanations for 
some of the practices observed in the case study developed in this 
research. 
 
The review focuses on how all these authors explain unexpected 
consequences in the implementation stage of public policy as result of 
specific practices by the implementers. Grindle and Thomas (1989) 
present a model for analysing the implementation sphere. Their 
approach is based on a critique of the use of linear approaches to analyse 
public policy. Thomas and Grindle (1990) point out that linear 
approaches ignore the implementation process because they take the 
policy design to be a critical choice, so the implementation is 
automatically considered a given. Hence they propose focusing on the 
social conflicts that a policy generates as well as the political and 
bureaucratic resources that policymakers need to mobilise to deal with 
the conflicts that arise in the implementation arena and to sustain the 
policy (ibid; Rap and Wester, 2013). Their main argument is that 
‘implementation is an interactive and ongoing process of decision-
making by policy elites and managers in response to actual or 
anticipated reactions to reformist initiatives’ (Thomas and Grindle, 
1990)).  
 
To some extent Thomas and Grindle’s view is along the same lines as 
those of Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1973) and Eugene 
Bardach (1977), who show that the implementation process is more 
important than is generally recognised if expected results are to be 
achieved. They demonstrate that even when a policy is designed using 
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rational and comprehensive technical methods, specific considerations 
in the implementation process are critical for the success of the policy, 
and call for more attention to the sphere of implementation.  
 
In this section all the works reviewed reveal how the scholars explain 
such conflicts at the core of bureaucratic organisations from different 
perspectives; not just what factors may influence policy outcomes but 
also the relevance of understanding bureaucracies in order to know 
what happens in the implementation in the process in generating policy 
outputs.  
 
Bureaucracy is defined as the starting point for this research. The 
traditional connotation of bureaucracy comes from political science, 
where bureaucracy means a government by bureaus; this is a 
government by departments of the state staffed by appointed, not 
elected, functionaries, organised hierarchically and dependent on the 
legitimate authority (Crozier, 1964: 3). The term bureaucracy has 
acquired alternative connotations, mainly from sociology and political 
science, as a consequence of several particularities observed in the day-
to-day performance of such public organisations. Slowness, 
routinisation, complexity and frustration were – and still are – some of 
the adjectives linked to the term and refer to inefficiencies in public 
organisations.  
 
In the context of this research, bureaucracy is understood as the network 
of actors embodied in an organisational system and legally bound to the 
implementation of a development policy or program. In other words, a 
bureaucracy comprises all actors, bound by formal or informal rules, 
who have to perform specific actions in order to achieve the will of the 
policy-maker. The actors in the bureaucratic network can be individuals 
linked to public or private entities. Note that this definition of 
bureaucracy transcends the traditional view of government by bureaus as 
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well as the view that bureaucratic organisations are related to public 
sector organisations. In the proposed definition there is room for all 
individuals and organisations, whether public or private – e.g. NGOs and 
civil associations – that are entitled to perform actions addressing the 
accomplishment of the policy mandate, which in the end all these actions 
take place in the public sphere. This definition of bureaucracy is 
determined by the type of formal aims it pursues; that is, public policy 
aims.  
 
Debates in the area of organisational studies about the nature of 
bureaucratic organisations and how they work can be divided into three 
streams: a rational-mechanic view, a humanistic view and power 
relations view. The latter two are alternative views of the rational-
mechanic view of the bureaucratic phenomenon, and some of its 
conceptual foundations are complementary to each other to explain 
different factors that can affect bureaucratic practice. Each of these 
streams is reviewed in the following subsections. 
 
The origin: Bureaucracy as machine 
The belief that implementation is the easy part of the policy process has 
been strongly influenced by the views of Max Weber and Woodrow 
Wilson on the nature and role of bureaucracies in the policy process. 
Wilson (1887) maintains that bureaucracy is a neutral actor in the 
implementation process that simply carries out the will of the policy-
maker. He considers policy-making and politics exclusive domains of the 
elected authorities, so the domain of bureaucracies lies exclusively in the 
execution of the will of those political bodies (ibid). 
 
The dichotomy between politics and administration in the public arena 
is reinforced by the work of Max Weber (1947) and his construction of 
the ideal type of bureaucracy. Weber considers bureaucratic 
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organisation the most efficient type of organisation. He conceptualises 
an ideal type based on the following features: an organisation of official 
functions bounded by rules with a specified sphere of competence for 
every office (administrative unit) that is part of the organisation; an 
organisation of offices that follows the principle of hierarchy, each lower 
office under the control and supervision of a higher one; the rules that 
regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or norms; the 
application of rules is to be fully rational –in technical terms; and there is 
a complete absence of appropriation of his official position by the 
incumbent; that is, there is no patrimonialism (Weber, 1947, pp. 330-
332). 
 
According to Weber, the superiority of bureaucracy over other types of 
organisation lies first in the command of technical knowledge – 
bureaucracies know how to implement public policies – and second, in 
the impersonality of its nature. That is to say it relies on rules rather 
than on individuals, and on hierarchies of offices rather than a network 
of personal relationships. In theory, the problems such as corruption, 
nepotism and personal favour observed in other forms of administration 
are not present in bureaucracies. The more formal and impersonal the 
bureaucratic organisation, says Weber, the more efficient it will be.  
 
Weber conceptualises bureaucracy as the perfect means to achieving 
policy ends. His view of bureaucracy is of a rational combination of 
human and material resources with well-settled organisational 
procedures. An organisation with such a level of technical rationality has 
no room for failure in the implementation of public policy, and thus 
undesirable outcomes should not be imputed to the bureaucracy but to 
the person who controls it. Then, Weber (1947: 338) says, the important 
question in analysing the outcomes of public policies is: Who controls 
the existing bureaucratic machinery?  
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Another important aspect of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy is the role of 
specialised knowledge in a bureaucratic setting. According to Weber, 
special knowledge of facts and access to special documentary material 
allows bureaucracies to hold official secrets, just as technical knowledge 
does in relation to commercial secrets. Bureaucratic organisations, or the 
holders of power as knowledge who make use of this power, have the 
tendency to increase their power still further as their knowledge grows 
up as they get more experience in the public service (Weber, 1947: 339). 
Even though Weber explicitly mentions the source of power of 
bureaucratic organisations, he does not consider this power a threat to 
achieving the policy mandates enacted by elected authorities; on the 
contrary, he sees it as a natural consequence of the technical authority of 
bureaucracies to provide professional advice to the legislature and 
elected officials. He argues that bureaucratic administration 
fundamentally means the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge – 
a feature that makes bureaucracies ‘rational machines’.  
 
The response: Bureaucracies are human organisations 
From a positivistic approach, sociologists and political scientists do not 
find bureaucratic organisations as perfect as Weber suggests. This 
stream focuses on the observed dysfunctions that affect their 
performance. Alvin Gouldner (1952) questions the efficacy of 
bureaucratic organisations, arguing that there are certain elements of 
organisations that cannot be predictable by its rules; e.g. interest groups 
created at the core of workers’ unions. Gouldner observes that not all 
members of a bureaucracy can be seen with the same degree of 
impersonality and that impersonal behaviour tends to be stronger 
between status levels and minimal between equals. 
 
Robert Merton (1952) observes that however rational and calculable the 
conception of bureaucracy might be, it may show several dysfunctions in 
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practice. The first dysfunction Merton identifies is what he calls ‘trained 
incapacity’, a ‘state of affairs in which one’s abilities function as 
inadequacies or blind spots. Actions based upon training and skills which 
have been successfully applied in the past may result in inappropriate 
responses under changed conditions […] their training may become an 
incapacity’ (Merton, 1952: 364). A second dysfunction is associated with 
the idea of routinisation; that is, the preferences, antipathies, 
discrimination and emphases that the people working in a bureaucracy 
can develop as a consequence of day-to-day routines. According to 
Merton, both dysfunctions may embody Weber’s concerns about the 
precision, reliability, efficiency and impersonalisation of bureaucratic 
organisations. Finally, a third dysfunction is related to the deflection of 
organisational goals due to strong sentiments that entail devotion to 
one’s duties. Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a mean to 
make organisation efficient, is transformed into an end itself: ‘an 
instrumental value becomes a terminal value’ (Merton, 1952: 367). An 
extreme representation of this process of displacement of goals, says 
Merton, is the bureaucratic virtuoso who never forgets a single rule 
binding his action and hence is unable to assist many of his clients. ‘Rules 
in time become symbolic in cast, rather than strictly utilitarian’ (ibid). 
 
Merton explains the dysfunctions of bureaucracies through the concept 
of over-conformity. He argues that in bureaucratic contexts officials are 
tacitly expected to adapt their thoughts, feelings, and actions to the 
prospect of their career; this increases the probability of conformity, 
which induces timidity, conservatism and technicism. He observes the 
existence of esprit de corps, a feeling of pride and mutual loyalty shared 
by the members of a group, that leads personnel to defend their group 
interests rather than assists their clients or elected higher officials. This 
is how vested interests arise to create bureaucrats’ resistance to 
achieving some objectives, which may affect their power position as part 
of the administrative structure of the organisation. What seems to be an 
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impersonal organisational structure is actually an organisation 
influenced by personal and very particular interests. 
  
Another key work, by Philip Selznick (1949), compares bureaucratic 
organisations with systems that maintain their equilibrium and survive 
through their formal and informal components. Unlike Gouldner and 
Merton, Selznick considers that unexpected outcomes are not necessary 
dysfunctions but a response of the organisation, as a system, to its 
environment. He sees organisations as developing informal structures 
that reflect individuals’ and subgroups’ spontaneous efforts to control 
the conditions of their existence. Hence individuals develop informal 
lines of communication and control. Observable bureaucratic behaviour, 
he says, is explained when it might be interpreted as a response to 
specific needs. Selznick identifies self-defensive mechanisms that 
produce structural transformations of the bureaucratic organisation: 
 
The needs in question are organisational, not individual, and include: the 
security of the organisation as a whole in relation to social forces in its 
environment; the stability of the lines of authority and communication; the 
stability of informal relations within the organisation; the continuity of 
policy and the sources of its determination; a homogeneity of outlook with 
respect to the meaning and role of the organisation. (Selznick, 1949: 252) 
 
The notion of unanticipated consequences is a key analytical tool in 
Selznick’s theoretical framework; he asserts that ‘where unintended 
effects occur, there is a presumption, though no assurance, that 
sociologically identifiable forces are at work’ (Selznick, 1949: 254). The 
attention is on the central status of constraints, tensions, and dilemmas 
that members of the organisation have to face in making decisions as a 
whole. For Selznick, social action has always to be seen in relation to 
human structures, which generate new centres of need and power and 
interpose themselves between the actor and his goal.  
 
For Selznick, commitments are a sociologically-significant source of 
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unanticipated consequences. He identifies commitments in five social 
spheres or dimensions: organisational, human relations, institutional, 
cultural and power relations. Commitments enforced by organisational 
imperatives refers to such aspects of the order, discipline and unity of 
the organisational setting that help to adapt organisational 
arrangements to unforeseen situations.  
 
Commitments enforced by the social character of the personnel refers to 
the collective image of the organisation in terms of levels of aspiration 
and training, social ideals and class interest that mould the character of 
the personnel. These kind of commitments, says Selznick, makes staff 
members resistant to demands that are inconsistent with their 
accustomed views and habits; the employer’s freedom of choice is 
restricted and he will find it necessary to conform to their received views 
and habits to some degree.  
 
In third place are commitments enforced by institutionalisation, which 
refers to commitments linked to established social patterns in the 
organisation, again restricting choice and enforcing special lines of 
conduct in the personnel. Fourth are commitments enforced by the 
social and cultural environments, which are similar to the ones linked to 
organisational institutions, but in this case the social and cultural context 
responds to a broader scope, even beyond the organisation’s boundaries. 
Finally, commitments enforced by centres of interest generated in the 
course of action are created in subordinate and allied groupings where 
the leadership has a stake in the organisational status quo. Here, says 
Selznick, the discretionary behaviour of a section of the bureaucratic 
apparatus find a way to justify some decisions in the name of the good 
for the organisation as a whole; it might be committed to a policy or 
course of action not anticipated by the programme’s prescription. In 
other words, lack of effective control over the tangential informal goals 
of individuals and subgroups within an organisation tends to divert it 
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from its initial path (Selznick, 1949, pp. 256-258). 
 
From Selznick’s viewpoint these types of commitments create persistent 
problems of decision and control, and the author focuses in identifying 
the key points at which organisational control breaks down. 
Operationally, the generation of observable unanticipated consequences 
can bring about a breakdown of control. This, says Selznick, suggests that 
significant possibilities inherent in the situation have not been taken into 
account. ‘The problems indicated here are perennial because they reflect 
the interplay of more or less irreconcilable commitments to the goals 
and needs of the organisation and at the same time to the special 
demands of the tools or means at hand’ (Selznick, 1949: 258). Selznick’s 
structural-functionalist approach stresses the relevance of macro 
elements of the social system that influence the behaviour of an 
organisation’s personnel. However, he opens a window on the study of 
bureaucratic organisations at the micro-level, suggesting that day-to-day 
decision processes may be more relevant than they might appear.  
 
Selznick observes that it is in the decision-making process that the 
creation of precedents, alliances, symbols and personal loyalties takes 
place that transforms the organisation from a profane, manipulable 
instrument into something of sacred status and resistant to treatment 
simply as means to some external goal (Selznick, 1949: 258). This is why 
he thinks that organisations are often cast aside when new goals are 
sought. He considers that the analysis of commitment is an effective tool 
for making explicit the structural factors relevant to decision in 
organised action, so attention should be directed towards the process of 
choice, selecting those factors in the decision environment that limit the 
alternatives and enforce uniformity of bureaucratic behaviour.  
 
The analysis of bureaucracies using Selznick’s theoretical framework is 
driven by the question: To what are the members of the bureaucracy 
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committed? Answering this question will reveal the logic of actions in 
contrast to the logic of contractual obligations commonly assumed in 
official documents: 
 
So long as goals are given, and this impulse to act persists, there will be a 
series of enforced lines of action demanded by the nature of the tools at 
hand. These commitments may lead to unanticipated consequences 
resulting in a diversion of original goals. (Selznick, 1949: 259)  
 
 
Thus Selznick considers it important to know the logic of actions as a 
means to discovering the social structure that determines the 
individuals’ choices; that is, how the social system of a bureaucracy is set 
up. Selznick’s ontological position rests on a macro-structural image of 
how society produces its outputs.   
 
The three works reviewed in this section have long been considered key 
contributions to understanding bureaucratic organisations. All challenge 
the classic administrative paradigm imposed by Weber regarding how 
bureaucracies behave to achieve their organisational administrative or 
policy objectives. All seek to explain why bureaucracies do not – or 
cannot – perform as Weber proposes. Selznick says that unanticipated 
consequences are the result of different kinds of commitment to the 
organisation; Merton says that bureaucracies present dysfunctions 
produced by the nature of the structure of bureaucratic organisations; 
Gouldner stresses that there is ‘something’ about bureaucratic 
organisations that makes the personalisation of procedures and their 
routinisation hard to avoid. All three suggest that the calculability and 
technical rationale of the Weberian model is not possible due to inner 
forces that deflect bureaucratic organisations from their original goals, 
and all three have in common an ontological position in which 
individuals respond only to the formal and informal components of the 
social system.  
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The bureaucratic phenomenon: A power-relations approach 
In response to structural-functionalist views of bureaucracy, Michel 
Crozier (1964) proposes an alternative theory of bureaucracy. Contrary 
to his predecessors, Gouldner, Merton and Selznick, he takes as the 
starting point the inadequacies, failures, slowness, routinisation, 
complexity and maladaptations as factors that define bureaucratic 
organisations. Crozier considers that Gouldner, Merton and Selznick 
have wrongly specified the research problem, as they seek to understand 
bureaucracies but neglect the relationship between rationality and 
efficiency that is central to any kind of organisation (Crozier, 1964: 183). 
 
The main difference in Crozier’s approach is the scope of his analysis of 
bureaucracies. His analytical framework is not located in structural-
functionalism or the macro-sociological sphere. He considers that the 
sociology of organisations should seek to ground its framework 
scientifically in order to understand the ‘social game’ and the narrow 
limits restricting the individuals’ choices and therefore, the restriction of 
individual’s actions (Crozier, 1964). He proposes moving from a 
sociology of institutions to a sociology of actions – a micro-sociology 
approach – to understand the rationale of bureaucratic organisations. 
Crozier’s ontological position is closer to a constructionist than to a 
structural-deterministic perspective on the social world. 
 
Crozier’s view is partly influenced by the work of James March and 
Herbert Simon (1958), who argue that to understand a bureaucratic 
organisation one must accept that its members are not governed solely 
by formal regulations, as Weber proposes, nor by affective organisations, 
as the human relations model claims, but rather operate as autonomous 
actors, each with their own personal strategy – in other words, with their 
own rationale. Simon explains that previously the focus has been on 
processes and methods for insuring incisive action in organisations, 
neglecting choice, which prefaces all action. He considers that a theory 
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explaining administrative should be concerned with processes of 
decision making as well as those of action (Simon, 1997: 1). 
 
Simon sees several constraints in the decision-making sphere that might 
hinder bureaucratic organisations’ efficiency in the Weberian sense. To 
understand certain decisions within an organisation one must know all 
the factors that might influence the individuals in it, such as their skills, 
personal objectives and values, knowledge and information. All these 
factors, says Simon, affect whether individuals will perform in the 
expected way. Simon uses the term rational behaviour for behaviour that 
is evaluated in terms of the individuals’ actions and its congruence with 
the objectives of the larger organisation. Disparity between individuals’ 
aims and those of the organisation is one element of non-rationality that 
the theory of organisations must deal with (Simon, 1997, pp. 45-47). 
 
Crozier challenges Simon’s thinking, asking if one must consider 
individuals’ decisions that diverge from the rationale of the bureaucratic 
organisation’s efficient decisions as ‘non-rational’. He points out that a 
human being has not only hand – by which he means mechanical choices 
– and heart – referring to emotional choices – but also head; that is to 
say, the individual freedom to decide on and play his own game. This, 
says Crozier, is what almost all proponents of human relations theories, 
as well as their early rationalists opponents, tend to forget. Crozier’s 
calls us to consider alternative schools of thought such as neo-rationalist 
and strategic analysis methods of studying decision-making processes in 
organisations, particularly when exploring not only the managerial 
sphere but also that of subordinates.  
 
Crozier’s theoretical framework encourages a transition from 
structuralism to constructivism; from the sociology of social structures 
to the sociology of actions; from a macro- to a micro-sociology approach, 
and from tangential forces to individual choices. It is only through 
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scrutinising the means that one may hope to view the mechanisms of 
social control and processes of change that play such an important part 
in the development of social systems (Crozier, 1964: 7). Crozier’s social 
constructionism does not deny the influence of social structures in social 
outcomes but he recognises that they can be overestimated, as everyday 
decisions may produce different realities in apparently similar social 
contexts. 
 
Rationality and predictability are the terms that Crozier uses to address 
his main concern: explaining how bureaucracies make use of their power 
resources to perform and produce organisation’s outcomes. It is 
precisely around the concept of power that Crozier develops his theory 
of bureaucracy. In his ontological stance, individuals can interpret and 
manipulate the components of the social system to achieve their 
particular interests. The more uncertainty the more spaces they have to 
bargain their interests: 
 
In our modern world, the progress of standardisation, of predictability, and 
of rationality in general paradoxically seems to be accompanied by an 
increasing dependence on the indispensable human means, who maintain 
their autonomy in regard to the goals of the organisation much more easily 
than heretofore. (Crozier, 1964: 6) 
 
For Crozier, individuals and groups use the power they hold rationally to 
fulfil their diverse interests and conflicting goals. The institutionalised 
way that individuals and groups in a bureaucracy solve their conflicts 
shape predictable patterns of behaviour. Crozier thus views conflict as a 
source of stability rather than a dysfunction of the organisational system 
of bureaucracies. Individuals try to understand or codify uncertainties 
(knowledge, information, symbols, etc.) in their organisational 
environment to control certain spaces in the organisation (functions, 
concessions, effective work time, etc.). The distribution of power among 
members of an organisation, based on the control of uncertain areas, is a 
source of stability for the organisation. Understanding how members of 
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an organisation have codified such uncertainties can provide insight into 
organisational behaviour when a new policy arises in a specific 
organisational context. 
 
Crozier reserves an important place for what he calls the cultural 
analysis of bureaucratic organisations. This analysis relies on the 
interpretation of bureaucratic practices in terms of their relationship 
with the social and cultural system in which the organisation is 
inscribed. Considering the cultural sphere helps to set a framework in 
which can be generated holistic explanations of how bureaucratic 
structures and patterns of action differ in different countries or regions 
where semantic or discourse specificities might be relevant in explaining 
specific practices that would otherwise not be possible. In Crozier’s 
theoretical framework, the relevance of the links between action and 
structural entities, where the actors’ interpretation of the social and 
cultural structure is a key analytical element, is explicit. 
 
Conclusion: Bureaucracies in Development Studies 
To understand the outcomes of development policy, one must accept 
that planned development rests not only on ideas and paradigms of 
development but also on the sphere of implementation in which a 
network of actors interacts to carry out the actions prescribed in the 
policy design. Planned interventions are highly dependent on the actors 
involved in them, whether formulating policy instruments or carrying 
out specific actions. This approach requires a view of bureaucracies as 
key actors in the entire development policy arena. The ambiguity in the 
meaning of the term development combined with the complexity of 
bureaucratic organisations creates a specific research arena in the 
development studies field.  
 
Bureaucracies have been widely studied by sociologists seeking to 
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understand how they function. Organisational studies focusing on the 
bureaucracies of private and public organisations have been widely 
developed. Theoretical and practical approaches to bureaucratic 
behaviour have set the conceptual bases of what is known as theories of 
bureaucracy. However, these conceptual bases are not commonly used in 
the field of development studies, so the integration of this analytical 
framework into the discipline of development studies might provide 
useful conceptual tools for understanding the rationale behind the 
decisions of actors involved in development policy.  
 
This chapter has reviewed theoretical frameworks for studying 
bureaucratic organisations based on decision-making models that share 
the ontological position with actor-oriented research approaches used in 
this work to study bureaucratic practices. Chapter 4 presents the 
foundations of actor-oriented research approaches and the methodology 
proposed for studying development bureaucracies. Here, it was 
reviewed different ways that bureaucratic practice is explained by 
different theories of bureaucracy. I have shown that in the Weberian 
perspective the rationalisation of decisions based on the policy 
prescriptions is the key feature to explain how an organisation achieve 
its goals beyond individuals’ rationality or choice. In the human relations 
model there is no space for the individual members of organisations to 
make decisions; they can only react to specific circumstances according 
to the social, cultural and/or organisational setting. In Crozier’s 
approach, what is technically rational for an organisation may not be 
rational from the personal perspective of an individual with her or his 
own needs. Crozier acknowledges that social, cultural and organisational 
structures matter, but it is individuals who produce social outcomes by 
making everyday decisions based on their interpretation of their 
environment. Sometimes such decisions can be very predictable, but 
where uncertainty surrounds the decision, unexpected outcomes can be 
produced.  
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Alternative decision-making theories are continually being developed – 
e.g. March and Shapira (1992). However, the purpose of this thesis is not 
to present an exhaustive review of all theories related to the study of 
bureaucracies. Those reviewed so far represent a complete and 
simplified set of the key approaches, concepts and theories in the specific 
field of bureaucratic studies. They offer a solid conceptual and analytical 
background from which to study the role of development bureaucracies 
in producing the outcomes of development policy. The challenge is to 
find out an effective way of linking such explicative frameworks to the 
broad and sometimes ambiguous field of development studies. The next 
chapter presents the proposed research approach to link the different 
analytical spheres in theories of bureaucracy to development practice.  
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Chapter 4. The actor-oriented perspective in the analysis 
of development policies: a methodological approach to 
understand development practice 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the research approach used in this 
work to understand the social world in the context of the main topic of 
this research. Like any research approach, it has its own epistemological 
and ontological stance from which to analyse and explain social 
phenomena. It explains the relevance of actor-oriented perspectives in 
studying development policies, particularly from the perspective of the 
actors involved in it. First, it explores Norman Long’s actor-oriented 
approach – also known as the sociology of development – in which the 
questions are not restricted to answering what and how actors produce 
development practice but go beyond this, seeking to understand why 
actors’ make decisions in the way they do. This is particularly useful in 
situations where actors’ decisions may look as ‘non-sense’ regarding to 
the prescriptions of a specific policy design. 
 
Next I explore actor network theory (ANT): its ontological foundations, 
instrumental principles and potential for understanding the outcomes of 
development policies from a macro-analytical perspective. I show that 
ANT can be a powerful theoretical approach to learning how 
development practice as a whole is produced as consequence of a broad 
chain of interpretations made by the actors taking part in the process of 
a particular development policy.  
 
The above actor-oriented approaches are presented in this chapter as 
alternatives to the so-called managerial approaches to understanding 
development practice. This proposed research approach is situated in 
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the sociology and anthropology of development fields and is represented 
by the works of Norman Long (2001; 1992), Oliver de Sardan (2005), 
David Lewis and David Mosse (Lewis and Mosse, 2006), Bruno Latour 
(2005) and John Law (1997), among many others. In terms of 
methodology, these works share a common methodological approach by 
which researchers are able to produce new interpretations close to the 
field, building a corpus of concrete analyses on the nature of different 
social rationales (Bierschenck et al. 2002; Lewis and Mosse, 2006).  
 
The third section describes the methodology used to answer the 
research questions from the actor-oriented perspective, and the 
methods and fieldwork techniques used to build a case study of the 
Mexico’s Sustainable Rural Development Act policy process. It explains 
the analytical structures from which the case study was built in relation 
to the positions of bureaucratic actors at different levels of government. 
A reflection on ethical issues in the research is included in this section. 
 
 
4.1 Long’s actor-oriented approach to understanding development 
practice 
Norman Long (2001) poses the research problem of development 
sociology as understanding how development actors deconstruct 
planned interventions. As presented in Chapter 3, demythologising 
planned interventions is a core element of Long’s approach and a key 
aspect of setting up the present research methodology. This notion of 
deconstructing the planned intervention refers to the process of a 
development policy in which ‘…external factors become “internalized” 
and come to mean different things to different interests groups or to 
different individual actors involved, whether they be implementers, 
clients or bystanders’ (Long, 2001: 31).  
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Long developed his analytical framework based on an actor-oriented 
perspective through which he seeks to ‘explain how the meanings, 
purposes and powers associated with differential modes of human 
agency converge to shape the outcomes of emergent social forms’ (Long, 
2001: 4). This approach allows the study of development practice in the 
light of the diverse cross-cutting discourses, institutional constraints and 
processes of objectification occurring in the implementation arena. To 
understand the processes by which development policies are interpreted 
and implemented by individuals, Long uses the concepts of social fields, 
social domains and social arenas to contextualise the spaces in which 
actors’ decisions are made.  
 
Social fields 
For Long, the notion of the social field refers to a social landscape 
composed of elements and relationships that characterise the 
phenomenon of study. These elements can be the ‘product of human or 
non-human interventions, both local and global, as well as result of both 
cooperative and competitive processes’ (Long, 2001: 58). The social field 
in which this research takes place is the field of bureaucratic 
organisations in the context of the implementation of development 
policies; here official regulations, public resources, buildings, public and 
private organisations, informal practices, beneficiaries, government 
functionaries, political parties, unions and so on converge.  
 
Social domains and institutional settings 
Long uses the term social domains to identify ‘areas of social life that are 
organised with reference to a central core of values which, even if they 
are not perceived in exactly the same way by all involved, are 
nevertheless recognised as a locus of certain rules, norms, and values 
implying a degree of social commitment’ (Long, 2001: 59). I link Long’s 
concept of the social domain to the concept institutions, defined by 
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authors such as Ostrom (2005) and North (1990) as the set of formal or 
informal rules that constrain the decisions of individuals in a specific 
context or domain. Elinor Ostrom (2005:1) defines institutions as 
‘prescriptions that humans use to organise all forms of repetitive 
structured interactions including those within families, neighbourhoods, 
markets, firms, sports, leagues, churches, private associations, and 
governments at all scales’. In this thesis the term institution is used 
interchangeably with the term social domain. 
 
Examples of social domains or institutions in the context of this research 
can be expressed in terms of the formal and informal rules that 
particular groups refer to when making decisions about rural 
development policy processes in Mexico. The institutions that the 
research identifies are associated with federal, state and local 
bureaucracy, specific secretaries of state, program beneficiaries, 
directors and program managers, operative workers and congressmen, 
and are located in diverse institutional settings– or, as Long calls them, 
arenas – associated with specific contexts such as Mexico’s democracy, 
specific governmental programmes, the policy-making process, the 
economic system and so on.  
 
Social arenas 
By social arenas, Long refers to the social and spatial locations in which 
actors confront each other, mobilise social relations and deploy 
discursive and other cultural means for the attainment of specific ends, 
including simply seeking to remain in a particular social game. Together 
with the notion of the arena, domains provide an analytical handle on 
the types of constraints and enabling elements that shape actors’ choices 
and room for manoeuvre (Long, 2001: 59).   
 
This notion of the arena is particularly important for Long in the analysis 
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of development projects and programmes, as he considers that 
intervention processes comprise a complex set of interlocking arenas of 
struggle, each characterised by specific constraints and possibilities for 
manoeuvre. Long points out that the concept of the arena is useful for 
identifying the actors and mapping out the issues, resources and 
discourses entailed in particular situations of disagreement or dispute. 
The notions of field, domain and arena are important in this research 
too, as they help to delimit the spaces and spheres of analysis; however, 
alone, they do not provide methodological insights from which to 
analyse and interpret actors’ actions. To discover the rationale behind 
actors’ decisions, Long proposes using discourse and interface analysis 
as two ways of exploring the logic of action in particular social contexts. 
 
Interface analysis 
The notion of interface analysis is oriented towards situations in which 
different and often conflicting lifeworlds or social fields converge; or, 
more concretely, in social situations or arenas in which interactions 
become oriented around problems of bridging, accommodating, 
segregating or contesting social, evaluative and cognitive standpoints 
(Long, 2001: 65). Interface analysis focuses on points of confrontation 
and social difference among actors. According to Long, this kind of 
analysis requires a methodology that counterpoints the voices, 
experiences and practices of all the social actors involved, including the 
experiential learning curves of policy practitioners and researchers. 
Long says that interface analysis used in the particular field of 
development policies can make a useful contribution to understanding 
how planned intervention processes enter the lifeworlds of the 
individuals and groups affected and come to form part of the resources 
and constraints of the social strategies they develop: 
 
Thus, so-called ‘external’ factors become ‘internalised’ and come to mean 
quite different things to different interests groups or to the different 
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individual actors, whether they be implementers, clients or bystanders. In 
this way interface analysis helps to deconstruct the concept of planned 
intervention so that it is seen for what it is – namely, an on-going, socially 
constructed and negotiated process, not simply the execution of an already-
specified plan of action with expected outcomes. It also shows that policy 
implementation is not simply a top-down process, as is often implied, since 
initiatives may come as much from below as from above. (Long, 2001: 72) 
 
Thus, according to Long, the use of interface analysis in development 
policies requires concentration on analysing the critical junctures or 
arenas involving differences in normative values and social interests. At 
the same time it entails not only understanding the struggles and power 
differentials taking place between the parties involved but also an 
attempt to reveal the dynamics of cultural accommodation that make it 
possible for the various worldviews to interact (Long, 2001: 66). 
 
Norman Long sets the basis of what today is called the sociology of 
development. He has provided a constructivist perspective from which 
to understand development practice, avoiding mechanical-managerial 
analysis based on the prescriptions of the policy models. His analytical 
framework represents a strong foundation for understanding each 
actor’s decisions, contextualised in the different lifeworlds s/he takes as 
reference for interaction with other actors in different organisational 
contexts. The following section explores actor-network theory (ANT), an 
analytical stream that shares the same ontological position in terms of 
considering the actor as the main referent of analysis; however the actor 
is not just considered individually but as part of an actor network in 
which individual actors’ decisions and network outcomes cannot be 
understood without analysing the interconnection between all the 
participants in the policy process.  
 
4.2 Understanding development practice through actor-network 
theory 
ANT began to be used in the field of development studies in the early 
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2000s as a ground-breaking approach to the analysis of the social world. 
The ANT approach accounts for the connections between actors in a 
network and how they interact with one another to produce social 
outcomes. ANT’s theoretical framework redefines the notion of ‘social’ as 
Bruno Latour (1999; 2005), one of its most prominent advocators, 
challenges the way in which traditional sociology explains the social 
world. Whether through objectivism, constructivism or a combination of 
the several ontological positions in between, traditional sociology looks 
for patterns of collective behaviour or social structures that explain 
social actions and their outcomes. ANT does not deny the existence of 
such social structures and institutions as customs, tradition, history, 
norms, etc., but sees them simply as elements or actors in a complex 
network which, as a whole, produces social outcomes. ANT does not look 
for hidden patterns that determine the action or patterns created by 
individuals but seeks to understand how actors are interconnected, and 
how they interact to produce social outcomes in a particular time and 
space frame. 
 
Looking through ANT’s lens, outcomes in the social world are the result 
of a series of interpretations made by a complex network of actors in 
relation to a particular social phenomenon. One of the key features of 
this approach is that the actors are not necessarily human; material 
objects and even intangible entities in a social setting can be also 
analysed as actors in the network. Ontologically, ANT responds to a view 
of the world that is based on a type of social constructionism in which 
social outcomes are the product of the agency of the actors that compose 
a network. This agency allows each actor to interpret, in their own way, 
other individuals, norms, customs, actors’ interests, technologies, 
climates, organisational cultures, governmental programmes, etc. – 
elements that ANT sees as potential actors taking part in a particular 
social phenomena. Unlike analytical approaches based on symbolic 
interactionism, in ANT’s view actors’ interpretations in relation to other 
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actors and elements of the network do not necessarily describe a 
pattern. Each actor may interpret each component of the actors’ network 
the same element in a different way; hence a social phenomenon can be 
understood by knowing how the actors in a network are interlocked to 
produce social outcomes.  
 
One of ANT’s most controversial features -and the main tension with 
Long’s approach - is the idea that non-human actors can have agency. 
How is this possible? ANT’s argument rests on the several meanings and 
uses that a human actor can give to an object, and how objects may 
undergo transformations that are beyond the will of a particular human 
actor. Thus the transformation of an object can be the result of a human 
actor’s particular interpretation of it: consciously or unconsciously, a 
human actor influences the nature of other objects through the way s/he 
and it interact. In this way the object’s original purpose is transformed as 
a result of a chain of interactions that gradually modify the relationship 
between both actors and the outputs they collectively produce. In a 
social network where several actors interact, an objects’ original role in 
the network may change as a consequence of the series of 
interpretations that take place in a particular context; these 
interpretations do not necessarily have to go in the same direction for 
each actor.   
 
ANT’s ontological position has provided scholars with new ways of 
studying complex social phenomena. Its focus is on actors’ practices and 
outcomes rather than their nature, or hidden nature, and it seeks to 
determine what social outcomes are produced and how are they 
produced according to the interactions between the actors in a network. 
ANT is concerned not with why actors interact as they do but how they 
interact and the result of their interactions. It offers the analogy of a 
black box to explain how some non-human actors that have worked for 
some human actors in a useful manner, or in a certain way, acquire a 
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robust and straightforward meaning for the rest of the actors; at some 
point the actors’ network stops looking at the nature and complexity of a 
specific object and begins to consider it as a given, at which point the 
object is ‘black-boxed.’ In Latour’s words, when a machine runs 
efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one needs only to focus on its 
inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, 
paradoxically, the more technology succeeds, the more opaque and 
obscure it becomes (Latour, 1999). 
 
This idea of black boxing can be better understood through an example. 
Consider the case of an actors’ network related to the production of 
carrots. The actors that compose the network are farmers, land, water, 
buyers, tractors, seeds and fertiliser. In the production process all of 
these actors are linked by a chain of interactions to perform activities 
that produce carrots. Thought the lens of ANT, some of these actors are 
complex machines, such as the tractors, or represent a complex 
technology, such as chemical fertilisers. A farmer does not need to know 
the physics behind the tractor’s design or the chemical reactions to the 
fertiliser; all s/he needs to know is the basics of how to operate the 
tractor to prepare the land or harvest the carrots and the correct 
proportions and techniques with which to apply the chemicals. Although 
a tractor is a multipurpose machine – it can be used for ploughing, tilling, 
disking, harrowing or planting and for pulling or pushing other 
agricultural machinery or trailers – in some particular places tractors 
have been black-boxed: they have been conceptualised in terms of 
traditional uses, neglecting the alternative or new uses that a tractor can 
provide. In some Mexican communities, besides the productive use of a 
tractor it is also used to demonstrate social status: the bigger and newer 
the tractor, the higher the social status it represents. It does not matter if 
it is underused for farming activities – what matters in this context is 
that people in the community realise that the farmer owns a new and 
powerful tractor. 
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Fertilisers can be black-boxed actors when their use and effectiveness is 
socially accepted by the carrot producers. Producers can create strong 
links with types or brands of fertiliser that have provided them with 
good results, creating strong barriers to the acceptance of new 
technological developments in the fertilising industry or new techniques 
replacing the use of fertilisers. In Mexico some fertiliser companies have 
had to continue to offer a particular product for 20 years because the 
product has created a special meaning, such as that it brings good luck, 
for producers. Independently of the substances or active elements in the 
fertiliser, this product – or actor – plays that specific role in the actors’ 
network of carrot production. The fertiliser – a specific technology – has 
been black-boxed by the human actors in the network for a specific 
purpose – and is seen as not exchangeable with a similar item. 5 
 
The above example illustrates how material objects produce meanings 
that can influence or affect human actors’ decisions. These meanings 
create relationships between human and non-human actors that can 
define the interactions between them to create a particular network. 
When actors are black-boxed their choices are predictable to other 
actors in relation to the outcomes that particular type interactions might 
produce.  However, not all the actors in a network perform as black 
boxes; some may have different meanings for different actors. Bruno 
Latour differentiates between whether the means of producing the social 
are seen as intermediaries, as a black box may be, or as mediators. An 
intermediary, he says, transports meaning without transformation; 
defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs (Latour, 2005: 39). On 
the other hand, a mediator’s input is never a good predictor of its output; 
its contextual stance has to be taken into account every time:  
                                                     
5
These examples are based on data shared by the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Project of FAO in Mexico 
(www.fao-evaluacion.org.mx) 
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Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the 
elements they are supposed to carry. No matter how complicated an 
intermediary is, it may, for all practical purposes, count for just one – or 
even for nothing at all because it can be easily forgotten. No matter how 
apparently simple a mediator may look, it may become complex; it may 
lead in multiple directions which will modify all the contradictory accounts 
attributed to its role. (Latour, 2005:39) 
 
The distinction between mediators and interpreters is a key element of 
ANT’s framework; it helps to identify the intimate nature of actors. As 
many interpreters take part in the network, the steadier the social 
outcomes are the more certainty they provide, while on the contrary, 
mediators can be the source of multiple interpretations of meaning, 
producing different meanings for individual actors and making the 
network uncertain and unstable. What matters in analysis using ANT is 
the role of each actor in the network and how the series of interactions 
they engage in produces social outcomes.  
 
ANT acknowledges that the social world is not as stable as traditional 
sociology suggests it is through its explanation of social structures: 
 
To sum up the contrast in a rudimentary way, the sociologists of the social 
believe in one type of social aggregates, few mediators, and many 
intermediaries; for ANT, there is no preferable type of social aggregate, 
there exist an endless number of mediators, and when these are 
transformed into faithful intermediaries it is not the rule, but a rare 
exception that has to be accounted for by some extra work – usually by the 
mobilization of even more mediators! No two viewpoints of the same object 
could be more different. (Latour, 2005:40) 
 
Understanding the difference between these two roles that an actor can 
play in a network makes it possible to map the many contradictory ways 
in which social aggregates are evoked, erased, distributed and 
reallocated in the network: it allows interpretation of the world in the 
several ways in which it is expressed. This requires abandoning the idea 
that all languages are translatable in the already-established idiom of the 
‘social’ (Latour, 2005: 42). In practice there is no one way of applying 
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this approach to studying social phenomena. Besides the basics of how 
actors in a network interact to generate the overall outcomes of the 
network, it is equally important to explore the basic features of an actor 
network as a theoretical body. However, conceptualising ANT as a 
unique or specific theoretical body is a task that could contravene ANT’s 
own nature. As John Law (1997) points out, even scholars make different 
interpretations of ANT in their research, so there is no unique or 
standard definition of it is. Rather than looking for its precepts, its 
theoretical framework can be described as a grounded theory system 
that is continually being determined by the ways in which it has been 
used and understood in applied research. Law (1997) provides some 
insights, which are product of the reflection on four research cases based 
on the ANT approach. Below are his main conclusions. 
 
First, an actor network is much like a structure, except for one crucial 
difference: there is no assumption that specific links or nodes in the 
network are given; that is to say a specific order of things is not implicit; 
instead both links and nodes have to be uncovered by the analyst. In the 
earlier example of carrot production one can see that there is no pattern 
to the elements that compose the production chain. In some cases the 
tractor can play a central role, in others its participation in the 
production process is limited or specific, even though theoretically it 
should have general use for all users. Similarly, some people can avoid 
the use of chemicals in production or can decide to use specific 
techniques. Objects can represent different things to different people; 
their use can be different so that the social outcome.  
 
Second, networks are materially heterogeneous; they are composed of 
human and non-human actors such as people, objects and intangible 
entities, all of which have equal status in the network. In the carrot 
production example the actor network is composed of machines, 
chemicals, persons, land, beliefs and so on, and not only of human actors.  
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Third, to know about a particular aspect of the network it may be 
necessary to decentralise the analysis from the object of study. In Law’s 
terms: 
 
Decentring may be crucial to centring. And, conversely, that accomplished 
centring may lead to motivated decentring. The strain, then, is not 
necessarily towards drawing things together. Or if it is, then it is about how 
drawing things together is intimately related to a contrary process of taking 
them apart’ (Law, 2006: 57) 
 
In the context of our example, this means that understanding the 
influence of chemicals on the production process requires focusing 
beyond just the relation between the farmer and the fertiliser to also 
consider all the interpretations and meanings that are being produced 
throughout the network, including the interactions of other actors 
involved as chemicals providers, neighbour producers or even particular 
beliefs. In other words, to focus on a specific issue one must decentre the 
analysis to gather a holistic understanding of the outcomes. 
 
Fourth, there are no temporal constraints to analysing an actor network, 
as ANT assumes that actor networks are dynamic, so different outcomes 
from an actor network at two different moments do not necessarily 
represent inconsistency as traditional sociology would view it: ‘There is 
no need to draw things together, except for a moment – and that moment 
will pass, pass into oscillation, movement, alternative patterning. At 
some other moment things will be ordered differently’ (Law, 1997: 58). 
Law borrows the term ‘ontological choreography’ from Charis Cussins 
(1998) to explain how he sees ANT’s ontological position. He likes the 
notion of understanding the social world as a dance rather than a given 
design. In the carrot production case this would mean that it could be 
possible to observe different uses of a tractor – with different outcomes 
– from one year to another, with no apparent logical explanation; 
however, the reconfiguration of the actors’ network should be able to 
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account for the shift and the new directions of the outcomes with perfect 
sense, according to the internal logic by which this particular actor 
network operates.   
 
For many researchers, ANT represents a window through which it is 
possible to study social phenomena that seem to be plagued by 
inconsistencies; it is also a window through which try to understand 
complex phenomena where material objects seems to be alive as they 
evolve and transform human relations. Applied studies based on ANT 
have traditionally been in the fields of medicine, information technology 
and ecology. Such studies generally seek to show how particular medical 
practices, uses of mobile phones or computer software or specific 
conservation practices create links between and different arrangements 
of actors and hence create specific actor-network dynamics. All of them 
have in common that there are no assumptions about a wrong or right 
path; they only explain how actors interact and interpret each other to 
produce the network’s outcomes. What if, as Law suggests, there is no 
overall pattern?  
 
Perhaps, then, it is not simply that we cannot describe a single and coherent 
pattern […] Perhaps there is no single and coherent pattern. Perhaps there 
is nothing except practices. Perhaps there is nothing other than stories 
performing themselves and seeking to make connections, practical and 
local connections, specific links. (Law, 2006:65) 
 
David Mosse (2004) raises the same question in the field of development 
studies. Mosse reflects on the enormous energy that governments and 
international organisations devote to generating the ‘right’ development 
policy models and the contrasting results that such policy models have 
produced. He stresses the lack of attention paid to the relationship 
between the models and the practices and outcomes that they are 
expected to generate in particular contexts. At best, he says the 
relationship between policy and practice has been understood in terms 
of an unintended gap between theory and practice, which can be reduced 
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by better policy more effectively implemented (Mosse, 2004: 640). It 
seems that for Mosse and many other scholars these explanations are 
not enough to account for the outcomes of development policies. Mosse 
asks:  
 
What if development practice is not driven by policy? What if the things 
that make for good policy are quite different from those that make it 
implementable? What if the practices of development are in fact concealed 
rather than produced by policy? What if, instead of policy producing 
practice, practices produce policy, in the sense that actors in development 
devote their energies to maintaining coherent representations regardless of 
events? (Mosse, 2004: 640)  
 
These questions that Mosse raises account for some of the new concerns 
in development policy studies that challenge the traditional way of 
posing research questions about policy analysis, and at the same time 
see ANT as a way to get answers in new directions.  
 
David Lewis and David Mosse (2006) see in ANT a research approach 
that makes it possible to understand development practice through 
deeper analysis of the ways in which actors interpret and produce 
meanings, social networks and development ‘success’ at every level, 
within donor policymaking circles and consultancy teams and among 
project staff as well as among the consumers of development (Lewis and 
Mosse, 2006:15). Both authors see ANT as a potential analytical 
framework for what they call ‘an ethnography of aid and agencies’, a 
particular ethnography for the study of development policies. However, 
from a methodological perspective this ethnography of development 
differs from the traditional ethnography of classic anthropology, which is 
based on the researcher’s deeper and longer involvement with the object 
of study. ANT’s analytical framework is used in the present research as 
an alternative approach to the managerial or organisational approaches 
traditionally used for studying development policy process.  
 
Managerial and organisational approaches have been used to focus on 
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studying operational and administrative procedures in programmes and 
projects. Studies based on that approach commonly seek to identify the 
‘wrongs’ and ‘rights’ in program/project design or how specific 
processes are performed at the implementation stage. The result of such 
analysis commonly ends in recommendations for modifications to the 
design or to specific operational/administrative procedures. Chapter 3 
presented a theoretical review of key works in the fields of public 
administration and policy analysis to explain why some policies do not 
produce the expected results as a consequence of unexpected practices 
on the part of bureaucratic bodies.  
 
All of the works reviewed were framed by the question: What went 
wrong in the design or implementation stage? They are constrained 
because the answers necessarily have a prescriptive nature. For 
example, under the traditional approaches two different interpretations 
of the same object by the actors involved are commonly seen as a 
diversion. In ANT this is not a diversion; it is just how it is, how the 
network is working in relation to the association of two actors with one 
object. The object becomes an actor when it has the capacity to influence 
the other actors’ decisions. This influence does not necessarily have to be 
a deliberate action; it can also be a reaction produced by the nature of 
the object – the role of the actor, the understanding of the actor’s role, 
power resources, its features, etc. 
 
ANT represents an opportunity for understanding development practice 
differently from explanations based on managerial and organisational 
approaches. Conceptually, ANT’s approach avoids thinking in terms of 
‘wrong’ and ‘right.’ This means that rather than analysing what elements 
of the policy were ‘rightly’ or ‘wrongly’ performed, one must focus on 
how actors’ networks are interlocked to produce the policy outputs. The 
plans or normative documents are not the main referents for analysing a 
policy. A normative document in ANT can be considered only as another 
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non-human actors with a part in the network that produces particular 
meanings and creates certain links with other actors. In ANT, the 
question in the context of a development policy is how the actors’ 
network is composed, how the actors interact and interpret one another 
to produce practice and to deliver ‘development’. 
 
As stated, this research investigates how development bureaucracies 
influence development policies. Clearly, the central actor in the analysis 
is the bureaucracy; however, bureaucracy as an organisational entity is 
composed of several actors with different natures that work in different 
positions and different locations and have different responsibilities at 
different levels. Similarly, bureaucrats have to deal with other human 
actors such as citizens, social organisations, external consultants, 
politicians, and so on; all have to perform their activities in diverse 
physical settings, whether buildings, the field, the street, etc. Equally 
important is the consideration that a policy is commonly composed by 
several governmental programmes or projects, implying the existence of 
different normative regulations and tools that establish specific 
responsibilities for the bureaucratic actors. From the ANT perspective, 
most of these elements, human and not, set a network of actors around 
the development policy that are interlocked in a broad chain of 
interpretations. A particular place, a particular program, a particular 
norm or a certain social group produces a particular meaning for a 
specific human actor which shapes the actor’s decisions and, therefore, 
influences the output of its action in a certain way.  
 
In applying ANT’s approach to the methodology of this research to 
centre the analysis on one actor, the bureaucracy, it will be necessary to 
decentre the analysis from it to describe the chain of interactions and 
interpretations between all the participants in the actors’ network to 
deliver development. The influence of bureaucracy on development 
outcomes cannot be understood without knowing its links with the other 
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network’s actors. This will require the identification of the actors that 
play a role in the development policy, and of how actors interact to 
produce development practice. The research question about identifying 
the actors and their interactions in relation to a specific policy is: Which 
actors take part in the development policy process? How do they interact 
to produce development outcomes?  
 
Identifying the actors’ network around a development policy requires 
knowing which human and non-human elements influence the decisions 
of a specific actor or group of actors, and what objects or humans are 
capable of providing scripts to others about how they can influence the 
network’s output (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 13). But scripts must not be 
seen as the embedded rules of a social structure. In ANT, a script means 
that one single actor can generate different meanings for different actors 
in the network which the latter can interpret in several and diverse 
ways. The complexity of ANT’s interpretative framework increases when 
one realises that there is no a steady configuration of the network in 
time or space. An actors’ network is a dynamic entity that can constantly 
change how actors interact according to particular moments or 
locations. Decoding or interpreting the actors’ network for a 
development policy requires identifying the moment and space in which 
it is analysed. The researcher must be cautious to express 
generalisations about the findings, but at the same time must also be 
prepared to explain the variations in actors’ interpretations when the 
time and space variables change.  
 
In summary, ANT argues that explaining the social world goes beyond 
debating the traditional dichotomy between agency and structure. ANT’s 
ontological view also transcends the dichotomy between objectivism and 
constructivism. Its epistemological stance is difficult to identify, as the 
researcher becomes a network builder, an interpreter not only of the 
relations between the several actors in a network but also of ANT’s 
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theoretical principles. The case study developed in Chapters 5 and 6 is 
precisely an interpretation of the researcher using ANT principles in the 
case of Mexico’s rural development policy, but at the same time these 
chapters describe the chain of interpretations in which actors in the 
network are interlocked to produce development practice.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
The methodology of this research is based on the development of a case 
study of Mexico’s rural development policy that explores how Mexican 
bureaucracy produces development practice in the context of the 2001 
Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. The main unit of analysis is the 
Mexican bureaucracy, which is divided into subunits of analysis 
according to the different types of government and different operational 
levels.  
 
Mexico’s rural development policy has been selected a case study as 
research design because the effectiveness it has shown to understand 
organisational realms. This work is wholly qualitative research based on 
the methodological approach fostered by sociologists and 
anthropologists in the field of development studies such as Norman Long 
(2001; 1992), Oliver de Sardan (2005), David Lewis and David Mosse 
(Lewis and Mosse, 2006), Bruno Latour (2005) and John Law (1997). 
This research stream basically rest on the construction of a case study 
and ethnography as research methods. In the present research, it has 
been selected to build a case study as research design, to generate a 
description of way the Mexican development bureaucracy is 
implementing the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. 
 
 As explained in detail in the following section, Chapter 5 builds the case 
of the processes involved in the decentralisation of the operation of the 
federal programme called PAAP. The empirical evidence is presented in 
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the form of interface encounters at three different levels of bureaucracy: 
upper, middle and lower. The same structure is used in Chapter 6, which 
addresses the way the notion of community participation is 
implemented in the operation of the Programa para la Adquicisión de 
Activos Productivos (Programme for the Acquisition of Productive 
Assets, henceforth PAAP). Both chapters continuously refer to the two 
the geographical locations selected for the study; the purpose of this is to 
show how different administrative, political and social settings present 
similar outputs in terms of bureaucratic practices. 
 
Because of the qualitative nature of this research, semi-structured 
interviewing and participatory observation were selected as research 
methods to explore the repertoires from which actors translate 
development policies into development practice. Documentary research 
was used as a complementary method to discover that the formal 
referents used by bureaucrats in implementing Mexico’s rural 
development policy are the LDRS, PAAP’s operational rules, formal 
agreements between state and federal governments and the informative 
flyers that each government uses to promote PAAP.  
 
One of the most powerful reasons for considering the use of semi-
structured interviews is the possibility of registering, through this 
method, information unconsciously provided by the interviewee such as 
their perceptions, reactions, opinions, gossip and body language in 
relation to a specific topic. In particular, the conversational mode of 
semi-structured interviews allows interviewees to express themselves 
openly. All interviews were carried out in each location from January to 
April 2010. Appendix 1 contains a list of the interviewees and Appendix 
2, the questions used to guide the interview.  
 
Participant observation was used to obtain specific information that 
would otherwise be very difficult to get. I was given permission by the 
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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), through 
its Technical Assistance Project based in Mexico, to participate as 
observer in the working sessions that they held with officials of Mexico’s 
Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y 
Alimentación (Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, 
Fisheries and Food, henceforth SAGARPA), where I was introduced as a 
postgraduate researcher. In the introduction it was explained the 
purpose of the research and the use of the information that I would 
gather by observation. I was also invited to observe FAO’s fieldwork 
activities, which they carried out for two months in the states of Jalisco 
and Oaxaca to gather information with which to evaluate SAGARPA’s 
programmes.  
 
FAO provided me with their fieldwork agenda and a list of the people 
they were going to interview. They gave me the chance to select which 
actors could be relevant for my research, so I chose those and some 
others who were not on their agenda but were in same administrative 
unit that FAO was to visit. The invitation letter to potential interviewees 
specified the purpose of the FAO fieldwork and the presence of a 
researcher from the University of East Anglia. At the beginning of each 
interview, informed consent was explicitly requested with an 
explanation of the proposed use of the information and the risks of 
participating in this research.  
 
The interviews usually started with the FAO consultant introducing the 
aims of the fieldwork and asking a question.  FAO’s questions sought to 
identify structural problems faced in the rural sector that prevented 
greater productivity or the satisfaction of poor peasants’ basic needs.  
However, a trend during most interviews was that the interviewee did 
not see the problems of the rural sector in terms of structural causalities 
– for example the producers’ low level of education or difficulties in 
accessing new markets  – and focused instead on the role of government 
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in the allocation of public resources. When this happened I had the 
chance to introduce the questions that I had prepared. When the 
interview developed as planned I had 30 minutes at the end to ask the 
questions on my research script. 
 
I recorded 80% of the interviews on electronic audio files, with the 
consent of the interviewees. Sixty per cent of these recorded interviews 
were transcribed for easy analysis. All the fieldwork data were kept on 
the Internet on a private wiki site in order to provide access only to my 
supervisors to show them the quality of the information I had gathered 
and to make searching for and retrieving the data for analytical purposes 
easier. Picture 4.1 shows the main page of the wiki site. 
 
 
Picture 4.1. Wiki page used to storage fieldwork data 
 
The analysis of the fieldwork data to build the case study was carried out 
through discourse analysis. In the context of the analytical framework of 
this research, discourse is understood as the set of meanings embodied 
in statements, metaphors, representations, images and narratives that 
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shape a particular view of the reality of objects, persons and events and 
the relations between them (Long, 2001: 51-52). In this sense, the 
definition of discourse is strictly linked to Long’s notion:  
 
By ‘discourse’ is meant a set of meanings embodied in metaphors, 
representations, images, narratives and statements that advance a 
particular version of ‘the truth’ about objects, persons, events and relations 
between them. Discourses produce texts – written and spoken – and even 
non-verbal ‘texts’ such as the meanings embedded in architectural styles or 
fashions. 
 
Discourses frame our understanding of life experiences by providing 
representations of ‘reality’ (often taken for granted), and shape or 
constitute what we consider to be the significant or essential objects, 
persons and events of our world. It is of course possible to have different or 
conflicting versions of the same discourse or incompatible discourses 
relating to the same phenomena. (Long, 2001: 52) 
 
Unlike discourse analysis, which focuses on how social inequalities are 
reflected or reproduced in linguistic features of discourse, the approach 
used focuses on how the ideas behind discourses account for actors’ 
decisions; that is to say, on the rationale behind certain actors’ decisions, 
which can be identified in their discourse. Hence in this research the use 
of discourse analysis focuses on understanding how different informants 
express their interpretations of actors and objects related to the 
implementation of Mexico’s rural development policy; for example, how 
different actors understand the directives of the Sustainable Rural 
Development Act and see homologous positions at different levels of 
government in different locations; and how programme beneficiaries 
interpret the programmes and their view of the programme operators. 
Analysing how actors behave and react to specific topics provides 
insights into how actors in different domains and arenas interpret the 
same objects in different ways, sometimes strategically and sometimes 
unconsciously.  
 
At this point it is important to explain the positionality of the researcher 
in the analysis of the fieldwork data. Positionality must be understood  in 
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this research as the individual backgrounds of different characteristics of 
the researcher such as race, gender, age, nationality, social and economic 
status, scholarship, among many other characteristics, which directly 
and indirectly influence experience, values, preconceptions, ideology, 
and interpretations in relation to research (Sumner and Tribe, 2008). 
 
My positionality as the researcher in this work is mainly affected by my 
professional background. In 2004 I had my first contact with the 
implementation of the LDRS when participating in a research project at a 
Research Centre in Mexico that had the aim of visiting five municipalities 
to observe how they where implementing the Ley de Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable in relation to the new attributions of local governments. 
Later on, in 2005, I was hired as a national consultant by FAO to perform 
process evaluations of the components of the SAGARPA programme 
‘Alianza para el Campo’ (the Farming Alliance). I performed this activity 
for the two years until I started my PhD studies in 2007.  
 
The aims and methodology of all the works I developed from 2004 to 
2007 were basically oriented towards contrasting the operational rules 
with administrative procedures in field. They focused on what the 
implementers did and looked for ‘failures’ in the policy design in order to 
make recommendations for more efficient implementation. However, on 
several occasions the fieldwork material offered information about 
explanations that were not even considered in the methodological 
instruments, so much of this information was neglected because it did 
not match any of the research categories of information, or had been 
obtained off the record. 
 
In these three years of professional activity I had the chance to hold 
formal and informal meetings with actors involved in the planning and 
implementation of the SAGARPA programmes, members of the Mexican 
Congress, leaders of producer organisations and peasants. These 
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meetings took place in restaurants, in vehicles during fieldwork trips, in 
the lobbies of public buildings, in seminars and in peasant houses. All 
these interactions with public servants linked to rural development gave 
me a particular perspective on the language and the jargon used by 
people linked to Mexico’s rural sector, the reasons that government 
functionaries give for some administrative decisions on the 
implementation of programmes and the logic behind some peasants’ 
actions in relation to the public programmes.  
 
During that professional spell at FAO I understood that sometimes the 
information you are looking for as researcher is obtained just after the 
interview finishes, when the interviewee feels relaxed because they do 
not feel the pressure of being examined in a formal interview. I realised 
that at that specific moment one can be a participant observer engaging 
in a meal or informal chat, with access to information that otherwise 
would not be available. 
 
In this research my professional background influenced not just the way 
I interpreted the fieldwork data but also how I posed the research 
questions right from the beginning.  I posed questions in a way that 
could produce answers not commonly obtained from process 
evaluations or research based on managerial approaches. I found in 
David Mosse and Norman Long’s research frameworks plenty of room to 
explore development bureaucracies in the way I wanted to. To 
understand the rationale behind certain of the development 
bureaucracies’ implementation decisions I used an ontological approach 
associated with social constructionism to observe how, situationally, 
individuals produce social outcomes. This, says Long, requires throwing 
the net high and wide: 
 
We must encompass not only everyday social practice and language games, 
but also large scale institutional frameworks, resource fields, networks of 
communication and support, collective ideologies, socio-political arenas of 
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struggle, and the beliefs and cosmologies that may shape actors’ 
improvisation, coping behaviours and planned social actions. (Long, 2001: 
4) 
 
Long’s actor-oriented approach is used in this research to generate the 
description of the encounters between the different actors involved in 
the implementation of the PAAP in a micro-analysis of the social world 
behind Mexico’s development bureaucracy in the specific case analysed. 
The analysis seeks to identify the factors that influence actors’ decisions 
and the rationale they use as part of their strategic behaviour. As de Vaus 
(2001:237) explains, case-study designs do not strive to make 
generalisations with the external validity of statistical methods, so 
instead of asking what a study can tell us about a general population, the 
case study design asks what this case tells us about some theoretical 
propositions.  
 
Actor-network theory is used in this research to generate a macro-
analysis that ignores the micro-encounters observed in Chapters 5 and 6 
and focuses on identifying the big picture. I focus on the actors’ network 
of representative elements that produced the development practice 
associated with the implementation of the LDRS. These elements are 
called actors in this approach, as even non-human actors can produce 
meaning and influence human actors’ decisions. From the case study 
developed in Chapters 5 and 6 it was possible to identify the following 
human and non-human elements of the actors’ network in the 
implementation of the LDRS: Congresspersons, LDRS, PAAP, Mexican 
history, clientelism, compadrazgo and the upper, lower, federal and state 
bureaucracies.   
 
Thus the proposed case study design is characterised as explanatory 
because it seeks the causalities of the way development practice is 
produced into particular processes. It comprises multiple cases: 
decentralisation and community participation. It is a retrospective study 
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because it analyses different bureaucratic settings and rationales from 
the beginning of the decentralisation process in 2001 up to now. Finally, 
its design is sequential; that is to say the generation of each case follows 
the last. 
 
Structure of the case study 
The case study looks at two development arenas that show how 
development ideas expressed in the LDRS are transformed into 
development practice by the Mexican bureaucracy; first the notion of 
decentralisation, and second, application of the notion of community 
participation. Both ideas were used to structure in two chapters the case 
study on the federal programme called Programa para la Adquicisión de 
Activos Productivos (Programme for the Acquisition of Productive 
Assets, henceforth PAAP).  
 
As explained in detail in Chapter 2, PAAP was created in 2008 to foster 
the acquisition of productive assets by people living in rural areas. The 
programme assumes that physical capital is fundamental to make 
profitable and sustainable productive activities in rural settings, so this 
programme provides subsidies to the beneficiaries of 25-70 per cent of 
the total cost of the productive asset. Today PAAP is one of few 
programmes whose design complies with the directives of the LDRS, 
although its 2004 predecessors were also precisely designed as a 
response to these directives. PAAP is not a new programme but an 
integration of its predecessors with the main target of increasing 
physical capital in rural areas. It is analysed in light of the original 
programmes created to implement the LDRS.  
 
Like its predecessors, PAAP can operate under a decentralised mode 
involving three levels of government. It also provides participatory 
spaces where members of the civil society and local producers can 
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influence decisions about the allocation of its resources. Cases are built 
here for both of these aspects in two different geographical settings 
where PAAP was implemented.  
 
Two states with different social, economic, political and administrative 
characteristics were selected to illustrate how a national policy is 
interpreted in different settings. The State of Oaxaca in Southwestern 
Mexico has a population of 3,506,821, of which 37 per cent are 
indigenous and 41 per cent are working. Almost a third (464,100 people) 
of the working population work in the primary industry. 6  In Oaxaca 64 
per cent of the rural working population have no earned income; 25 per 
cent earn no more than US$3.8 a day and 11 per cent, US$3.8-19 a day 
(INEGI, 2012).  
 
At the time that the fieldwork was conducted the State of Oaxaca was 
governed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the main 
opposition party to that of the Mexican President, Partido Acción 
Nacional (PAN). The State of Oaxaca has a very complex political system 
at municipal level because it is divided into 570 municipalities, 70 per 
cent of which are governed under a special legal system called the 
‘customs and traditions system’7 while the remaining 30 per cent are 
governed according to common law. Fifty per cent of the municipalities 
ruled under common law are governed by the PRI.  
 
 
 
                                                     
6 ‘Primary industries’ in the context of this research comprise agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, 
quarrying and mineral extraction. 
7 The Mexican Constitution states that communities of mainly indigenous people are to be governed by 
their indigenous customs and traditions. 
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     Figure 4.1: Geographical division of Mexican territories 
 
The State of Jalisco in West Mexico has a population of 6,752,113 of 
which 0.7 per cent are indigenous and 43 per cent are working. Only 8 
per cent (242,000 people) of the working population work in the 
primary industry; 13 per cent of the rural working population of Jalisco 
do not earn an income, 27 per cent earn no more than US$3.8 a day, and 
34 per cent earn between US$3.8 and $19 a day.  
 
The State of Jalisco is governed by PAN, which also governs 50 per cent 
of the 125 municipalities, all of which are ruled by common law.  
 
 There are important differences in the two states’ public administration 
structures. While the State of Jalisco has very modern buildings, highly 
professionalised human resources and standardised organisational 
procedures, the State of Oaxaca has a very precarious administrative 
system at state level, expressed in its non-professionalised personnel 
and the poor condition of its public buildings. 
 
These two locations present two different rural, social and 
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administrative settings to analyse development practice. In this research 
an implementation network is understood as the set of human actors 
involved in the implementation of rural policy at federal, state and local 
levels.  
 
At the local level, two municipalities were selected in each state. Like the 
analysis at state level, the purpose of this is to illustrate bureaucratic 
practice in places with different institutional settings. The selected 
municipalities in Jalisco are Chapala and Jamay (Figure 1.2); and in 
Oaxaca are San Miguel Suchixtepec and San Miguel Coatlán (Figure 1.3). 
 
Jalisco
3.Chapala
5.Jamay 
 
Figure 4.2: Geographical division of the state of Jalisco and the municipalities selected 
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San Miguel 
Suchixtepec
San Miguel 
Coatlan
Oaxaca
 
Figure 4.3: Geographical division of the state of Oaxaca and the municipalities selected 
These locations were selected in order to obtain a holistic picture of the 
decentralisation of rural programmes in Mexico at two levels of analysis. 
One (Figure 4.1) illustrates the process at federal to state level, with the 
federal government the same for both states; the second (Figures 4.2 and 
4.3), shows decentralisation at the municipal level. Figure 3.4 illustrates 
the three levels of government on which the case is based and the seven 
case study locations. 
 
Local level
State level
Mexico
Jalisco
Chapala Jamay
Oaxaca
San Miguel 
Suchixtepec
San Miguel 
Coatlan
 
Figure 3.4: Case study locations from which to build the case study by level of government 
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To examine how bureaucratic structures implement the notion of 
community participation as development practice, the case study is 
based on the local sustainable rural development councils that the LDRS 
sees as the participatory spaces where members of civil society can 
participate actively in the implementation of PAAP. Seven rural 
development councils were studied for this research: the sustainable 
rural development council at the national level, two sustainable rural 
development councils at state level (Jalisco and Oaxaca), and four at 
municipal level (Chapala and Jamay in Jalisco and San Miguel 
Suchixtepec and San Miguel Coatlán in Oaxaca). 
 
 
Research ethics 
The University of East Anglia’s International Research Ethics Committee 
approved the proposed research’s ethical approach for this research. All 
the participants interviewed were first informed about the objectives of 
the research, how the information would be used in the research and the 
potential risks involved in participating in it; thus all interviews were 
carried out with the informed consent of the participants. 
 
Even when personal data was not requested in the fieldwork, the nature 
of the research sought participants’ opinions of informal organisational 
practices, which carried a professional risk if some of the contents of the 
interviews were revealed to third parties. Confidentiality was 
guaranteed to the participants both at the collection stage and in all 
written research reports. No participant is named unless they have given 
explicit permission for this. The names of all the participants were 
masked, both on the datasheets and in the electronic devices where they 
were stored. Information registered during participatory observation 
was strictly used to corroborate practices identified in the early stages of 
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the research; again, the participants’ real names are not used in any 
circumstance. 
 
In the development of the research, ethical issues arose that I had to 
manage carefully as researcher to avoid putting my informants into a 
vulnerable position. This applied when I interacted with them 
personally, such having lunch or travelling to specific locations with 
them. In such situations they spoke to me more openly than during their 
formal interviews. During these informal chats I returned to topics 
discussed in their interview and the informants, provided additional 
insights into the implementation of Mexico’s rural development policy. 
Aware that information revealed under these circumstances was not 
covered by the informed consent given previously, I had to ask 
permission to use these informal talks to inform my research with the 
specific guarantee that I would not refer to them by name in my report.  
 
This information had the quality of off-the-record statements and it was 
evident that it was very sensitive, as most of the participants who spoke 
with me informally only agreed to let me use the information they gave if 
I guaranteed their anonymity. This way of collecting information was 
outside the original plan, but it was necessary because the quality of the 
information corroborated data about some of the influential 
bureaucratic practices based on the directives of informal institutions in 
Mexico’s rural sector. 
 
I tried to avoid manipulating information when selecting quotes from the 
interviews for inclusion in this document. My criterion was to use 
specific parts of conversations held with informants that clearly 
illustrated the situations described or the findings reported. The 
generalisations made in this work rest not only on these quotations but 
also on systematic analysis of all the information collected. 
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Another ethical challenge occurred when FAO staff and government staff 
granted me permission to take part, as a participant observer, in the 
interviews that FAO was conducting in order to make a national 
diagnosis of the problems of Mexico’s rural sector. I tried to observe how 
the FAO consultants carried out these interviews, but the role of 
bureaucrats in the implementation process and the factors that influence 
their decisions was continually brought up during the interviews. It was 
not the main topic of the FAO interviews, but naturally the interviewees 
shifted the interview to that arena. When this happened I participated, 
asking questions to investigate some topics more deeply, and on some 
occasions I took control of the whole interview because the informant 
was reluctant to speak about other topics and was more interested in the 
topics in my own interview guide. The methodological problem here was 
that in some interviews I suddenly became the interviewer rather than 
the observer with eventual participation.  
 
Fortunately the FAO staff understood perfectly that the interviewees 
produced shifts from the interviews’ topics spontaneously and that I was 
not responsible for it. Some information that should be registered as 
observations was suddenly converted into interview material. This did 
not represent any risk to the quality of the information, as the 
informants were aware of the additional use of the information they 
provided in my academic research. 
 
Another ethical element was the way in which some rural individuals 
participated in the interviews. Because it is very easy in rural Mexico to 
identify people who are not from the rural sector by how they dress and 
speak, some rural informants saw me as a public servant or somebody 
from the federal government in Mexico City with access to the 
authorities. Even after clarifying many times that I was a researcher 
from the University of East Anglia, they did not understand what I meant 
and continued to assume that I came from Mexico City and had access to 
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channels by which I could transmit their messages to the Mexican 
governmental authorities. Some asked me to pass a message to the 
authorities in Mexico City about the social and economic needs of the 
population of the region. When this happened I had to explain again that 
I was unable to transmit their message because I was an academic 
researcher, and recommended that they gave their message to the local 
representative of the federal government. They usually behaved as if I 
did not want to transmit the message, not believing that I had no 
connection to the government. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the potential of actor-oriented approaches 
for understanding development practice. Long’s perspective is used to 
understand actors’ decisions in the context of their perspectives. It is 
necessary to explore the planned intervention considering the lifeworlds 
of the actors involved in the implementation of Mexico’s Ley de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. The methodological approach also uses 
Long’s conceptual framework, including identification of the social fields, 
arenas and domains in the implementation arena.  
 
Like Long’s analytical framework, actor-network theory offers great 
potential for discovering how actors in a particular development policy 
process produce development practice as a consequence of the broad 
chain of interpretations by the actors that take part. ANT’s nature leads 
us to ask who produces development practice, which actors influence it, 
how actors interpret each other to make decisions, what those decisions 
are and how they produce development practice. ANT is a powerful 
analytical tool which helps to answer all of these questions in the present 
research. 
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The complementarity in the use of these two research approaches rests 
on ANT’s difficulty in explaining the rationale behind actors’ decisions. 
ANT does not question the nature of the decision or whether a specific 
interaction between two actors is appropriate to deliver the expected 
outcome of a policy. It only describes how actors relate to each other in 
the network and how they interact to produce the network’s outcomes. 
To some extent, ANT provides a macro-representation of the actors’ 
network involved in the implementation of the Mexico’s Ley de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. According to the advocators of this 
approach, avoiding going deeply into explanations of the decision-
making and focusing on the interactions and their outcomes has built 
ANT’s strength as an analytical framework. Some have asserted that ANT 
has a ‘flat’ ontology’ that makes it possible to study the complexity of the 
social world (see Faik, Thompson, and Walsham, 2011). Nevertheless, 
what some see as strength, others may see as weakness in 
understanding the social world, particularly in relation to understanding 
the rationale behind certain actors’ decisions that influence development 
practice. 
 
As shown in this chapter, ANT’s approach sees some actors as ‘black 
boxes’, as it is easier to focus on the interactions between actors than on 
the causes of the interactions, the purpose is to get the big picture of how 
development are produced by the implementation network composed 
by bureaucratic actors. For this reason Long’s (2001) analytical 
framework is employed to carry out microanalysis of actors’ lifeworlds 
and to contextualise their decisions to open the black box to understand 
development practice; that is to say, to understand individual choices in 
the context of the implementation of the PAPP. In doing this, 
participatory-observation, semi-structured interviews and discourse 
analysis are the key research tools to produce information to get a 
holistic view of Mexico’s development bureaucracy. 
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Actor-oriented approaches, like any other research approach, are the 
lenses used by the researcher to identify the variables, specificities and 
aspects of interest about a specific social phenomenon. It would be 
wrong to think in terms of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ research approaches; the 
selection of a research approach should rest on the nature of the social 
phenomenon studied and the specific aspects that the researcher is 
interested in understanding (Gilbert, 2008; de Vaus, 2001). In 
development studies there is a wide menu of research approaches and 
methodologies because it is an interdisciplinary field. They range from 
Marxism and historical institutionalism approaches at one end of the 
spectrum to those ones shaped by symbolic interactionism and 
grounded theory at the other. In the middle are agency-structure 
frameworks, Foucauldian analysis, systems theories, new institutional 
economics and actor-oriented approaches, among many others.  
 
The research approaches proposed by Long (2001) and ANT are chosen 
because the analytical frameworks they offer make possible to identify 
the rationale of actors’ decisions and how actors link with each other in 
the implementation of a development policy to generate insightful 
information and a holistic understanding of development practice. This 
research approach allows identification of the diversity of 
interpretations made by the different actors involved in the 
implementation of Mexico’s Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable to allow 
insights to the particular ways in which some actors make decisions, 
some of decisions strategically contravene the spirit of the rural 
development policy under study. 
 
The ontological approach in this research is based on constructivism, but 
is not based on a purely grounded-theory approach, particularly as Long 
provides a set of conceptual tools with which to set the contexts in which 
actors make decisions. It has no intention of testing any theory, which 
are used only as a referent to the different explanations that can be 
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identified in the field, and it is open to identifying new explanations from 
the empirical work. In terms of the analysis, the strength and the 
weakness of this approach is that it rests on the view of the researcher, 
his knowledge of the local context, local meanings, history, jargon and 
local symbols and his understanding of local institutions (the rules of the 
formal and informal games played by members of a society in different 
locations and situations). So it relies heavily on the researcher as the 
interpreter of the phenomena and on how he codes and systematically 
analyses the information. 
 
Similar to works on the anthropology and sociology of development that 
are based on the actor-oriented approach, this research develops a case 
study as the main method of systematising fieldwork data, analysing 
causal relations and presenting the main findings. The case study 
accounts for how different levels of bureaucracy in different places 
produce development practice from the directives of the Mexico’s rural 
development policy.  
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Chapter 5. Case study of Mexico’s development 
bureaucracy on the notion of decentralisation 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the case of Mexico’s bureaucracy in the context of 
the decentralisation of the country’s rural development policy. The 
implementation of the rural development programme known as 
Programa para la Adquicisión de Activos Productivos (PAAP, Programme 
for the Acquisition of Productive Assets) illustrates how bureaucrats at 
different levels and in various institutional settings in rural Mexico 
produce development practice according to a shared normative 
framework based on the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. Making 
use of the actor-oriented approach presented in Chapter 4, the case 
study shows how these actors’ decisions on policy implementation 
respond to multiple realities and expose the different rationales of 
bureaucracies at every level to interpret and implement the notion of 
decentralisation. 
 
The case study reveals that the decentralisation of Mexico’s rural 
development policy has taken a different route to that expected by its 
policymakers. A first and general conclusion is that rural development 
programmes play a very important role in Mexico’s political system due 
to the historical background of the rural sector since the Mexican 
Revolution. The peasantry has been the object of paternalistic and 
clientelistic practices by different governments throughout the post-
revolutionary years. Bureaucratic actors and programme applicants 
have used clientelism strategically in the execution of new rural 
development policy to produce development practice. 
 
The second general conclusion is that bureaucratic actors play a key role 
in delivering development. The case study has shown that a 
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development initiative such as decentralising rural development 
programmes can produce results that diametrically oppose what is 
expected, if bureaucratic actors behave strategically to avoid losing their 
power over the allocation of public resources. In the case studies 
presented, while these actors did not contravene any of the LDRS’ 
directives they did create a way to simulate the decentralised 
implementation of a rural development programme while maintaining 
their discretional power to influence decisions about the allocation of 
public resources. 
 
The third and last general conclusion is that bureaucracies respond not 
only to political and economic incentives but also to the personal 
sentiments and commitments that shape their decisions, which may be 
just as important, and we must understand these if we are to explain 
development practice.  
 
5.1 The PAAP: the decentralisation of rural development policy in 
practice 
The PAAP was one of eight federal programmes managed by Mexico’s 
Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and 
Food (SAGARPA) to foster rural development in México between 2008 
and 2012. Although it was created in December 2008, it is in fact a new 
version of a programme created in 1996 under the name Alianza para el 
Campo (the Farming Alliance) which included a component to help rural 
producers and peasants expand their productive assets, whether for 
agriculture, livestock or fishing. Another important characteristic of 
Alianza para el Campo that was transferred to the PAAP was the 
decentralisation of its implementation. This decentralisation took the 
form of delegation, 'a situation in which the central government 
transfers responsibility for decision-making and administration of public 
functions to municipal governments or semiautonomous organizations 
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that are not wholly controlled by central government but are ultimately 
accountable to it’ (Litvack, 1998: 6). Alianza para el Campo transferred 
the responsibility for deciding who was eligible to receive help from the 
programme to state government.  
 
In other words the federal government, represented by SAGARPA, 
provided resources to state governments to support the activities of 
rural producers.  I had the opportunity to speak with ‘Pedro’, who was 
Secretary for Rural Development in the State of Oaxaca in 2004-2010 
and had been personal assistant to the Secretary of SAGARPA in 1996. 
According to Pedro, in 1996 the President of the Republic wanted to 
increase state governments’ administrative capacity with the aim of 
gradually delegating more responsibility for rural development strategy 
to them. He said that the Secretary had told him: ‘Pedro, Alianza para el 
Campo was created to be operated by the states, so please send a signal 
to our local branches not to interfere with state government decisions’.  
 
Pedro’s testimony corresponds with the move towards decentralisation 
expressed in the political discourse on ‘new federalism’ of President 
Zedillo’s government (1994-2000).  As explained in Chapter 2, since 
1929 Mexico’s political regime had been highly dependent on the 
president’s power, which had created a centralised political regime and 
administration system. Programmes such as Alianza para el Campo 
sought to create new relations between federal and state governments to 
strengthen the country’s federal system (Rodriguez, 1999: 271). 
 
As also explained in Chapter 2, President Zedillo saw the 
democratisation of the political regime as necessary if a deep political 
and economic crisis was to be avoided. In consequence, the opposition 
began to win local elections and the PRI suffered several electoral 
setbacks from 1995 onwards. The political map changed and in 2000 the 
PRI lost the presidential elections; the new government decided to retain 
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the Alianza para el Campo programme to foster rural development as 
part of SAGARPA’s offer of programmes.  
 
In 2003, Alianza para el Campo was reformulated to accommodate the 
directives of the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (Sustainable Rural 
Development Ac, LDRS). The new design had four objectives: 1) to foster 
the formal organisation of peasants for productive purposes; 2) to foster 
producers’ rural investment, mainly via projects to increase the 
productivity and profitability of their activities; c) to strengthen the 
organisation of Unidades de Producción Rural (UPR, Rural Productive 
Units) and; 4) to strength the levels of health and innocuousness of 
agricultural products (Diario Oficial, 2003: 20). 
 
Alianza para el Campo was regrouped to form four separate 
programmes: the Programa de Fomento Agrícola (Agriculture 
Development Programme); the Programa de Fomento Ganadero 
(Livestock Development Programme); the Programa de Acuacultura y 
Pesca (Fishery Development Programme) and the Programa de 
Desarrollo Rural (Rural Development Programme), making Alianza para 
el Campo – now called Alianza Contigo (henceforth Alianza)  – a strategy 
composed of a set of programmes rather than one single programme. 
Each programme had subprogrammes or components linked to one of 
Alianza’s four objectives; i.e. the capitalisation component was created to 
help producers to increase their productive assets; other components 
provided them with organisational and legal assistance to organise 
themselves as economic units; and another provided technical assistance 
with production techniques and with the health and innocuousness of 
agricultural products.  
 
The new SAGARPA administration’s operational rules for Alianza para el 
Campo in 2003 created further important changes to the programme, 
which can be summarised as follows: 1) if a state government wants to 
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receive resources from Alianza it must sign an agreement with SAGARPA 
wherein both guarantee to allocate a fixed amount of resources from 
their respective budget to the programme; 2) Alianza resources should 
be used to support productive projects, with all applicants presenting an 
application form specifying the technical and economic feasibility of a 
proposed productive project; 3) to receive funding from the programme, 
beneficiaries must also invest in their project; 4) a state technical 
operative unit, Unidad Técnica Operativa Estatal (UTOE) must assess the 
technical and economic feasibility of each application; 5) a trust 
composed of functionaries of federal and state governments must 
approve UTOE’s assessments and resolutions concerning each 
application and release the programme’s resources to the beneficiaries. 
 
To understand the development approach of this new version of Alianza 
para el Campo and the technical justification for the changes to the 
implementation strategy, I talked with two actors who had been closely 
involved in its reformulation in 2003. As the available official data does 
not provide enough information about this, part of my fieldwork for this 
research addressed the technical and the non-technical arguments 
behind the formulation and instrumentation of the LDRS through Alianza 
in 2003.  
 
I interviewed ‘Anastacio’, a former SAGARPA functionary, and ‘Hector’, 
still a SAGARPA functionary, both of whom had participated in the 
reformulation of Alianza para el Campo in 2003. At the time both were 
general directors of the Sub-secretariat for Rural Development, so were 
part of SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy. As general directors they had 
access to planning meetings with the Secretary and Sub-secretaries 
about SAGARPA’s new strategy to foster rural development.  
 
The interview with Anastacio was carried out in his office at the 
University of Chapingo, the most influential university in agricultural 
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matters in Mexico, where he currently works as a professor-researcher. 
At the beginning of the interview he probed me to find out if I knew 
about the Mexican agricultural sector, asking me about the places where 
I have worked and studied; after that he expressed implicit approval at 
being interviewed by me, as he considered that I had enough knowledge 
to talk to him. His implicit approval was apparent in his change of 
attitude towards me, treating me more familiarly, as equals. He decided 
to briefly introduce himself with a brief summary of his professional 
career, highlighting his academic background at the University of 
Chapingo, his spell at FAO as a national consultant and his recent 
involvement as a public functionary as General Director of SAGARPA. 
Although he assumed a very open attitude in answering my questions, 
Anastacio was careful not to give the names of any of his former 
SAGARPA colleagues. He was self-reflective and critical about his spell at 
the organisation, particularly in relation to the attempt to decentralise 
the operation of Alianza. He was emphatic in saying that the main idea 
behind the changes to Alianza’s operational rules was to avoid state 
governments making discretional use of this public resource: 
 
Previous [PRI] governments allowed governors to assign Alianza’s 
resources at public events, official visits by governors to communities, so 
the events worked as forums to show how the government supported 
communities; however, allocating Alianza resources at such events did not 
address the [people] with the most needs: the allocation was not based on a 
technical decision, it was more discretional and sometimes circumstantial. 
For example, at such an event the governor could decide to give a hundred 
tractors to a specific producers organisation for free, or to commit 
resources to a specific person who reached the governor during the event 
asking for support. Thus with the new operational rules we tried to stop 
this discretional way of allocating public resources. 
 
The last line of this quote is very revealing, and other interviews with 
actors in the upper bureaucracy 8  confirmed that SAGARPA’s top 
functionaries see Alianza as a federal programme, so as federal 
                                                     
8 This idea was revealed in interviews and meetings with the Oaxaca and Jalisco delegados (heads of 
SAGARPA’s local branches); the official mayor of SAGARPA, and SAGARPA’s general directors. 
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functionaries they must oversee how the resources are used by state 
government even though the decentralisation has removed this from 
their remit.  Anastacio explicitly said that state governments use non-
technical criteria to allocate public resources for rural development, and 
in so doing are failing to manage these resources efficiently. His implicit 
assumption was that, in contrast, SAGARPA functionaries do know how 
to manage development resources efficiently. Although he did not 
specifically refer to state governments’ political use of public resources, 
when I raised the point in the interview he agreed that the risk of 
political abuse of Alianza was the issue.  
 
Thus two key ideas emerged from this interview. The first is that the 
technical rationale for decentralising Alianza effectively sought the 
empowerment of state governments in local development and a 
reduction in federal red tape. The second idea rests on the upper federal 
bureaucracy’s awareness of the implications of delegating decisions to 
state government; that is to say, the weakening of federal government in 
relation to state governments’ ability to make decisions about public 
resources. There is an feeling among the federal bureaucracy that it is 
unfair for state functionaries to be able to decide about federal 
resources.  
 
When I was leaving the University of Chapingo I could not avoid 
observing how many symbols are embedded in the setting of this 
university in relation to Mexico’s rural sector. There are murals by Diego 
Rivera describing the Mexican Revolution in which peasants have the 
central role, and the university’s coat of arms with the legend: ‘Teaching 
the exploitation of the land, not of the man’ (Enseñando la explotacion de 
la tierra, no la del hombre). These symbols reinforce one of the main 
ideas developed in Chapter 2 about the historical legacy that the Mexican 
Revolution leaves to the peasantry. 
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The feeling of the upper federal bureaucracy about the incursion of state 
government into decision-making about federal resources is clearly 
expressed in Hector’s interview. Hector is a general director who was 
working for SAGARPA when the interview took place. He had a very 
cautious attitude at the beginning of the interview and asked for 
anonymity regarding the use of his comments. The interview took place 
in Hector’s office at SAGARPA’s headquarters in Mexico City. Like 
Anastacio, Hector conceded that the decentralisation is an instruction 
from above – referring to the office of the President – which was not 
received well by most of SAGARPA’s administration.  He said: 
 
Since it was a presidential instruction, the head of SAGARPA had to 
implement it and SAGARPA’s Secretary decided that the Sub-secretary of 
Rural Development must be the person to lead the decentralisation of 
SAGARPA programmes, starting with Alianza. The Sub-secretary of Rural 
Development had a fresh approach to SAGARPA. In theory, the other two 
Sub-secretaries [of livestock and agriculture] must follow the suggestions 
of the Sub-secretary of Rural Development to adequate the components of 
Alianza that they manage to operate according to the spirit of the LDRS. 
This situation created permanent tension between the Sub-secretariat of 
Rural Development and the other Sub-secretariats. The general comment 
was that this strategy would never work in SAGARPA because there is a 
particular way of managing the politics of the rural sector through the 
allocation of public resources. 
 
Hector was acknowledging that rural-sector politics influences decisions 
about the allocation of public resources, specifically in relation to rural 
producer organisations’ power to create political problems at the 
national level if their demands are not met, as I describe later in this 
chapter. This is why Hector pointed out that most of SAGARPA’s 
directive board members did not like the idea of decentralising the 
programme’s operation, as they were sure that state governments would 
use its budget for political and electoral gain. 
 
From Anastacio and Hector’s perspective, SAGARPA had to work out a 
way to decentralise the operation of Alianza that eliminated the 
possibility of what they called ‘political manipulation’. SAGARPA created 
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operational rules for the programme that included barriers to indirectly 
retaining control of its funding. The first barrier obliged applicants to 
justify their request with details of the viability of the productive project 
they were putting forward, and sought to enforce the allocation of 
Alianza funding based on economic and productive criteria. The second 
barrier was a rule stating that the allocation of Alianza resources must 
be managed by trust funds (FOFAE) in each state composed of state 
government and SAGARPA personnel, with all approved applications 
authorised by both. When an application is evaluated and approved by 
state government, a SAGARPA functionary makes the administrative 
decision to release funding to the beneficiary.  
 
When I asked Anastacio whether these barriers contravened the spirit of 
decentralisation he answered in the negative: ‘In the end, those Alianza 
resources were ours [SAGARPA’s resources], so they [state 
governments] had to be accountable to us’. He said this as if it would 
have been unfair of the LDRS to propose giving federal resources to 
states with no requirement to report back to federal government. Hector 
confirmed this feeling at SAGARPA’s headquarters arguing that ‘it was 
the first non-PRI federal administration in 70 years, so the new 
administration did not trust the governors from the PRI’. 
 
Anastacio and Hector confirmed what I had understood from interviews 
with other upper-bureaucracy actors: that SAGARPA’s Sub-secretary for 
Rural Development had been in charge of redefining SAGARPA’s 
development approach in 2000-2006. He was appointed by the Secretary 
of SAGARPA in 2000 and became his right hand to create a new rural 
development approach based on the principles of the Nueva Ruralidad, a 
rural development approach based on the particularities of specific 
territories rather than on the economic potential of particular 
agricultural economic processes and which sees rural development as a 
process that goes beyond agricultural activities and stresses the creation 
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of links between non-agricultural activities and rural environments 
(Mundial, 2003; Kay, 2001). The combination of this development 
approach with the decentralisation of rural development policy resulted 
in new operational rules for Alianza in 2003.  
 
In addition to the barriers embedded in Alianza’s regulations, SAGARPA 
decided to set up two modes of operation, the first delegating the 
administration implementation of the programmes to state 
governments, with SAGARPA performing as a supervisory body 
(ejecución federalizada), and the second leaving the implementation of 
the programme exclusively to SAGARPA’s administration (ejecución 
nacional). Thus the implementation of Alianza was not decentralised as a 
whole as SAGARPA retained the allocation of some of its resources 
without the intervention of state or municipal governments.  
 
According to Anastacio, the original idea was to decentralise Alianza 
para el Campo as a whole: 
 
…that was the intention of the Sub-secretary for Rural Development when 
he was instructed to design SAGARPA’s new rural development 
programmes; however, he also received pressure from the Sub-secretaries 
for Agriculture and Livestock Development, so they negotiated a space in 
the rules to keep the operation of a fraction of the programme exclusively 
under SAGARPA’s control. 
 
The above is the ejecución nacional mode of operation. The justification I 
heard from the Sub-secretaries of Agriculture and Livestock 
Development was that SAGARPA is responsible for directing the 
resources of its programmes to national rural development priorities, 
and decentralising the decision-making process would not guarantee 
that state governments would address such national priorities. 
 
As mentioned, this case study focuses on how development practice is 
produced by the network of actors involved in implementing the LDRS 
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and in particular Alianza, the instrument designed by the federal 
government to carry out the new rural development policy directives. 
The analysis of how the policy is put into practice focuses on the 
component of Alianza that addresses increasing rural producers’ 
physical productive assets (capitalización). This chapter focuses on the 
decentralisation of the programme at state level; the next chapter 
discusses its local implementation, specifically regarding the 
involvement of civil society.  
 
I take the operational principles behind the capitalización component of 
Alianza as a reference for the analysis. Encounters between the various 
actors involved in the implementation of Alianza provide the basis on 
which to build a case study based on their different lifeworlds. In Long’s 
words, all ‘forms of external intervention necessarily enter the lifeworlds 
of the individuals and groups affected and thus, as it were, come to form 
part of the resources and constraints of the social strategies they 
develop’ (Long, 2001).  Long uses the term ‘lifeworld’ as Schutz does 
(1962) to describe the contexts in which actors make decisions. The 
purpose of describing actors’ lifeworlds is to depict the ‘lived-in’ and 
‘taken-for-granted’ world of the social actor; methodologically, this 
requires an understanding of practical action shaped by a background of 
the actor’s intentionality and values (Long, 2001:54).  
 
Everyday life is experienced as some kind of ordered reality, shared with 
others (i.e. it is inter-subjective). This ‘order’ appears both in the ways in 
which people manage their social relationships and in how they 
problematise their situations. Even a brief conversation with an individual 
quickly reveals some aspects of his/her effective or meaningful network of 
social relations and at the same time a glimpse of the personal constructs 
with which the person categorises, codes, processes and imputes meaning 
to his or her experiences (past and present) (ibid). 
 
Thus an actor’s lifeworld in this research means the particular set of 
factors attached to the actor’s way of life that shapes his/her 
interpretation of his/her environment to make decisions. These ‘things’ 
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could be values, beliefs or cultural objects that are part of his/her 
everyday life. Actors of different natures have encounters during the 
implementation of the LDRS, some of which represent a clash of different 
lifeworlds, different interpretations of the same object that are all 
perfectly valid if one considers each lifeworld as the background to such 
interpretations. Long emphasises the relevance of these encounters to 
understanding the social world in the following terms: 
 
Inter-individual action encompasses both face-to-face and more ‘distanced’ 
relationships. The types of social relationships range from interpersonal 
links based upon dyadic ties (such as patron–client relations and 
involvement in various types of transactions – buyer–seller, producer–
money lender, and client–ritual specialist, farmer–extensionist, etc.) to 
social and exchange networks, to more formally constituted groups and 
organisations (such as farmers’ organisations, cooperatives, village 
councils, churches, etc.) where legal prescriptions, bureaucratic legitimacy 
and authority and defined membership criteria assume greater 
significance. (ibid) 
 
Thus at the different stages of the case-study programme there are 
different encounters between different actors. The analysis of these 
interface encounters and identification of the different lifeworlds 
embedded in such encounters are the key elements on which an 
explanation about how development practice is produced can be built. 
 
In 2003 the capitalización component was present in each of Alianza’s 
programmes. In 2008, Alianza was again restructured, following 
recommendations by the FAO, that each of SAGARPA’s programmes 
should address one type of support offered rather than, as previously, 
three separate programmes, for agriculture, livestock and rural 
development.  Under the new structure there were eight programmes: 
the Programa para la Adquisición de Activos Productivos (Programme for 
the Acquisition of Productive Assets), Programa de Apoyos Directos al 
Campo (PROCAMPO) (Programme for Direct Farm Support), Programa 
de Inducción y Desarrollo del Financiamineto al Medio Rural (PIDEFIMER, 
Programme for Rural Sector Induction and Development of Financing), 
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Programa de Uso Sustentable de la Producción Primaria (Programme for 
the Sustainable Use of Primary Sector Production), Programa de Atención 
a Problemas Estructurales (Programme to Address Structural Problems), 
Programa de Soporte (Support Programme), Programa de Atención a 
Contingencias Climatológicas (Climate Contingency Programme) and 
Programa de Fortalecimiento a la Organización Rural (Programme to 
Strengthen Rural Organisations) (see SAGARPA, 2009 for details of each 
programme).  
 
In the words of a senior FAO consultant who advised SAGARPA on this 
restructuring:  
 
The advice we provided to SAGARPA basically focused on helping them to 
put order into their actions because the evolution of their programmes in 
the last 20 years responded to specific situations and administrative 
matters, rather than to the roots of problems identified in a formal 
diagnosis. For example, we offered to restructure all the SAGARPA 
programmes based on the rural sector’s current problems, but this would 
imply the elimination of some of the current programmes or components as 
there would be no technical justification to keep them. The answer we 
received from SAGARPA to our suggestion was a straight ‘NO!’ The 
argument was that several internal administrative areas might complain 
when they realised that the programmes they operated would not be 
available any more. So the only option they accepted was our help to group 
the components of each programme according to the type of services or 
goods that it provides. 
 
The interview with this senior FAO consultant reveals some aspects of 
the bureaucratic thinking of top SAGARPA functionaries.  As it shows, 
these functionaries prefer not to make decisions that will optimise the 
impact of their programmes because they would cause internal struggles 
between SAGARPA’s different bureaucratic areas: instead they choose 
the  second-best option of simply regrouping their current programmes 
in relation to the nature of the components that compose them, a 
decision that to some extent maintained the status quo in SAGARPA’s 
administrative structure;, that is, nobody in the administration structure 
would feel their jobs threatened by the changes .  
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Due to these changes to the operational regulations of SAGARPA’s 
programmes in 2009, I cover both the capitalización component of 
Alianza, which operated from 2003 to 2008, and the PAAP from 2009 
afterwards to identify and analyse development practice. Both are 
basically the same SAGARPA policy instrument under different names. 
The general objective of the PAAP is the same as the capitalización 
component of Alianza: to help rural producers and peasants to increase 
the physical capital they use productive activities in agriculture, 
livestock or fishing, for example in shovels, hammers, ovens, irrigation 
systems, containers, feeders, boats, fishing nets, tractors and so on. In 
2003 this support was extended to the acquisition of productive assets 
for non-agricultural activities in rural areas, such as machinery and tools 
for local bakeries, small restaurants, Internet shops, handcraft studios, 
coffee shops, etc.  For practical purposes in this research it would be 
used indistinctly the terms ‘PAAP’ and ‘component of capitalización of 
Alianza’ to refer to SAGARPA programme that is used in this work to 
illustrate the implementation process of the LDRS. 
 
The PAAP only partially subsidises the cost of productive assets; the 
beneficiary must provide 20-50 per cent of their value. To apply for the 
PAAP subsidy applicants fill out an application form on which they must 
demonstrate that the aid requested is part of a sustainable productive 
project; as mentioned earlier, this requirement was introduced in 2003. 
From the PAAP application to the allocation of resources there is a series 
of interface encounters between different actors involved in its 
implementation process.  
 
As explained in Chapter 4, interface analysis is used to understand the 
responses of local actors to the implementation of the PAAP. For this it is 
necessary to identify the encounters that occur at points where 
‘different, and often conflicting, lifeworlds or social fields converge, or 
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more concretely, in social situations or arenas in which interactions 
become oriented around problems of bridging, accommodating, 
segregating or contesting social, evaluative and cognitive standpoints’ 
(Long, 2001: 65). I show that there are social arenas in the PAAP process 
in which peasants engage differ from those where high-profile farmers 
develop their activities. Similarly, the upper and lower bureaucracies 
have their own rules, social and organisational settings in which they 
produce development practice. Hence each encounter accounts for the 
particularities of the interactions between several actors in the different 
PAAP processes. 
 
5.2 Encounters at the interface: Bureaucratic actors in the 
implementation of the PAAP 
The first encounter for analysis takes place at the intersection of the 
lifeworlds of potential PAAP beneficiaries and staff at the programme’s 
front desks (ventanillas de atención), where applicants can get 
information about and apply to governmental rural development 
programmes for resources. Before 2003, SAGARPA only received 
applications at ventanilas de atención at its local Rural Development 
Support Centres (CADER). With PAAP’s decentralisation in 2003, 
ventanillas de atención were operated by both state and municipal 
governments. This encounter is characterised by applicants’ interaction 
with the civil servants in charge of receiving applications for PAAP 
resources. 
 
Once the applicant submits an application form it is reviewed and 
accepted by a ventanilla de atención programme officer and sent to a 
technical unit for assessment of its financial and technical viability. In 
some cases an application must be approved by two technical units, one 
internal and one external – the latter is usually the UTOE. If these 
consider the application acceptable the final approval rests with a small 
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committee of government officers. This second interface encounter, also 
analysed here, takes place in the council of the FOFAE, the trust 
managing the PAAP’s resources. Here a superior technical commission 
decides which applications deserve to be supported according to the 
state’s rural development priorities. At the core of this council there is a 
clash between SAGARPA’s middle bureaucracy and the State Secretariat 
of Rural Development (SEDER), a governmental organisation.   
 
The decisions made in the FOFAE are the main indication of the 
decentralisation of rural development policy, for it is here that local 
government decides which applications to prioritise for PAAP subsidies. 
This involves the coordination of federal, state and municipal 
government administrative structures not only in receiving and 
analysing the applications but also in defining the criteria for resource 
allocation.  
 
The FOFAE is an intergovernmental body composed of ten government 
officers – five from federal government and five from the state 
government concerned. The PAAP rules that the president must be the 
state governor and the vice-president, the local SAGARPA representative. 
The key role is given to state government, with SAGARPA in a 
supervisory role. The most influential decisions about resource 
allocation are reserved for functionaries of the federal and subnational 
governments; municipal government is not included in this committee. 
 
After the FOFAE decides to approve, modify or reject the technical units’ 
assessments of the applications, the next step is to inform the applicants 
of the results. The staff at the ventanillas de atención that originally 
received the application notifies the applicants that they have been 
accepted or rejected. This is the third interface encounter for analysis 
and takes place between the actors analysed in the first, the ventanillas 
de atención staff and the applicant, at a later point in the PAAP process. 
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A beneficiary whose application has been approved must make the 
promised investment in productive assets and prove, with purchase 
receipts and in situ, that s/he has done as stated in the application. This 
involves two encounters between different actors: the supplier of the 
productive asset and the ventanillas de atención staff, who check that the 
investment has been made. After this the beneficiary receives a cheque 
refunding part of their investment.  
 
All of these encounters take place on the ground and involve 
beneficiaries and lower bureaucracy dealing with the directives of the 
LDRS through the PAAP. At this level other non-bureaucratic actors such 
as the private technicians and suppliers of productive assets also play an 
important role in producing development practice. As mentioned above, 
discourse analysis is used to build the case study, with the focus on 
understanding how different actors in the implementation network 
translate the idea of decentralisation into development practice, as 
described in the following subsections. The case study seeks to identify 
some of the factors that account for certain actors’ decisions in the PAAP 
implementation process; in other words, it seeks to discover the 
rationale behind actors’ decisions in the local context.  
 
Interface encounters at ground level: ventanillas de atención staff: the 
public face of the Programa de Activos Productivos 
Since 2003, Alianza’s operational rules have stated that applicants’ 
contact point with the programme for information or to applying to a 
programme should be the authorised ventanillas de atención agreed 
between SAGARPA and the state government. To understand the role of 
bureaucracy at this level in the context of the rural development policy it 
is necessary to briefly review the development of the governmental 
administrative structures.  
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Before Alianza para el Campo appeared in 1996, SAGARPA had a wider 
network of administrative offices distributed across the country to 
administer its programmes. The basic administrative unit of this federal 
structure was the CADER. Each CADER was strategically located in a 
rural area to provide popular access to SAGARPA services.  CADERs 
report to their local Rural Development District (DDR), an administrative 
unit that coordinates their work. SAGARPA has divided the national 
territory into 192 DDRs and 713 CADERs to manage its rural 
development programmes.  
 
When Alianza para el Campo was launched, a downsizing of SAGARPA’s 
administrative structures began to reduce the number of personnel at its 
own local branches and CADERs and DDRs in response to the economic 
crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. The purpose of decentralising rural 
development programmes was to reduce the fiscal load on federal 
government by delegating their implementation to state governments, 
hence also fostering municipal governments’ capacity-building as they 
created their own administrative contact points for the rural population. 
 
According to Anastacio and Hector, who worked or had worked at 
SAGARPA’s headquarters, the downsizing of SAGARPA’s administrative 
personnel was intended to be compensated by the development of state 
and municipal governments’ own administrative structures. Before 2003 
SAGARPA only received applications for its programmes at its local 
CADER and DDR ventanilas de atención. After 2003, the decentralisation 
of the PAAP’s operations included ventanillas de atención operated by 
state and municipal governments. The first encounter that I analyse, 
below, is that between staff at ventanillas de atención and applicants at 
both the federal and state level.  
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A CADER operator’s perspective 
I begin with Alonso, the Chief of a CADER located in Oaxaca’s Sierra Sur. 
He has worked for SAGARPA for 20 years and is responsible for the 
administration of SAGARPA programmes across 45 municipalities. When 
I approached him I explained that I was interested in what had changed 
with the decentralisation of the PAAP and the inclusion of state and 
municipal governments in its administration. Although I made it clear 
that my activity was strictly academic and that I would respect his 
anonymity, at the beginning of the interview Alonso was defensive, 
providing short answers and stating that everything was going well with 
the decentralised operation of the PAAP. However, as the interview 
continued and empathy grew between us, he became more open in his 
responses and admitted that there have been some unexpected 
outcomes that are shaping the implementation of Mexico’s rural 
development policy. The first aspect he highlighted was how, with the 
introduction of the decentralised mode of operation, managing the PAAP 
has become a complex task for CADER’s operators: 
 
The changes to the operational rules about the capitalización component of 
the  [PAAP] produced extra work for us, because in the past we only had to 
inform the people which productive assets SAGARPA would subsidise for 
the current convocatoria [invitation to apply], then they [applicants] write a 
letter requesting specific productive assets. Generally the allocation of 
programme resources used to be made by SAGARPA on a first-come-first-
served basis until the resources ran out […] Today, with the new PAAP 
rules, it is very difficult for applicants to understand the requirements for 
formulating a productive project to justify their request for a specific asset. 
[…] You know, here the peasants have very low level of education; many are 
illiterate, so many require help even to write a plain letter. So formulating a 
productive project is a complex task for them – it’s almost impossible, I’d 
say.  As we, the ventanillas staff, don’t have time to help them formulate 
their projects they have to resort to freelancers that know how to [do it]. In 
the end, these new rules make it more difficult and more expensive for 
peasants to apply to the programme, and the worst of it is that they have no 
guarantee that after spending money on formulating the project they will 
receive a PAAP subsidy. 
 
Alonso seemed to be complaining about his increased workload with the 
new programme design. The common working environment of a CADER 
Chapter 5. Case study of Mexico’s development bureaucracy on the notion of decentralisation 
 147 
member of staff is an old-fashioned office of about 402m with shelves 
embedded in all the walls and overloaded with files.  This type of office is 
the remains of a super-administrative structure that operated in the 
mid-1970s and 1980s but now, since the downsizing of the federal 
bureaucracy, they look old and abandoned as there are no resources for 
their maintenance and just a few personnel working there, usually the 
CADER head and one or two assistants. Alonso did not appear convinced 
that asking programme applicants to put forward a productive project 
was a more effective way of allocating rural sector resources. From his 
perspective it only generated problems for the applicants and for 
themselves as programme operators; for the applicants, this was the cost 
of hiring a professional to produce a suitable project, while for the 
CADER operators it was a complex procedure since it required to verify 
that applications are correctly presented and they have uncertainty 
about the application assessment process, as it is their job to notify 
applicants about whether or not they have been successful. This final 
notification is problematic for CADER operators: 
 
Now, with the decentralised operation, peasants have other places to 
submit their applications such as state government ventanillas. This has 
caused problems for [SAGARPA] ventanillas because some applicants 
whose projects are rejected complain that they know that other people who 
submitted their applications to the state government ventanillas have been 
accepted […] They see this as a personal issue, as if we don’t want to grant 
them a subsidy, and of course this is untrue because the decisions are made 
by the technical commissions. 
 
According to the PAAP’s operational rules, applications for a subsidy 
must be handled in the same way, independently of the ventanilla de 
operación to which it has been submitted. However, in practice some 
applications submitted to SAGARPA ventanillas de operación are treated 
differently from those submitted to state government ventanillas de 
operación. The reason for this variation is based on local SAGARPA and 
state government SEDER branch agreements to run the technical 
commissions that assess the applications. Speaking with CADER chiefs at 
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the Istmo of Tehuantepec and the Oaxaca Centre, I understood that these 
are informal agreements between SAGARPA and SEDER and that 
ventanilla and SEDER operators have created a political clientele for 
their programmes. This is where politics arises in the implementation of 
the PAAP. Alonso expressed his frustration at the political use of the 
PAAP: 
 
Sometimes our bosses say: ‘Well, what I am doing here if all I do as a 
ventanilla is disappoint [people]? I only authorise 5-10% [of applications] 
and our counterparts [state ventanillas] authorise 100 per cent of the 
applications they receive’.  
 
By ‘authorising’, Alonso meant ensuring that each application fulfils the 
PAAP’s regulations prior to sending it to the technical unit for 
assessment.  Alonso’s complaint was about the unfairness he sees in the 
decentralised mode of operation for SAGARPA’s administrative 
structure. He pointed out that as the state government of Oaxaca 
represents the interests of the PRI, the federal government has to fight 
the political clientelism9 that the state government fosters. From his 
perspective, fighting the state government’s clientelistic practices is very 
difficult because the state government knows how to put pressure on the 
federal government. When asked why SAGARPA allows administrative 
units operated by the state government to ignore some of the PAAP’s 
directives such as the technical assessment of the applications, Alonso 
was clear: 
 
For me it’s fear, isn’t it? Fear of those who take part in the [technical 
commission meetings], I guess; maybe I’m wrong; many of us [SAGARPA 
personnel] look after our jobs, don’t we? And maybe if they [SAGARPA’s 
members of the technical commission] don’t accept the position of SEDER 
[state government] functionaries there will be complaints, won’t there? 
And maybe they think they [SAGARPA’s members of the technical 
commission] might get fired, and in the future they won’t find a job, not 
even with the state government. 
                                                     
9 Note the clientelism as an informal institution that works as a system of exchange between politicians and 
citizens, as explained in Chapter 2. 
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Alonso suggested that mid-level federal bureaucrats in the technical 
commissions do not have the full support of their upper-bureaucracy 
bosses in strictly applying the PAAP regulations in the spirit of the LDRS. 
As a result they have to be careful to maintain good relations with their 
counterparts at SEDER to avoid any conflict that could become political 
and may lead to them being punished by their own bosses. The nature of 
the concern rests on public complaints that state government can make 
about how SAGARPA manages PAAP resources. Since the programme is 
meant to be operated in the spirit of decentralisation, the public image of 
SAGARPA could be jeopardised by political action by the peasantry. So 
Alonso’s main complaint is that he has to contend with state-level 
political dynamics, as a member of the federal lower bureaucracy he is 
not allowed to get involved in politics but must strictly apply the 
operational regulations. 
 
As I explain later, this inconsistency in the assessment of applications is 
the result of informal arrangements between upper bureaucrats at 
SAGARPA’s local branches and SEDER that split the decisions in the 
technical commissions and avoid clashing over their views of the ‘right’ 
way to allocate PAAP funding. Ventanillas de operación staff are not privy 
to the details of these informal agreements and do not know how the 
technical commissions reach their decisions. For Alonso, the way 
technical commissions work puts the ventanillas de operación in a very 
vulnerable position towards the local population because as federal 
government functionaries, they apply the PAAP’s regulations to the letter 
while SEDER’s operators do not because as state functionaries they are 
beyond federal law.  
 
CADER’s operators explained that the state government method of 
allocating PAAP resources is to split the budget that it manages into very 
small amounts in order to reach as many people as possible, because it is 
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subsidising cheap productive assets. This was how the PAAP worked 
under Alianza para el Campo before the productive project approach 
was incorporated in its operational rules, and people are accustomed to 
this approach. ‘That’s how we used to work in the past’, as Alonso said. 
 
On the other hand, SAGARPA distributes PAAP resources through CADER 
and DDR offices that try to respect the PAAP’s development approach; 
that is, they support viable productive projects. However, as most of the 
rural population are unable to formulate a productive project correctly 
many of the applications are rejected by CADERs because they are not 
properly presented. This is turning people in the community against  
SAGARPA staff who appear to them not to want to help them: Alonso 
says: ‘Many [applicants] think we only accept and support applications 
from friends or people that give us some kind of bribe, which is not true.’  
 
CADER’s functionaries spend much of their time explaining to applicants 
about the federal government’s priorities, the right way to present a 
productive project and that decisions about their application are made at 
a higher level where they have very little influence. However, when the 
assessment results are released by the technical commission, in some 
cases CADER’s personnel cannot explain why some have been rejected 
and often stand accused of corruption.  
 
With this inconsistency in the application results, CADER’s operators see 
the PAAP as no different from the 1996 version with, as Alonso said, 
‘more paperwork to do, but with the same results, uncertain decisions 
from the top […] that’s why we haven’t changed anything about how we 
run the programme: we’ve just adapted the new regulations to our 
traditional operations’. 
 
Applicants do not know which programme they are requesting resources 
from. It is difficult for them to understand how public programmes work 
Chapter 5. Case study of Mexico’s development bureaucracy on the notion of decentralisation 
 151 
and their administrative requirements because the majority of the rural 
population has little education; illiteracy is very common in rural Mexico. 
Hence most applicants have to trust the person in charge of the CADER’s 
front desk. There is a long-established relationship between CADER 
officials and the community, as most have run SAGARPA programmes in 
the community for several years – similarly as the middle bureaucracy 
the lower bureaucracy of SAGARPA are also hired on permanent basis10. 
Their interaction with the rural population is exemplified by the 
experience of the CADER official in Oaxaca: 
 
People do not read the invitations that we paste on the walls of the office;  
they always come to me personally to ask me when they will be able to 
apply for public funding. They don’t identify the different SAGARPA’ 
programmes, they only want to know when they can apply. Some people try 
to give me money or gifts with their application so they can feel that I will 
put effort into processing it. If I reject them they think I’ll bin their 
application. I have to convince them that it’s not up to me but to the 
technical commissions that work in the capital city […] When the result of 
an application is not favourable to the applicant and they see that their 
neighbour has been granted resources from an application submitted to a 
SEDERS office they shout at me and tell me that they won’t trust us any 
more and will go to the state government. 
 
The hunt for beneficiaries: interface encounters at ground level 
SEDER’s functionaries compete with SAGARPA’s offices to prove that 
state government can satisfy the demands of the rural population more 
effectively. In Oaxaca, SEDER’s lower and middle bureaucracy functions 
and work conditions are similar. They have temporary contracts, which 
makes it easy for their superiors to control them. Their unofficial main 
task is to become political activists for the state government, creating 
and consolidating their superiors’ political capital. When elections are 
due, PAAP beneficiaries are reminded about the support they have 
received from the state and specifically the ‘help’ provided by some 
functionaries to apply successfully for PAAP resources. 
 
                                                     
10 This view was shared by all the CADER and DDR personnel interviewed in Oaxaca and Jalisco. 
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In Jalisco, the lower state bureaucracy works differently to that in 
Oaxaca. Jalisco has developed a network of municipal advisors to 
facilitate the application process of PAAP to potential beneficiaries in the 
municipal governments’ front desk. Theoretically, all municipal advisors 
must be accountable to all three levels of government and are the most 
important actors fostering the decentralised operations of the PAAP. 
Their main responsibility is to act as a link between the Municipal 
Councils for Sustainable Rural Development (CMDRS) and federal and 
state programmes for rural development such as the PAAP. However, in 
practice municipal advisors are more accountable to state government, 
and CMDRS resolutions are commonly neglected by SEDER and 
SAGARPA11.  
 
In Jalisco some municipal advisors (asesores municipales) are committed 
to working as freelancers to facilitate the rural population’s access to 
PAAP resources, their main drivers being work values and a vocation for 
public service; however, others see their position as a means of 
increasing their own political capital by using their political connections 
with members of the upper bureaucracy to influence the assessment of 
applications that they personally support. Local news travels fast, so 
when a municipal advisor is very effective in bringing resources to a 
community s/he will immediately find many people around her/him 
requesting support from the programme in exchange for votes when 
required. Just in Jalisco, nearly eleven municipal advisors ran for 
municipal government seats in the 2009 municipal elections.  
 
In general, municipal advisors are in the role of development broker in 
the sense that Mosse (2006) uses the term; they operate as facilitations 
as for the rural population as the upper and middle bureaucracy. They 
are not formally part of the governmental bureaucracy as they are 
                                                     
11 In Chapter 6 this topic is developed and the main causes for the indifference of state and federal 
governments to CMDRSs are identified.  
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contracted as free agents, paid to achieve specific aims and on a 
temporary basis. In Oaxaca the municipal advisors are little involved 
with the implementation of the, working more as CMDRS and municipal 
government facilitators to manage the municipality’s relationship with 
federal and state government, as analysed in the next chapter.  
 
Interface encounters at the upper federal bureaucracy: redesigning 
rural development programmes under a decentralised approach 
 
At another level of the chain of interpretations of the implementation 
process of the LDRS, there are those in charge of leading the 
decentralisation of federal rural development programmes. This is the 
responsibility of the heads of SAGARPA, including the Secretary and Sub-
secretaries of Agriculture, of Livestock and of Rural Development. These 
functionaries belong to the upper federal bureaucracy and are the 
decision-makers who lead the changes in SAGARPA’s operational 
structure to comply with the LDRS.  However, as I will show, complying 
with the LDRS directives about decentralising rural development policy 
means very different things to different bureaucratic actors at this level.  
 
When the LDRS was enacted the Secretary of SAGARPA was instructed 
by the President of the Mexican Republic to implement it at the national 
level. At that time he saw in the LDRS an opportunity to reverse the over-
centralisation of rural development policies. In particular, the 2000-
2006 federal administration was interested in demonstrating a different 
style of government from that of previous administrations as it was the 
first government led by a party other than PRI for 70 years. 
 
Two years after the LDRS was enacted the Secretary of SAGARPA 
decided to implement the LDRS through the reformulation of the rural 
some of the development programmes managed by SAGARPA, 
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specifically the sub-programmes that composed the one called Alianza 
para el Campo. He chose the Sub-secretary for Rural Development, to 
lead the integration of the principles of the LDRS into Alianza para el 
Campo. In that year the operational rules of all of SAGARPA’s 
programmes were modified to incorporate the principles of the LDRS to 
create a decentralised mode of operation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
main characteristic of this operational mode is FOFAE, a trust 
comprising state government functionaries who make decisions together 
with federal functionaries about the allocation of SAGARPA programme 
resources. The other key characteristic of this operational mode was the 
inclusion of state administrative units to process applications for 
resources. 
 
Although the notion of decentralisation expressed in the LDRS calls for 
the delegation of decision-making about federal programme resources to 
subnational and municipal governments, this is not an operational rule. 
The Sub-secretary for Rural Development received pressure from 
different actors to avoid affecting their interests. What interests were 
they protecting? First, SAGARPA’s headquarters middle bureaucrats, 
mainly represented by administrative units directors, subdirectors and 
managing directors, demanded a guarantee from the Secretary of 
SAGARPA that the programmes they had managed for years would have 
a place in SAGARPA’s restructuring. These white-collar workers could 
not see themselves performing a different role in the organisation and 
were afraid that their operative unit might disappear. 
 
Second, SAGARPA’s Sub-secretaries of Agriculture and of Livestock 
informed me SAGARPA had previously committed to delivering 
resources from SAGARPA programmes to specific producers’ 
organisations. The full decentralisation of the programmes could not 
guarantee the allocation of public resources to these organisations as 
subnational government now had the power to prevent it. 
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These two underpinning aspects were enough to constrain the redesign 
of SAGARPA’s programmes. In the end, SAGARPA’s Sub-secretary for 
Rural Development could not create new operational rules that fully 
complied with the spirit of the LDRS so he had to produce an 
intermediate solution. There was pressure from other subsecretaries to 
allow them to retain control of the allocation of at least a certain 
percentage of SAGARPA’s programme resources. The answer to this from 
the Sub-secretary of Rural Development was the incorporation of the 
FOFAE trust in SAGARPA’s decentralised programmes. The only way that 
FOFAE can release resources to beneficiaries is with both federal and the 
state approval. The operational rules make it mandatory for all 
allocation letters to have the signatures of both the head of the local 
branch of SAGARPA and the head of the respective SEDER for each state. 
 
Besides the decentralised mode of operation, an alternative was also 
contemplated in SAGARPA’s operational rules based on centralised 
management similar to the model that SAGARPA had been running 
previously. Both of these measures, the use of a trust and centralised 
management, were ‘safety’ measures that SAGARPA took to avoid losing 
control over decisions about programme resource allocation.  
 
If the purpose of the LDRS’ decentralisation was to delegate decision-
making responsibilities it is unclear why senior SAGARPA officers were 
reluctant to relinquish control over final decisions about allocating 
resources from its programmes. According to a senior SAGARPA officer, 
the Secretary of SAGARPA was explicitly instructed by the President of 
the Republic ‘not to make waves’ (no hacer olas) nationally, by which he 
meant keeping the social peace in the rural sector. Retaining control of 
programme resources gives SAGARPA the chance of containing potential 
social outbursts in the rural sector. When peasants or rural producer 
organisations face problems they customarily organise demonstrations 
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to express their problems in the national arena through road blockages 
or by taking over public buildings. The federal government’s usual 
method of disarming such demonstrations is to negotiate directly with 
the leaders and committing resources from SAGARPA’s programmes to 
resolve the protesters’ problems, or at least to reduce their effects. So 
usually protesters receive money from SAGARPA’s programmes in this 
situations. 
 
A more effective method that SAGARPA has used to deal with rural 
organisations’ national demonstrations over the years is though a yearly 
commitment to the latters’ leaders to assure to their organisation public 
resources from SAGARPA’s programmes. Thus the allocation of 
resources from its programmes has not been tied to efficiency criteria 
but to social and political dynamics in Mexico’s rural sector. The Sub-
secretaries of Agriculture and of Livestock saw did not see 
decentralisation as alleviating rural development problems on the 
ground but rather as hindering their ability to resolve them. 
 
Interface encounters between federal bureaucracy and state 
bureaucracies: the fight to control the PAAP budget 
The State of Oaxaca presents a particular political and social context that 
requires special analysis. In the first place there is political antagonism 
between the two levels of government – federal and state – as Oaxaca’s 
government is led by the PRI, the strongest opposition party. Second, 
Oaxaca is well known for having one of the most politically active 
societies in the country. It is common for citizens to organise themselves 
in social or political groups to protest against a public decision that 
might affect them. Oaxaca society is so combative that most protests do 
not end until the protesters get what they want or the government 
represses them via the police. Citizens often put pressure on the 
government by blocking public buildings or roads. 
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Since the LDRS now delegates decisions about allocating federal 
resources for rural development, in Oaxaca the federal government sees 
its administrative and political power threatened by the political 
antagonism that exists between federal and state governments over the 
notion of decentralisation. Below, the head of SAGARPA’s Oaxaca branch, 
– called the delegado if is a man or delegada if a woman – interprets the 
notion of decentralisation in the implementation of the PAAP: 
 
The state government is only thinking politically and electorally; they aren’t 
thinking about the real development of rural society. If we give them the 
chance to manage federal resources for rural development it’s certain that 
they’ll break it up into small sums in order to reach as much of the rural 
population as they can because they’re looking for votes  – you know what I 
mean, right? They don’t care whether public investment fosters sustainable 
livelihoods; they only want to distribute goods that look like gifts from the 
state [government] to the population. That’s why we have to stop them 
doing that; we have to guide them, regulate them, punish them when 
necessary […] That’s why SAGARPA has got the design of the PAAP’s 
operational rules right; with the current rules the [state government] needs 
my signature to allocate PAAP resources. Without my signature they can’t 
spend one penny from the programme. So even when they can decide 
which applications to support, all of them will require my consent. I think 
it’s fair, because the resources are federal so they have to be in line with our 
view of development. 
 
These lines reveal the rationale that SAGARPA functionary uses to justify 
blocking the state government regarding the PAAP’s decentralisation. He 
also mentioned during the interview that he had received instructions 
from his superior at SAGARPA headquarters to protect the position of his 
office in Oaxaca by blocking any attempt by state government to use the 
PAAP’s resources to promote their image or create any electoral 
clientele. However, his argument does not make clear what state 
authority activities SAGARPA sees as attempts to promote their political 
image. This leaves room for the head of SAGARPA’s Oaxaca branch to 
boycott the decentralised operation of the PAAP at his discretion. 
 
Theoretically, the PAAP’s policy design considered the use of an entity 
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through the federal and state governments set common rural 
development objectives and define the PAAP’s role in achieving them. 
This entity is called the Consejo Estatal para el Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable (State Council for Sustainable Rural Development). As the 
LDRS recommends, the chairperson of the council is the Governor of the 
State of Oaxaca, who usually delegates the Secretariat for Rural 
Development of the State of Oaxaca (SEDER) to represent him, and the 
vice-chairman is the head of SAGARPA’s local branch. The LDRS also 
consider the participation of rural producers and civil society in this 
council. However, in all my conversations with upper bureaucracy 
functionaries the council was never mentioned as a relevant space for 
collective decision-making by the two levels of government because in 
practice, decision-making spaces like this, created as a result of the 
LDRS, are not accepted by the actors concerned.  
 
The reason that bureaucrats at both levels of government do not accept 
this space, which is of such relevance to their coordination and 
cooperation, is that making this council work as intended would reduce 
the discretional spaces they hold around decisions about the allocation 
of PAAP resources. Making use of the council as stated in the PAAP’s 
operational rules would mean that both bureaucracies must be 
transparent about the criteria they apply to potential beneficiaries 
applications –such as local priorities, preferred social strata, type of 
productive projects, etc. – to decide whether they are eligible for support 
from the programme. As it stands, both avoid using the council and the 
allocation of public resources has become a negotiation process between 
the two levels of government with neither revealing their criteria. 
Arguing in this council in general terms allows functionaries to justify 
awarding subsidies to particular individuals, families or groups of 
producers. Therefore the council sessions are only held to give the 
impression of fulfilling the LDRS’ normative requirements, as this is not 
where decisions about PAAP funding are made.  
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The political-electoral use that state governments might do of PAAP 
resources is the main argument used by the federal bureaucracy to 
justify its active intervention in the decentralised mode of operation of 
PAAP. The federal bureaucracy assumes a paternalistic attitude towards 
lower levels of government, arguing that they themselves have the 
necessary knowledge, experience and ethics to allocate the public 
resources efficiently and justly. They try to give the public the message 
that their intervention is protecting them from the factious behaviour of 
lower levels of government. In the federal bureaucracy’s view most state 
and municipal governments do not understand the technical rationale 
behind the allocation of public resources because they lack capacity or 
are politically biased. This paternalistic discourse is strategically used to 
justify intervention in the decentralised operation of the PAAP at 
different stages of its implementation.  
 
The fact that all decisions about the PAAP made by state or municipal 
governments must be approved by a SAGARPA functionary gives the 
federal bureaucracy a great power to control the allocation of public 
resources. So federal government uses this power to negotiate with 
subnational governments the way PAAP resources should be allocated, 
usually rejecting some of the applications already approved by state 
governments. However, state governments know well that the Mexican 
Congress has set a deadline for the allocation of all federal programme 
resources; they also know that SAGARPA is responsible for allocating 
these resources on time. Knowing this, state functionaries boycott 
FOFAE, delaying decisions on applications for PAAP funding. This 
mechanism of pressure of state governments makes federal bureaucracy 
to accept some of the applications previously rejected using SAGARPA’s 
criteria. SAGARPA is sensitive to this pressure because they need to 
receive the support of SEDER functionaries to allocate PAAP resources 
on time or to support particular applications that SAGARPA is really 
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interested in funding with PAAP resources. It is an exchange of favours: 
one level of government is interested in supporting particular 
applications and the other also has its favourites. 
 
Another way that the State of Oaxaca’s upper bureaucracy puts pressure 
on the federal government is by sending contingents of peasants to 
Mexico City, where SAGARPA’s headquarters are located, to demonstrate 
against SAGARPA’s programme allocation policy with the aim of 
compelling the federal government to allocate SAGARPA programme 
resources to peasants or producers living in specific places or in 
particular social conditions, or engaged in particular productive 
activities. Federal government has shown that it is very sensitive to 
social protests from the rural sector, which has the sympathy of civil 
society due to its historical economic and social vulnerability and the 
peasants’ combative role in the Mexican Revolution of 1910 (see Chapter 
2). 
 
Peaceful or violent demonstrations are generally used to block the main 
streets around SAGARPA’s offices, or to symbolically close the offices. 
Sometimes the demonstrators bring the entire harvest of a crop that has 
been damaged by economic or climate causes into the main entrance of 
SAGARPA’s building. It is common for the federal government to 
negotiate with protesters through a SAGARPA officer to guarantee the 
allocation of public resources from SAGARPA programmes to their cause. 
Usually all travel expenses for getting the peasants to Mexico City are 
covered by the state government through informal channels, leading the 
public to think that the peasants are demonstrating independently as a 
social right to express themselves. 
 
Although the government of Oaxaca can use these two mechanisms 
against the federal government, they only do so when negotiating is 
difficult. Informal codes of communication between the federal and state 
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bureaucracies have been developed, to facilitate implementation of the 
PAAP’s decentralised operations. The interview with the Secretary of 
Oaxaca’s SEDER reveals his lifeworld and illustrates how these informal 
practices work and the political interests hidden behind them. 
 
I carried out the interview at his office in conjunction with a FAO 
consultant. The Secretario arrived late for the appointment: we had to 
wait more than 30 minutes in the lobby and when he finally arrived we 
were taken to his office, a luxurious room equipped with very expensive 
furniture including a big desk of fine wood. Photographs of the Secretario 
and state political authorities in rural locations of Oaxaca hung on all the 
walls. When he arrived in the office he justified his delay by stating how 
busy he was, without any apology. The person who had arranged the 
interview with him was a functionary accountable to SAGARPA and 
SEDER; he introduced us to him, using very careful language and tone of 
voice, showing a lot of respect to the Secretary – it was a clearly 
submissive attitude. The Secretary barely paid attention to the 
functionary’s introduction and when he left the office he asked us again 
what the specific purpose of the interview was. He had been 
misinformed by his assistant about the purpose of the meeting and 
thought we would be applying a structured questionnaire. When he 
realised the scope and topics of the interview, of which the focus was to 
understand the interaction between federal and municipal governments 
in implementing the PAAP, he requested the support of three members 
of his staff.  
 
The staff members that responded to his call were the Head of  the Rural 
Development Programme, the management chief and the management 
assistant. The three men remained standing by the Secretary’s desk, 
waiting for him to start to talk. At that moment I observed their great 
respect for the figure of the Secretary, I realised that the presence of his 
staff at the meeting responded not to his need for information but was a 
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ritual to show who was ‘boss’ in the room. The Secretary sat behind his 
big luxurious desk; his leather chair was also big and luxurious and he 
continuously swivelled on it, looking us in the eye. It was clear that he 
wanted to let us know that we were on his territory, with his people, and 
should follow the rules of his office, whatever they were, which I did not 
know.  
 
This environment made me feel uncomfortable, so I decided to move on 
with the interview and asked him directly what was happening with the 
decentralisation of SAGARPA’s programs. As background to the question 
I mentioned that the technical rationale for decentralising SAGARPA’s 
programs was apparently to create spaces of convergence for different 
levels of government to address the rural development problems based 
on the local perspective. I pointed out that I had observed a struggle 
between the federal and state governments to allocate the resources of 
SAGARPA programs under the decentralised mode. The Secretary 
interrupted me before I finished my question and started to answer. He 
accepted that there was a struggle going on between the federal and 
state governments and explained the issue in the following terms: 
 
The struggle [between the federal and state governments] is to address 
politics; there it is! […] Clientelism, yes, people must see that ‘I [the federal 
government] give to you [state government]; you come [for money] and I 
rule [how the money has to be spent]. So this pushes you, as Secretary of a 
free and sovereign state, to go to [Mexico City, the Federal District] all the 
time, right? You heard a few minutes ago [in a phone conversation] that I 
am [promoting some greenhouse projects], so I have to go to talk to the 
director of a federal programme and say: ‘Mi directorazo [My great director 
(informal)], how are you, man? What happened with the money for the 
projects?’ [Secretary’s staff laugh] Right? That’s stupid! You know what I 
mean? 
 
Implicitly, SEDER’s Secretary is saying that he has to behave in a certain 
way to receive federal programme resources. He must behave almost as 
if he is asking for a special personal favour, when in fact he is only 
requesting federal programme resources to solve a local issue. He must 
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begin the request with his homologous at federal government, and if that 
functionary does not answer positively the SEDER Secretary goes to the 
next-highest-ranking functionary until he gets the answer he wants. If 
the issue is very important he calls the Secretary of SAGARPA directly.  In 
this part of the conversation he was referring to FIRCO (Fideicomiso de 
Riesgo Compartido), a federal government trust managed by a SAGARPA 
technical agent.  
 
According to the SAGARPA programme regulations there is no space for 
any state functionary lobbying about a project; however, in practice 
there is a lot of lobbying about the allocation of public resources. In this 
case the Secretario had been approached by some producers for help in 
making their applications to SAGARPA programs successful. Even though 
the state government  does not play a formal role in the allocation of 
resources managed by FIRCO, the producers know that the Secretario 
can influence SAGARPA decisions. This is possible because the Secretary 
of SEDER has informal spaces of power that maintain the social stability 
of the state and even the country. In this particular situation the 
Secretary of SEDER had to approach the Director of FIRCO in a very 
friendly and respectful manner. After this informal protocol, the Director 
of FIRCO gave instructions for the support of applications patronised by 
the Secretario. In exchange the Secretario offered public recognition to 
FIRCOS’s Director and social peace –at least for a period of time. 
Although FIRCO programs were not meant to operate in a decentralised 
mode, this example provides important evidence about the informal 
practices that are frequently seen in the operation of most federal 
programs.  
 
In the specific case of PAAP, the Secretary of SEDER expressed his view 
about the risk to SAGARPA of decentralising the rural development 
programmes, as he explained in the following terms: 
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[By decentralising its programmes, SAGARPA] loses power to control and 
manipulate public resources […] this is because they [federal government] 
think they control the public resources with this scheme, so every year you 
have to renew your agreement [with the federal government], every year 
you have to review how much is going to be budgeted, how much they are 
going to give your state, and then the issue of discussing the operational 
rules, every year they change the programmes […] the thing is that it is a 
bloody scheme of chaos… for the producers – ha! Because maybe we, as 
bureaucrats, assimilate [changes to the regulations] faster, but not a 
producer – even this [chaos] drives you to an underallocation of program 
resources […] Today we have a joint-execution scheme [with the federal 
government], it is not clear you [federal government] are the norm and I 
[state government] am the executive, because we are so similar in all [the 
implementation process], even producing a pay check: in order to be 
cashable it needs the signature of the Head of SAGARPA’s local branch and 
my signature. 
 
In this part of the conversation the Secretary of SEDER revealed what the 
decentralisation of rural development programs meant to him. He posed 
his view in terms of political power: he thought that having control of the 
allocation of public resources gave one the opportunity to control and 
manipulate people for electoral purposes. That is why he suggested that 
federal government was just simulating the decentralisation of the rural 
development programs; he thought the current formal institutional 
arrangement did not delegate the allocation of resources to the states, as 
SAGARPA was co-participating in the execution of the programs. He saw 
several constraints in PAAP’s operational rules that restricted the action 
of state government’s allocation of the resources of programs executed 
under the decentralised mode of operation.  The SEDER Secretary 
participated directly in the design of the precursor programme to PAAP 
in 1995, so he knew and was easily able to identify very well the 
differences in the programmes’ design. His knowledge and experience 
gave him powerful argumentative tools that he used against federal 
functionaries to negotiate the terms of the implementation of PAAP in 
his state.  
 
SEDER and SAGARPA have arrived at an informal arrangement that 
reduces the struggle between these levels of government and gives each 
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the power to allocate PAAP resources. They both pretend that they 
decide together how PAAP’s resources should be allocated based on 
technical criteria. However, in fact they have agreed that each will be 
responsible for assigning a percentage of the PAAP’s resources. 
Commonly, SEDER has 60 per cent of the resources and SAGARPA has 
the remaining 40 per cent, and both sides are satisfied. The federal 
bureaucracy can allocate 40 per cent of the resources of a programme 
that, with a decentralised approach, is meant to be operated wholly by 
state government.  
 
The 40 per cent agreed allows the local SAGARPA office to fulfil the 
federal government’s political commitment to certain groups of 
producers, which are mainly producers’ associations. It is equally 
important is that they use their resources to maintain visibility locally by 
making it clear that it is federal government that provides the resources 
for rural development.  
 
The main benefit for state governments is that they can decide on the use 
of federal resources. Although in most circumstances they must 
contribute with state resources if they want to participate in the PAAP, 
the federal resources are at least double the formers’ contribution. Thus 
subnational governments have important funding with which to satisfy 
their commitments to producer groups and peasants, whether these are 
of a personal or a political nature.  Under this informal arrangement 
SAGARPA does not question SEDER’s choices and, reciprocally, SEDER 
does not attack or question SAGARPA’s application selections. Everybody 
seems to be happy, at least in the upper bureaucracy. 
 
After two hours of interview, the Secretary of SEDER was completely 
confortable talking to us and started to use colloquialisms and swearing 
to express himself. He implicitly pointed out that peasant and producer 
organisations are loyal to the state government, so the federal 
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government had to use a strategy against the state government based on 
the creation of new organisations to balance the social and political 
power that traditional organisations represent in the country.  
 
This interview with the Secretary of SEDER confirmed what other 
sources have also said:12  that the state government uses peasant 
organisations as a means of forcing federal government to allocate 
SAGARPA programme resources to peasants or producers in specific 
places or social conditions or those engaged in specific activities. One 
way they do this is by sending a contingent of peasants to protest in 
front of the SAGARPA headquarters in Mexico City, blocking the main 
streets around the building or symbolically shutting down the SAGARPA 
offices. Another way the protesters pressurise SAGARPA is by dumping 
the complete harvest of crop that has been damaged by economic or 
climatic causes in the main entrance of the SAGARPA headquarters. 
Travel expenses for carrying people to Mexico City are usually covered 
by the state government through informal channels.  
 
As described in Chapter 2, the federal government has been very 
sensitive to social protests that come from the rural sector. Politically the 
rural sector has the sympathy of all social sectors due to its historical 
economic and social vulnerability and peasants’ combative role in the 
Mexican Revolution of 1910. Therefore it is common for federal 
government – through a SAGARPA officer – to negotiate with protesters 
to guarantee the allocation of public resources from SAGARPA programs 
for their cause.  
 
The Secretary of SEDER knew how this worked and explained that 
SAGARPA had tried to limit the influence of SEDER on the allocation of 
                                                     
12  The CNC National Secretary, the Head of SAGARPA’s Oaxaca branch, State Coordinator of the 
Sustainable Rural Development Councils at Jalisco, SAGARPA’s Planning and Rural Development 
Manager at Oaxaca’s local branch and SAGARPA’s Fisheries Office Manager at Oaxaca local branch. 
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SAGARPA programs resources by enforcing the PAAP’s operational 
rules; however, he asserted that SAGARPA’s attempts have not reduced 
his influence over the allocation of public resources. He confidently 
ridiculed SAGARPA’s functionaries, calling them ‘a bunch of idiots’ who 
did not know how the normative framework of public administration 
works, as he does. So SAGARPA’s use of their regulations toward state 
governments is not a threat for him as it could be for Secretaries of 
SEDER in other states. The following quote from the Secretary of 
SEDER’s interview represents not just the political nature of the struggle 
between the two levels of government but also the means and rationale 
used to fulfil their expectations. 
 
The Panistas [members of the PAN party] think they lost the [previous state 
election], then Usabiaga [a former head of SAGARPA] tries to find out how 
to bring new votes back in favor of PAN. To do so he tried to foster several 
parallel organisations [of peasants and producers] to the existing ones […] I 
think he tried to balance the [social and political] power of the CNC 
[Peasants National Confederation]. On the other hand he tried to appoint 
delegados who do not play in favour of state governments and whose main 
function would be to ensure the right application of programme regulations 
in the operative sphere. As consequence, a lot of delegados and sub-
delegados of SAGARPA suddenly appeared saying: ‘I interpret the norm 
buddy, so fuck you.’ […] So when they want to fuck me I fuck them. Why it 
will not be approved?’ [the Secretario imitates a federal functionary] 
‘Because I [federal functionary] interpret the norm; that is to say, I am the 
law [Secretario and others laugh] – I have to say that they do not fuck with 
me, I have always fucked them! But imagine how many Secretaries of SEDER 
[in other states] know their local administrative structure [well] and how 
many of them know how [headquarters] works. 
 
This case in Oaxaca shows how two different political parties converge in 
the implementation of PAAP and openly struggle to control the allocation 
of public resources for rural development. However, in Jalisco, where the 
same political party –PAN – governs the state and the federation, the 
situation is the same but with a more subtle struggle that it is just 
possible to observe when talking to middle and lower bureaucrats. 
Jalisco’s upper bureaucrats said that coordination to implement the 
PAAP in Jalisco has always been strictly linked to the programme’s 
operational rules and that relations between the two levels of 
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government is respectful and cooperative. As I show in Chapter 6, 
cooperation between the two levels of government in Jalisco is also 
influenced by the different political groups of the PAN at state level and 
commitments to persons and groups that support the political projects 
of various PAN leaders in the state.  
 
Managing PAAP resources involving personal sentiments: the case of 
SAGARPA’s head of finance department 
SAGARPA’s head of finance department manages SAGARPA budget and is 
based at SAGARPA headquarters. He is responsible for authorising the 
allocation of resources to each of SAGARPA’s administrative units, 
whether at headquarters or a local branch. The head of SAGARPA’s 
finance department is able to freeze or extend the budget for the several 
programmes that SAGARPA manages nationally. Although his position is 
little different to the same office in any organisation, in Mexico’s public 
administration this is a position with power over the staff of SAGARPA’s 
administrative units, who all confirmed that they had to maintain a good 
relationship with him as this makes things easier for everybody. Having 
a good relationship with the head of SAGARPA’s finance department 
means being provided with resources for the operation of programmes 
on time.  
 
Understanding the position of the head of SAGARPA’s finance 
department is relevant if we want to understand Mexico’s development 
bureaucracy because it illustrates the important role of personal and 
political relations in the production of development practice. While I was 
carrying out my fieldwork the Secretary of SAGARPA appointed a new 
head for the finance department, a man with whom he had a good 
relationship. Both SAGARPA’s Secretary and the head of its finance 
department were born in the State of Jalisco and developed a close 
personal relationship over many years, as the Secretary of SAGARPA was 
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the Governor of Jalisco. According to state functionaries interviewed in 
Jalisco, the Secretary of SAGARPA totally trusts the head of SAGARPA’s 
finance department and allows him to make decisions without 
consulting him. 
 
According to programme directors at SAGARPA’s headquarters, one day 
in 2008 the head of SAGARPA’s finance department called a meeting of 
SAGARPA programmes’ heads at headquarters where he expressed 
concern about the poor social and economic conditions he had found in 
his hometown on a recent visit. Nostalgically he described how beautiful 
this rural area had been fifty years ago and told the programme heads 
that he wanted a plan drawn up to recover his home town and foster 
rural development using SAGARPA’s programme resources. 
 
The programme managers could not refuse his request as they knew 
how close he was to the Secretary of SAGARPA, so they could receive a 
reprimand if they did not respond to his demands. In the words of a 
programme director: 
 
You cannot say ‘no’ to the Head of Finance because it would imply loads of 
administrative delays to my requests to that office to make my programme 
work properly by delivering resources to the different SAGARPA branches, 
and you know the most important menace for us as public functionaries is 
not complying with the regulations because administrative sanctions we 
can get. In addition, this particular Head of Finance has a very close 
personal relationship with the Secretary of SAGARPA – I think that even 
they are compadres, so you don’t want to upset the boss, right? 
 
The Head of Finance’s request had several administrative implications 
for functionaries in the middle bureaucracy, who had to find a way to 
justify the use of SAGARPA’s money in the finance head’s home town. 
They had to create records that made it look as if citizens from the town 
had applied to specific SAGARPA programmes and the technical 
commissions and Jalisco’s FOFAE had approved the applications. During 
a visit to the site I observed the investment that had been made in the 
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head of the finance departments home town. 
 
This example illustrates how programme managers, knowing full well 
that the allocation of PAAP resources must be the result of technical 
deliberations by the Council for Sustainable Rural Development and 
state committees, had to ignore this formal mechanism to fulfil the 
personal demands of SAGARPA’s head of finance department. The latter 
had explicitly asked for a way to be devised to allocate SAGARPA’s 
programme resources to his hometown and implicitly asked them to 
pretend that this was a collective decision by state and municipal 
government with the support of SAGARPA. This example shows how 
decentralisation of the operation of rural development programmes can 
be hindered by the personal interests of a top bureaucrat who thinks 
that his wish for the development of a rural part of the State of Jalisco 
should be seen as technically rational. However, I show later on in this 
chapter that SAGARPA’s middle bureaucracy sees this as no more than 
the whim of a top bureaucrat who manages SAGARPA according to his 
own personal and political commitments. Programme directors 
interviewed at SAGARPA’s headquarters explained that they were tired 
of attending to the desires of top bureaucrats who often asked them to 
improvise in order to fulfil their wishes, which required them to falsify 
the records to show that resources had been allocated by the rules and 
after technical analysis. 
 
In Jalisco there is no extreme antagonism between federal and state 
government like that described in Oaxaca. This makes it easier for top 
SAGARPA functionaries to influence the decisions of local technical 
committees. As functionaries from the State of Jalisco have become 
SAGARPA’s functionaries there are strong links with the state 
administration; both governments are in the same political party, 
although different internal groups have their own political interests. In 
Jalisco many of the unexpected results of the decentralisation of rural 
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development programmes are produced by egocentric styles of 
management combined with strong personal links between certain 
members of the upper bureaucracy. 
 
The middle bureaucracy: dilemmas in the implementation of the PAAP 
Part of the PAAP’s implementation network involves programme 
managers, directors and subdirectors of administrative units related to 
the PAAP at both the federal level – at headquarters and in local 
branches of SAGARPA – and subnationally in SEDER. In this research, I 
call middle bureaucracy to the administrative body that is not directly in 
contact with programme beneficiaries, and does not have the power to 
make decisions about the criteria used to allocate resources, middle 
bureaucracy. The decentralisation of PAAP was a challenge for middle 
bureaucrats, who had to arrange and coordinate many issues with their 
counterparts at other level of government. Public functionaries at this 
bureaucratic level take part in the technical commissions that evaluate 
the technical feasibility of PAAP applications; thus their greatest 
responsibility is to achieve consensus on application approvals.   
 
At this level there are remarkable differences between the federal and 
state bureaucracies. The middle bureaucracy at the federal level call 
themselves arrastra lapices, which can be translated as ‘scribes’, 
referring to those who do the hard work. They see themselves as 
maintaining SAGARPA’s proper functioning. They believe that they know 
how to ensure successful programme implementation and perceive 
themselves as a neutral machine that knows how to deal with all the 
political struggles of the upper bureaucracy without jeopardising the 
proper operation of the programmes. However, their view of successful 
implementation is limited to allocating programme resources as laid out 
in the operation manuals and the timescales set in them. They are not 
interested in the outcomes of the programmes. Their self-confidence is 
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based on having worked as public servants in the organisation for a 
number of years. They have survived several changes of government, the 
most important in 2000 when the PRI lost the presidential election. Most 
SAGARPA personnel at this level are part of the civil service, so they have 
some degree of stability in their position.  
 
At the subnational level, the middle bureaucracy is very vulnerable to 
changes in the subnational upper bureaucracy. Most functionaries 
secured their jobs through personal invitation or recommendation. This 
hiring tradition means that middle bureaucrats owe their positions to 
their superiors and hence their commitment is to the person who helped 
them to get their job, with the organisation’s objectives and even its 
normative framework coming second. The middle bureaucracy at state 
level is the coordinating body of a politics machine – the operational 
body being the lower bureaucracy, as I explain later – as they carry out 
the strategy and administration of resource allocation in rural 
development programmes. Their aim is to show the people that the state 
government is supporting the rural population through the PAAP and to 
make sure that beneficiaries remain aware of the political party that is 
supporting them. Payback time comes when elections are held.  
 
The clash between these different dynamics driving middle 
bureaucracies at the federal and state levels makes the coordination of 
rural development policy almost impossible. In the State of Oaxaca this 
clash is very clear, as the political origins and views of federal and state 
governments is so divergent. The PAAP manager of the Fisheries 
Division at SAGARPA’s Oaxaca branch expressed the frustration of the 
federal middle bureaucracy: 
 
Unfortunately, I have seen how municipal government only sees [the PAAP] 
as a bag of money that helps them to promote themselves politically […] 
This morning I was telling some state functionaries that is not possible to 
allocate PAAP resources like confetti, only considering small projects that 
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are not economically feasible by their nature – projects that will be 
abandoned by the end of the year! I said that allocating PAAP resources for 
two fish-tank projects is not efficient; it would be cheaper [for the 
applicants] to buy the fish at the supermarket than to produce them. With 
that kind of allocation policy we will not overcome rural Oaxaca’s economic 
backwardness. Actually, we already have plenty of fish tanks that have not 
been installed, and people are selling them off in parts. [... state 
government] does this deliberately with the aim of reaching as many 
people as they can, ignoring the expected impact that those resources 
should produce…  
 
This PAAP manager provides insights into the rationale behind his 
counterparts’ practices at the subnational level. The state’s middle 
bureaucracy seeks to maintain and extend the network of political 
support for the state government by asking for the loyalty of inhabitants 
of rural areas when elections are due; a way to ask for a payback to 
programme’ beneficiaries in electoral times. This implies diluting PAAP 
resources in order to reach as many people as possible, regardless of the 
possibility of success resulting from public investment. The state 
government of Oaxaca prioritises the rural population due to the rural 
nature of the territory, while SAGARPA’s middle bureaucracy seeks to 
approve PAAP applications based on the size of productive projects that 
has been identified at the national level as potentially economically 
feasible. Thus while the official federal position invests PAAP money in 
clearly profitable projects, SEDER supports any kind of project, even 
those based on consumption goods.  
 
In the intergovernmental technical commissions, SEDER officials’ 
justification for their strategy is that in Oaxaca most of the rural 
population do not have the physical capital or capability to carry out 
large productive projects. To some extent this is accurate: most rural 
productive units in Oaxaca are small family allotments. SAGARPA’s view 
is mainly based on relations with large farmers’ organisations to the 
members of which it has traditionally allocated public resources.  The 
difference between these two views has resulted in the informal 
arrangement to divide the PAAP budget and allow each side control of its 
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own resources, as discussed above. 
 
The rationale for such informal agreements rests on the fast 
administrative output that middle bureaucrats have to produce for their 
superiors. At this level SAGARPA employees understand the potential 
benefits of fostering the decentralisation of rural development 
programmes, but most are not interested in whether it is successful in 
practice because they are focused on the operational results expected of 
them in the short term: allocation of the programme’s resources 
according to the programme normative. Their understanding of a 
successful programme is limited to the allocation of all the resources for 
each programme according to its operational rules. To justify their 
importance they constantly refer to subnational bureaucracies’ political 
bias. 
 
SEDER’s middle bureaucrats, however, do not to operate the PAAP with 
full awareness of its design. Perhaps this is because in the administrative 
and political agenda of the state government, being completely informed 
about the design of SAGARPA’s programme is not relevant as it does not 
influence the practices of state middle bureaucrats, who see it as just one 
more federal programme whose administrative procedures they must 
follow in order to access its resources. As explained earlier, bureaucracy 
at this level works to build and strengthen a social base that they hope 
will support upper bureaucrats in their political aspirations. However, 
one must be cautious about typifying their rationale in political terms. 
The aspiration of middle bureaucrats at the state level is to have a source 
of income to satisfy their day-to-day needs. They seek merely to retain 
their jobs by satisfying their superiors’ requirements. As long as their 
bosses hold their own positions they too will keep their jobs; and their 
bosses’ position in the upper bureaucracy depends on their political 
progress. I observed this behaviour in both Oaxaca and Jalisco, although 
in Oaxaca the antagonism between the two levels of government is more 
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explicit than in Jalisco. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the case of the policy process behind the 
capitalización component of the programme Alianza para el Campo, also 
known as Programa para la Adquicisión de Activos Productivos (PAAP: 
Programme for the Acquisition of Productive Assets). The programme 
was redesigned in 2003 by the Mexican federal Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs to fulfil the directives of the new Ley de Desarrollo 
Rural Sustentable (LDRS). This chapter has described how bureaucratic 
actors have put the notion of decentralisation into practice as part of the 
rural development policy’s implementation strategy. The case study was 
developed retrospectively and considers the different hierarchical levels 
of the bureaucratic structures involved in implementing the programme 
in two states, Oaxaca and Jalisco, in 2010. 
 
I have shown that the decentralisation of Mexico’s rural development 
policy has taken a different route to that expected by its policymakers. 
Decentralisation was considered as a development strategy in the design 
of the LDRS in 2010 as a way of allocating public resources for rural 
development efficiently through municipal governments which, in 
theory, have a better understanding of local problems and locations and 
the people affected by such problems as well as have the closeness to the 
citizens to make governments more accountable. However, after seven 
years of its implementation the expected results have not been produced 
in the case-study locations.  
 
A first and general conclusion is that rural development programmes 
play a very important role in Mexico’s political system due to the 
historical background of the rural sector since the Mexican Revolution, 
when the peasantry had a symbolic place in the political realm. This 
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sector is therefore very influential in the allocation of public resources 
for rural development. After the revolution the federal government 
assumed a paternalistic stance towards the peasantry, which became a 
relationship of clientelism in the 1990s. Before 2000 the federal 
government allocated public resources via rural development 
programmes to support specific groups in the rural sector in exchange 
for their votes at elections. This clientelism became an informal 
institution in Mexico’s political system.  
 
Bureaucratic actors and applicants have used clientelism strategically in 
the execution of new rural development policy to produce development 
practice. In decentralising rural development programmes it was not 
possible to make work, in the way it was meant, the collective bodies in 
which converged federal and state governments to produce technical 
decisions about the allocation of the resources of the PAAP.  
 
It became clear in the case study that the political interests of upper state 
and federal bureaucrats shape their decisions about implementation of 
the PAAP. Upper federal bureaucrats are fighting the delegation of all 
such decisions to lower levels of government, arguing that the latter are 
not responsible enough to allocate public resources with an apolitical 
approach. They fear losing control of the allocation of SAGARPA’s 
programme resources, which would also mean losing the political 
visibility that they enjoy when operating federal programmes through 
the federal administrative structure.  Meanwhile, upper state 
bureaucrats are fighting to secure discretional power to use federal rural 
development programme resources to fulfil their development agenda, 
which in most cases is associated with creating or maintaining their 
political-electoral clientele in the rural sector. 
 
This struggle between the state and federal upper bureaucracies to 
control the allocation of the PAAP’s resources has generated a space for 
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negotiation in which each has found a way to fulfil their political 
interests. They divide the programme’s budget into two parts, and each 
controls one part. Both give the public impression that they are making 
collective decisions about the whole of the programme’s budget. In 
practice, each side makes its own discretional decisions about the 
allocation of their agreed percentage of funds. This institutional 
arrangement sets up a structure that leads to federal and state 
functionaries competing with each other to satisfy the needs of the local 
population and thus secure their political support, but this results in 
inefficient allocation as their decisions are not made via the proper 
channels. This practice directly contradicts the efficiency objectives of 
decentralisation. 
 
On the other hand the lower bureaucracy, the front line of federal and 
state governments, show that the operation of rural development policy 
is not only based on political-electoral criteria. This bureaucratic stratum 
reacts to incentives other than political ones in its implementation of 
rural development programmes. The lower federal bureaucrats see the 
new policy as the whims of the upper bureaucrats which gives them 
extra work, so rather than generating new practices to address fulfilling 
the requirements of the decentralised mode they adapt the new 
requirements to the old ones, operating the new programmes almost as 
before. Federal lower bureaucrats are more concerned about the 
personal pressure on themselves when dealing with applicants for 
programme resources and avoid speculation about their role in 
allocation decisions. They are not concerned with political cycles, as 
most have permanent posts and have worked in the same position for 
different national governments and political parties for years. 
 
The job security of lower state bureaucrats is usually linked to the 
political cycle. Most of these functionaries were appointed on the basis of 
strong personal links known as compadrazgos, which are represented by 
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loyalty to their superiors based on friendship. The rationale behind this 
bureaucratic stratum is based on the direct instructions of superiors that 
are often outside the spirit of Mexico’s rural development policy. Usually 
at this level such decisions are based on the state government’s need to 
expand its new political-electoral clientele during its term in office, 
which is usually six years, The aim is to bring as many people as possible, 
including those supported by federal programmes such the PAAP, onto 
their side using state government resources. These bureaucrats are 
aware that their jobs depend on their superior’s position, which in turn 
depends upon the position of the governor. 
 
Thus the second general conclusion is that bureaucratic actors play a key 
role in delivering development. The case study has shown that a 
development initiative such as decentralising rural development 
programmes can produce results that diametrically oppose what is 
expected if bureaucratic actors behave strategically to avoid losing their 
power over the allocation of public resources. In the case studies 
presented, while these actors did not contravene any of the LDRS’ 
directives they did create a way to simulate the decentralised 
implementation of a rural development programme, in the practice of 
maintaining their discretional power to influence decisions about the 
allocation of public resources. 
 
The third and last general conclusion is that bureaucracies not only 
respond to political or economic incentives but also to the personal 
sentiments and commitments that shape their decisions, which may be 
as important as political or economic incentives, and we must 
understand these if we are to explain development practice. 
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Chapter 6. Case study of Mexico’s development 
bureaucracy on the notion of community participation 
 
Introduction 
Like Chapter 5, this chapter presents the case of Mexico’s development 
bureaucracy in the context of the implementation of the Programa para 
la Adquicisión de Activos Productivos (Programme for the Acquisition of 
Productive Assets, PAAP), in this case focusing on the notion of 
community participation. Is is shown that the result of of a chain of 
interpretations on the nottion of community participation reveals the 
abandonment of community participation as a strategy for rural 
development in Mexico. Eleven years after the introduction of the LDRS 
and eight years since its implementation, today community participation 
through municipal councils is just a fiction.  
 
It is described encounters between the different levels of bureaucracy.  
The first section presents a review of how this notion of community 
participation was incorporated into the design of the LDRS, particularly 
in the PAAP’s operational rules. Section 6.1 reviews some of the 
conceptual foundations of community participation in development. 
Section 6.2 describes the interface encounters between actors that 
participate in the implementation process of PAAP, which account for 
how community participation is implemented in rural Mexico. There is a 
description of the different lifeworlds of the actors in the PAAP’s 
implementation network and the social arenas in which interactions 
between bureaucratic actors take place.   
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6.1 The notion of community participation in the Ley de Desarrollo 
rural Sustentable 
The involvement of civil society in decision-making is still one of the 
most solid trends in the dominant discourses of development. The 
United Nations Development Project (UNDP) fosters citizens’ 
engagement in and influence over public processes (UNDP, 2012a); and 
the World Bank backs projects based on a community-driven 
development approach; that is, development projects in which members 
of the community control planning decisions and the investment of 
resources (WB, 2011). Using the same development approach other 
international development organisations such as the OECD, USAID, DFID 
and IMF foster the participation of civil society in the allocation of 
resources for development projects. Nowadays this notion of directly 
involving civil society in public decisions is one of the key features of the 
global development strategy known as participatory governance (WB, 
1992; Williams and Young, 1994; Chhotray and Stoker, 2009;). 
 
The relevance of this topic in development studies is justified by the 
view that community-based development is a way of improving 
economic and social efficiency in communities, allowing poverty 
reduction efforts to be taken to scale, making development more 
inclusive, empowering the poor, building social capital, strengthening 
governance and complementing market and public sector activities 
(Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 2). Economic and social efficiency are not the 
only factors that make this development approach attractive: it can also 
help to strength weak democracies. 
 
The criterion of efficiency based on community participation draws on 
the idea that community involvement the allows the incorporation of 
local knowledge in decision-making, whether in identifying and defining 
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public problems or choosing potential solutions (Chhotray and Stoker, 
2009: 177). Community-based development approaches see poor people 
and their institutions as assets and partners in the search for solutions to 
development challenges (WB, 2011); and the UNDP (2011) sees civic 
engagement as a fundamental element of a democratic state and defines 
it as a process whereby citizens, or their representatives, can engage in 
and influence public processes in order to achieve civic objectives and 
goals. This latter notion of community participation is closer to the idea 
of empowering members of local communities to make their own 
decisions.   
 
Chhotray and Stoker (2009) frame the many terms, ideas and purposes 
included in the notion of people’s participation in public decisions in a 
specific category of governance named participatory governance, which: 
 
…stems from different uses of the idea of participation within particular 
discourses, which in turn influence the construction of individuals as 
citizens, community members, beneficiaries, clients, users and so on. These 
postulations are dissimilar, sometimes contradictory, and reflect the wide 
range of theoretical traditions that endorse participation. […] The practices 
of participatory governance essentially reiterate the shift from state-
centred activities to a proliferation of civil society organisations. (Chhotray 
and Stoker, 2009, pp. 165-166) 
 
Nowadays it is common to find that development policies framed as 
participatory governance are mainly influenced by concepts from the 
discipline of economics, which has been particularly significant in 
shaping the idea of individuals’ participation not as citizens but as 
beneficiaries, clients or users (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009, pp. 169-170). 
 
Critics of community-driven development based on community 
participation have argued that while incorporating local knowledge can 
improve the targeting of the intended population, reduce the costs of 
implementation and improve accountability (Chambers 1993; Ostrom, 
Lam, and Lee 1994; Uphoff 1986), such advantages are likely to be 
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realised only when formal or informal institutions can ensure local 
accountability.  
 
Some argue that such institutions are more likely to emerge in societies 
that are highly mobile, with a tendency toward homogeneous 
neighbourhoods […] Where mobility is low, communities are more likely to 
reflect social orderings with long histories and deeply entrenched power 
hierarchies – just where poverty programs are most needed. Consequently, 
local inequity in relations of power and authority may well allow program 
benefits to be captured by nontarget groups. In the extreme, the 
decentralization of poverty programs in such contexts could worsen local 
inequity and perpetuate local power relations. (WB, 2011) 
 
In Mexico the idea of involving civil society directly in public decisions 
was embraced by the Congress in 1988 (Cabrero Mendoza, 2003; 
Bazdrech Parada, 2003) and formally incorporated into national 
development policy in 2001 through the Ley de Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable.  Just as decentralisation can be seen as one pillar of the 
policy design of the LDRS, community participation is the other in terms 
of transforming the delivery of development in rural Mexico.  Both are 
related since some ideas of decentralisation arrive at the consideration 
of the participation of civil society in public decisions. For analytical 
purposes, in this work decentralisation is associated with the delegation 
of decisions about the allocation of public resources to lower 
governmental levels, that is from federal to state and municipal 
governments, as described in Chapter 5. On the other hand, the meaning 
of the term ‘community participation’ is restricted in this research to the 
involvement of civil society in some actions or decisions that in the past 
were exclusively the responsibility of governmental operational 
structures. This is the focus of the case study in this chapter. 
 
As described in Chapter 2, in its policy design the LDRS uses Sustainable 
Rural Development Councils as a mechanism for the decentralisation of 
the planning of rural development programmes in Mexico. These 
councils were conceived as spaces of convergence for different levels of 
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government and civil society to make collective decisions. According to 
article 24 of the LDRS, Sustainable Rural Development Councils are: 
 
participation spaces for producers and other agents of rural society to 
define regional priorities, plan and distribute the resources that federal 
government, State Governments and Municipal Governments provide for 
productive investments and for sustainable rural development in general… 
(LDRS, 2001: 12) 
 
In the words of SAGARPA’s Sub-secretary for Rural Development in 
2005, the LDRS ‘considers the participation of rural society one of the 
fundamental engines for the development of rural areas, through local 
entities such as the Councils…’ (Ruiz García, 2006: 26). 
 
 
The instrument used to include civil society in public decisions is 
Sustainable Rural Development Councils at four administrative levels at 
which bureaucratic structures operate the rural development 
programmes: a national council, 32 state councils – one per state – and 
up to 2500 local councils for sustainable rural development at municipal, 
district or regional level according to specific needs or circumstances. 
The LDRS states that Sustainable Rural Development Councils must 
incorporate members of civil society, who may represent civil 
organisations that pursue social or economic aims in the rural sector, for 
example a national tomato producers’ association, a local women’s group 
promoting gender equity, a cooperative managing local fisheries, a 
regional maize producers’ association, a young farmers’ association and 
so on. According to the size of the association and the number of 
branches it has throughout the national territory they can take part in a 
national, regional, district or municipal Sustainable Rural Development 
Council.  
 
Theoretically the councils should work like any other democratic body. 
One member chairs the council as mayor, a co-chairperson is the 
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secretary and the rest of the members, composed as mentioned of 
representatives of government at different levels and representatives of 
civil society, all have an equal right to vote on propositions posed in the 
council. As it was conceptualised, this mode of operation seeks to 
empower civil society in decisions on public issues, in this case about the 
allocation of governmental resources for rural development. The 
councils are formal spaces in which citizens can directly participate in 
the implementation of rural development policy (Ruiz Garcia, 2006).  
 
The case study developed in the following section shows Mexico’s 
experience of incorporating community participation in the 
implementation of a new rural development policy. In doing so, it seeks 
to understand development practice where community participation is 
involved. Are the Sustainable Rural Development Councils real 
participation spaces where producers and other agents of rural society 
can define regional priorities and plan and distribute governmental 
resources for rural development? How is the notion of community 
participation interpreted by the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable’s 
implementation network? What are the drivers of bureaucratic actors in 
the incorporation of community participation?  
 
6.2 Community participation in practice: interface encounters in 
the implementation of community participation in the PAAP 
As mentioned in the previous section, the consideration of the 
involvement of civil society in public decisions is everywhere in political 
discourses and official documents of Mexico’s federal government. The 
attempt to incorporate civil society in public decisions on rural 
development has taken a variety of forms which are the product of a 
chain of interpretations by the actors involved in the process. Section 
6.2.1 presents this chain of encounters between different actors involved 
in the inclusion of community participation as part of a new approach in 
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Mexico’s rural development policy. 
 
6.2.1 Interface encounters at the planning stage: SAGARPA’s central 
bureaucracy 
The participation of civil society in the planning of rural development 
policy in Mexico begins with the definition of national priorities in the 
rural sector. The official document where all these definitions are stated 
is known as the Rural and Agricultural Sector Plan (Plan Sectorial de 
Desarrollo Agropecuario y Rural). According to national planning law the 
federal government must carry out consultation forums every time there 
is a new federal administration – that is every six years – at which non-
governmental actors linked to the rural sector must be consulted to 
express their views about the problems and needs that they identify in 
their local contexts. These non-governmental actors are composed of 
members of the rural population such as rural producers and peasants 
as well as rural development scholars and experts. 
 
SAGARPA is the federal government agency with the responsibility for 
organising such consultation forums for the Rural and Agricultural 
Sector Plan as it is the Federal agency that addresses rural development 
issues at national level. SAGARPA’s Linkage and Operations Unit 
(Coordinación General de Enlace y Operación) is in charge of organising 
the consultation forums. It is a small administrative unit composed of the 
head of the coordination office and four mid-level functionaries.  
 
Cross-referred information from the interviews revealed an interesting 
story behind the coordinator of the linkage and operations unit, who was 
appointed in 2003 with no previous experience in the federal public 
sector. He was appointed directly by the Secretary of SAGARPA, with 
whom he has a compadrazgo relationship based on a Catholic 
godfathering ceremony. He had experience in the public sector as an 
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elected authority, as before joining SAGARPA he was mayor of his 
hometown municipality in the State of Jalisco – the state in which 
SAGARPA’s Secretary was born. Detailing the relationships behind the 
work environment is relevant here to understand how decisions are 
made in Mexico’s development bureaucracy.  
 
The new coordinator of the linkage and operations unit did not show any 
interest or initiative regarding his responsibilities as head of the unit; he 
delegated all the technical work directly to his second-in-command, the 
unit director, who has three subordinates to carry out all the operational 
responsibilities of the unit. The director and his crew can be categorised 
as mid-level bureaucrats as they cannot make major decisions, but can 
ask lower-level SAGARPA functionaries of other administrative units to 
carry out their operational requests.  
 
The operational personnel in the unit are part of a stable administrative 
structure linked to a career system, while upper bureaucracy 
appointments are associated with the temporary position of the 
Secretary of SAGARPA; these positions are called puestos de confianza 
(positions of trust). People in such a position can be fired at any time 
with no reason given, while those employed as part of the career system 
keep their jobs by adhering to the internal regulations and through 
evaluations of their performance. Because of the risk of being summarily 
dismissed, positions of trust are better remunerated than permanent 
ones.  
  
Differentiating the job conditions of the two levels of bureaucracy also 
helps to explain Mexico’s national planning process in the context of 
rural development policy. As mentioned, the Linkage and Operations 
Unit is responsible for organising consultation forums, which should 
provide information to formulate the national plan for the development 
of the rural and agricultural sector.  
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SAGARPA’s linkage and operations unit organised about 30 national 
consultation forums in 2006 across the states that make up the Mexican 
Republic. Although such forums must be open to all Mexican citizens in 
the rural sector according to the spirit of the Federal Planning Law, 
invitations were addressed to the leaders of specific agricultural 
producers’ organisations, academic authorities at local universities and 
research centres and, as special guests, functionaries of federal and state 
agencies related to the rural issues. This did not make the forums 
nationally representative, so the information they provided was not 
appropriate for planning purposes. The information was biased towards 
the views of the big producers’ organisations which have historically 
been able to ensure that their needs are included in the development 
agenda through their access to governmental authorities in the form of 
SAGARPA. 
 
Despite the biased composition of the forums, none of SAGARPA’s 
functionaries saw the consultation as a failure or a mistake because 
SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy and middle bureaucracy see the 
consultation forums simply as another administrative requirement from 
the of the Presidency Office to formulate the plan of development for the 
rural sector. In practice, the upper bureaucracy formulates alternative 
development plans for internal use based on the particular perspective 
of their specialised areas. For example, Sub-secretariat of Agriculture 
formulate the part specifically related to the agricultural sector, similarly 
the Sub-secretariats of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development do 
the same for their own areas of expertise in order to create the Plan for 
their Sectors. They think that presenting a plan is just a formality, as they 
are aware that in practice the allocation of public resources for rural 
development at the national level is the result of negotiations between 
the Federal Finance Secretariat of and Mexico’s National Congress. The 
programme director of the Sub-secretariat of Agriculture explained: 
Chapter 6. Case study of Mexico’s development bureaucracy on the notion of community participation 
 188 
 
There is no room to plan different things to the ones we planned in 
previous year, unless there is a direct instruction from the Secretary of 
SAGARPA. If there is no instruction we expect to have a very similar budget 
to the one we received last year for our programmes, because the budget 
comes fixed by the Finance Secretariat] 
 
Hence for SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy, when formulating a national 
plan for the development of the rural sector, considering the opinion of 
civil society does not represent an important aspect of their bureaucratic 
activities, nor for their bureaucratic interests.  
 
The middle bureaucracy, specifically the operational unit in charge of 
organising the consultation forums, are also aware that the information 
gathered will barely be used to shape the plan for the development of the 
rural sector. However, being the visible face of SAGARPA at the national 
level is enough incentive for them to get involved in this activity. They 
assume that their main focus should be organising ‘nice’ events for the 
participants and reducing the risk of confrontations between officials 
and members of civil society at the forums. They want to show local 
SAGARPA branches and their peers at headquarters that their 
administrative unit has the support of SAGARPA’s Secretary for 
developing such responsibilities. The director of the linkage and 
operations unit expressed this idea in the following terms: 
 
Our task is to carry out the forums without problems [… such as] an 
organisation holding a demonstration during the event, blocking the event, 
or receiving public criticism of what SAGARPA do in the rural sector. 
Fortunately, all the organisations felt fine and confortable at the forums and 
most of them participated very well 
 
For the operations members of the linkage and operations unit, the idea 
of ‘successful’ consultation forums is far from creating a plural space to 
hear the voices of the different actors of the civil society; instead, they 
focus on the leaders of rural sector organisations with the power to put 
pressure on Federal government through demonstrations or roads 
Chapter 6. Case study of Mexico’s development bureaucracy on the notion of community participation 
 189 
blockages. They want to make these leaders feel that they play an 
important role in the definition of the rural development agenda and 
avoid any attempts to boycott to the forums by any local organisation. 
Part of the unit’s strategy is to provide excellent catering during the 
event in an effort to gain a good local reputation by making participants 
feel confortable and important.  
 
The linkage and operations units evaluate the success of each forum in 
terms of how peaceful it was, how many ‘relevant’ actors attended the 
event, favourable feedback from participants and the lack of complaints 
from participants towards SAGARPA. The visibility that of forums 
generates a feeling in the units that everybody recognises their ability to 
deal with the diversity of participants from the rural sector. They feel 
that carrying out this kind of activity strengthens their position in the 
organisation, increasing the chance that changes the upper bureaucracy 
might be accompanied by their being invited to perform key activities 
with their new superiors. So times of change should be understood as a 
new appointment of SAGARPA’s Secretary or governmental 
reorganisation as result of federal elections.  
 
The final product of the consultation forums is a document called 
‘Memories of the Consultation Forums’ which is composed by the 
summaries of the forum’s participations. The information is not 
presented in a format that can be used to understand the causalities and 
size of the existing problems of the rural sector in the region; instead it is 
presented like a conference magazine highlighting who participated and 
what the participants said in general terms. SAGARPA uses it for 
publicity to show that they are close to the population, rather than as a 
planning instrument. 
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6.2.2 Interface encounters at the Consejo Mexicano para el Desarrollo 
Rural Sustentable  
Article 17 of the LDRS states that the Consejo Mexicano para el Desarrollo 
Rural Sustentable – henceforth the Mexican Council – is a federal 
consultative body that is inclusive and representative of the interests of 
producers and agents of rural society (LDRS, 2001). This council must be 
composed of the heads of state secretariats that might deal with issues 
related to the rural sector; accredited representatives of national civil 
society organisations and private organisations of the rural sector; 
national agroindustry and agribusiness organisations; research centres 
working on agronomical issues, and non-governmental organisations 
focusing on rural development issues. In this entity SAGARPA’s 
representative chairs the council. 
 
According to the LDRS the purpose of the Mexican Council is to help the 
federal government to make decisions about how the national master 
budget for rural development (PEC)13 is executed and evaluated. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the PEC is a budgetary document that 
integrates all the federal programmes from the different secretariats of 
state that deal with the rural sector. Thus in theory the Mexican Council 
is the most important national body to provide the federal government 
with information about the opinions and positions of the rural 
population regarding the allocation of public resources. 
 
The Mexican Council represents another example of a great idea that was 
overwhelmed by bureaucratic practice. In the words of a top SAGARPA 
functionary who was in charge of coordinating its activities: 
 
…;this was a council that was difficult to make work because from the 
perspective of some top SAGARPA functionaries, rural sector organisations 
should not take part in making the regulations that would apply to them 
                                                     
13 Programa Especial Concurrente (Special Concurrent Programme). 
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later as beneficiaries. They think it is nonsense.  
 
SAGARPA functionaries who think that civil society must not take part in 
public decisions are the ones who formulate the operating rules of the 
programmes and who have the final word on the allocation of its 
resources. Historically, these administrative units such as the Sub-
secretariat for Agriculture and the Coordination Unit for Livestock 
Programmes have used their powers to negotiate with national 
organisations about the type, quantity and conditions to allocate public 
resources of the programmes such administrative units manage. 
Apparently they are confident of their ability to allocate public resources 
to the ‘right’ organisations that will use them ‘efficiently’. 
 
At the same time than the other Sub-secretariats, SAGARPA functionaries 
of the Sub-secretariat of Rural Development pushed to include the rural 
civil society in public decisions. As mentioned in previous chapters, this 
was the sub-secretariat in charge of incorporating the principles of the 
LDRS into SAGARPA’s programmes. These functionaries argued that 
SAGARPA needs to educate people on how to participate in these public 
spaces. Roberto, a functionary of the Sub-secretariat of Rural 
development, said:  
 
Rural sector organisations must realise that is not financially sustainable to 
allocate public resources as they have been allocated in previous years. 
They need to understand that there are greater needs in the sector and to 
see the potential benefits in the long term if they focus on these needs. It is 
not possible to continue allocating public resources based on political 
pressures. 
 
The two positions reveal two different interpretations of the idea of 
community participation coexisting within the same organisation. One 
position is based on the bureaucrats’ view that rural organisations are 
always seeking public resources and use all their powers to put pressure 
on the government. They see these rural organisations as the ‘enemy’ or 
as a ‘child’ that they have to control in order to allocate SAGARPA’s 
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resources efficiently. Thus for them, rural organisations demands need 
to be bounded to the national priorities of development and SAGARPA 
has the knowledge, experience and legal power to do it. From this 
perspective rural organisations do not represent the interests of the 
rural population but the particular interests of small groups of rural 
sector producers – the same organisations that have been beneficiaries 
of federal agricultural development programmes. For these bureaucrats, 
community participation threatens the efficient allocation of public 
resources for rural development because these organisations have the 
political power to capture the spaces for participation. 
 
On the other side, community participation is seen as a way of 
legitimating public decisions and allocating public resources in a more 
efficient way. It is based on the view that federal development 
programmes have not produced positive outcomes because they have 
historically been operated by SAGARPA bureaucracy, which does not 
know the real needs of the rural population. This population must have 
access to spaces where they can add their specific needs to the rural 
development agenda. There is an implicit self-criticism of the 
functionaries of the Sub-secretariat for Rural Development of SAGARPA 
towards to whole SAGARPA. They acknowledge that rural development 
policy has neglected the needs of the population and the apparent 
technical decisions of SAGARPA over the allocation of programmes 
resources have not addressed the right population nor provided the 
right support in the rural sector. 
 
The clash between these two interpretations of community participation 
at the core of the Mexican Council explains the budgeting process of 
federal resources for rural development. The coordination of the 
Mexican Council, which rests with SAGARPA’s Sub-secretariat of Rural 
Development, presents several challenges regarding bringing the key 
actors together at the Council’s sessions. First, it has to deal with 
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governmental actors from the inside – SAGARPA’s Sub-secretaries, who 
are not willing to work in the council with new actors from the rural 
sector and demand to work with the national organisations they have 
traditionally deal with over the years because they are the ones that 
have political power to create social conflicts. Second, it is difficult to find 
national organisations that represent the whole of Mexico’s rural 
population. In the words of the coordinator of the Mexican Council’s 
assistant: 
 
It’s true that the organisations we invite to participate in Mexican Council 
sessions are not representative of the national rural population, but it is 
difficult to find organisations with such a level of representation. Most of 
the rural population is not organised, at least not for economic purposes. 
People from rural communities are split in moments where they can 
participate in public issues; that is one reason they are in such a vulnerable 
social and economic position. 
 
SAGARPA’s Sub-secretariats of Agriculture and Livestock do not want to 
deal with new actors from the rural sector because they do not think it 
relevant to negotiate with others. These functionaries do not look after 
organisations with a great degree of representation of rural population  
but for the ones that have the power to compromise politically the public 
image of SAGARPA creating newspapers headlines through actions such 
as blocking roads and invading public offices. These bureaucratic units 
do not consider community participation a priority in the development 
of the rural sector; in fact they see themselves as far from the objectives 
stated in the LDRS, identifying more with high-income economic 
objectives in the agriculture sector with which the LDRS’s view of rural 
development is not compatible. 
 
So the Mexican Council does not work as a council; instead, it works as 
an informative space where the federal government presents its rural 
development public expenditure plan. Representatives of each of 
SAGARPA’s Sub-secretariats present the programmes that they will 
operate in that fiscal year, the kind of productive assets that will be 
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subsidised, the requirements that applicants must fulfil, on what type of 
crops or activities the federal budget will focus and some of the basic 
administrative procedures that the application of such public resources 
will follow.  
 
According to Alicia, the operational coordinator of Mexican Council 
meetings, producers’ organisations ‘do not participate actively, 
proposing options to invest the public resources of SAGARPA’s 
programmes; they are usually concerned about the amount of money in 
the budget for them as producers’ organisations’. Thus rural sector 
organisations’ participation in council sessions is limited to questions 
about their own interests. For example, a tomato producers’ 
organisation will ask about the quantity of public resources budgeted to 
support tomato producers through SAGARPA’s programmes, the kind of 
physical capital that qualifies to be subsidised, what kinds of supplies 
will be delivered to producers, when their members can apply to 
SAGARPA for assistance, and when they will receive it. If an answer does 
not satisfy the organisation’s representative, they state the 
organisation’s needs and ask for adjustments to the programme design 
or implementation strategy. When a situation like this arises, SAGARPA’s 
representatives weighs up the political power of the organisation and, 
based on this, makes some modifications or maintains the official plan. 
 
Thus organisations called to take part in the Mexican Council far from 
represent the rural population; instead, their invitations are connected 
to their political power in the national arena – (see Appendix 3 for 
listings of social and private organisations that take part in the Mexican 
Council). These organisations do not see the Mexican Council as a space 
in which to interact with different actors from the rural community who 
provide opinions to governmental agencies about the best way of 
allocating public resources for rural development; they see it as a 
platform where they can demand the ‘historical figure’ that each 
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organisation must receive from federal government. Hence technical 
arguments and long-term development goals are relegated to second 
place at the council sessions, which work mostly as informative meetings 
for both government and organisations about short-term governmental 
action for rural development. All of this is against the spirit of the LDRS, 
which set up this space for collective decision making for the good of the 
sector. 
 
How the actors are interlocked to make the Mexican Council work shows 
that while the Sub-secretariat for Rural Development tries to implement 
the notion of community participation as conceptualised in the LDRS; the 
other SAGARPA sub-secretariats do not see the relevance of this new 
approach. Opposite Sub-secretariats to the Rural Development one see 
rural sector organisations as their clients, so the general rural population 
are not useful for their bureaucratic purposes. The notion of community 
participation is vested with the participation of traditional organisations 
of Mexico’s rural sector, which demand public resources based on the 
view that they are the ‘sons of the Mexican Revolution’ and the Mexican 
State owes them for the development of Mexico after the revolution. This 
traditional relationship between the federal government and national 
organisations generates inequity in relation to peasants who do not 
belong to any organisation and do not have the same chance to access 
rural development resources. 
 
6.2.3 Interface encounters at the core of the Consejos Municipales de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable 
While the Mexican Council was created as a space to involve civil society 
in rural development policy at the national level, the Consejos 
Municipales para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (Municipal Councils for 
Sustainable Rural Development, henceforth municipal councils) do the 
same in the LDRS at the local level. Between these two councils the LDRS 
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also considers homologous councils at district and state level. However, 
policy-makers, congresspersons, and governmental actors highlight the 
municipal councils as the key to boosting rural development in Mexico.  
 
In the words of SAGARPA’s head of the Sub-secretariat for Rural 
Development: 
 
 [The LDRS] considers the participation of rural society as one of the 
fundamental engines for rural development, through local entities, such as 
the Councils [for sustainable rural development], which are structured 
from the productive sphere to the transformation, commercialisation and 
product-market systems spheres.  (Ruiz García, 2006: 26) 
 
In this sense, the Sub-secretariat for Rural Development saw the 
municipal councils as a tool to deal with the traditional clientelism that 
has characterised rural development policy in Mexico for the last 50 
years. He saw the municipalities as the most feasible level at which to 
demonstrate the potential of a community-driven approach to delivering 
development in rural Mexico. This is because at the municipal level, 
perspectives looked different than councils working with national 
organisations, as municipal governments have not had in the past 
important influence to negotiate and determine the rural development 
policy. In other words, the involvement of municipal governments 
brought new actors to the implementation arena– governmental and 
civil society actors that in the past have not been involved in rural 
development policy. Local actors are seen as uncontaminated by old 
practices for the allocation of public resources for rural development. So 
theoretically, municipal councils would not have to face the constraints 
observed in the Consejo Mexicano. 
 
The basic strategy fostered by SAGARPA’s Sub-secretariat for Rural 
Development was to create one council per municipality with the power 
to decide over the allocation of a fixed amount of governmental 
resources for rural development. The other SAGARPA Sub-secretariats, 
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for Agriculture and for Livestock, had no interest in making the 
municipal councils work because they are mainly involved with national 
organisations but at the same time were happy for the Sub-secretariat 
for Rural Development to set them up as long as this would not create 
any extra work for them. This indifference on their part allowed the Sub-
secretary for Rural Development to decide how he wanted to 
municipalise rural development policy by involving local councils in 
decisions about the allocation of SAGARPA programme resources in the 
implementation of the LDRS. 
 
The main challenge to the municipalisation of rural development policy 
was not only to create representative local councils composed of 
members of the government and civil society but also to get them to 
work as a democratic body. Since the governing structure of the 
municipal councils had to be similar to that of the Mexican Council, the 
LDRS proposed the Presidente Municipal – the mayor of the municipality 
– as the chairperson of the municipal council, the rest of the council to be 
composed of representatives from federal and state government and 
from the social and private sectors.  
 
Despite this LDRS mandate to make use of the councils to allocate the 
resources of all federal programmes addressing rural development 
issues, the only programme set up to incorporate the municipal councils 
in this operation, in 2003, was one of those managed by SAGARPA’s Sub-
secretariat for Rural Development, the Subprograma de apoyos a 
proyectos de inversión rural (Subprogramme of Support to Rural 
Investment Projects, PAPIR). Later, in 2008, it was integrated into the 
new Programa para la Adquisición de Activos Productivos (PAAP).  
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the objective of PAAP is to 
help the poorest inhabitants of rural areas to acquire productive assets 
such as tools, machinery and infrastructure to help them to perform 
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productive activities proper to the local context. The programme 
subsidises up to 50% of the total cost of the asset. Applicants to the 
program must present their application in the form of a proposal for a 
productive project, specifying the role of the requested asset and 
showing that the project is economically and technically feasible. 
 
The process of allocating SAGARPA programme resources through 
municipal councils involves the following steps: 1) the mayor of the 
municipality brings together the members of the municipal council 
according to LDRS regulations and 2) installation of a public reception 
desk in the municipality where applicants can ask for information and 
leave their application forms; 3) all applications received at the 
reception desk are analysed collectively at official sessions of the 
municipal council, focusing on the proposed project’s relevance to local 
rural development and its feasibility; 4) the council decides which 
requests to accept according to SAGARPA’s available municipal 
resources; 5) the applications approved by the municipal council are 
sent to an external technical unit which reviews the economic and 
technical feasibility of the project; 6) if the technical unit is content with 
the technical and financial feasibility of these projects, resources from 
SAGARPA’s programme are released by the trust that manages them in 
the state concerned.  
 
To ensure that the municipal councils work according to the spirit of the 
LDRS, in 2003 SAGARPA’s Sub-secretariat for Rural Development signed 
an agreement with INCA Rural, a decentralised SAGARPA agency 
specialised in training and capacity-building for rural development. INCA 
Rural was to train a team of municipal advisors to perform as facilitators 
and guide the members of the municipal councils about how the council 
works, mainly in the sense of community participation. The municipal 
advisor was seen as an independent non-governmental worker paid by 
the municipal councils to provide professional advice.    
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Like the decentralisation analysed in Chapter 5, community participation 
is clearly specified in the PAAP’s 2003 design and sufficient resources 
are allocated to involve civil society in public decisions as well as an 
administrative structure to its implementation. However, nine years 
later there has been no real involvement of community members in 
public decisions; the municipal councils are not representative of the 
community, council sessions are a sham as the mayor of the municipality 
generally has the final word, and even when decisions are made by local 
councils they are not respected by state and federal government, which 
use their power to block some of them. The following subsections 
illustrate how in Mexico the policy outcomes of the community-driven 
development strategy are the result of a chain of interpretations by 
different actors. Four local settings in two states are presented as case 
studies to explain the influence of development bureaucracies on policy 
outcomes.  
 
Local bureaucracies on the notion of community participation 
San Miguel Suchixtepec (population 3400) and San Miguel Coatlán 
(population 2400) are municipalities located in the Sierra Sur – the 
southern mountains – in the State of Oaxaca. San Miguel Coatlán is 
ranked 44th and San Miguel Suchixtepec 538th poorest out of the 2440 
Mexican states and they are classified as having very high and high levels 
of marginalisation respectively (CONAPO, 2012). 
 
The municipal governments of these communities are not ruled by the 
common law as they are mainly composed of indigenous inhabitants. 
Mexico’s Constitution allows such communities to base their local 
government on their own customs and traditions. As part of these 
customs, all elected authorities are in honorary appointments; that is to 
say none receive remuneration as public servants. At public assemblies 
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every two years the community decides who will take on the 
governmental responsibilities. All members of the local bureaucracy are 
part-time public servants, as they also have to support themselves and 
their families.  
 
When SAGARPA promoted the participation of municipal governments 
in allocating public resources for the PAAP in 2010 neither of these 
municipal authorities clearly understood the federal government’s 
strategy. They are used to resolving their problems based on their own 
customs and traditions, and the incursion of a federal program into their 
local agenda clashed with the ways that they deal with everyday issues. 
The Municipal President of San Miguel Suchixtepec expressed this 
situation in the following terms:  
 
I was appointed as mayor of this municipality without my consent; 
however, according to our traditions it is an obligation and a great honour 
to serve our community. There is no chance of refusing this appointment 
without being disgraced in the community. When I started my term I had 
no experience and no knowledge about what to do; however, after a year I 
am getting used to the general requirements of the position […] When a 
SAGARPA functionary approached me to tell me that there is an 
opportunity to get federal funds from a programme whose name I don’ 
remember I asked for these resources, but he told me that I had to follow 
some steps in order to get them. It was that thing called municipal council… 
 
To understand the reaction of this municipal president I will describe his 
lifeworld. He as most of the members of the community was born in San 
Miguel Suchixtepec as member of family of peasants. His family need the 
workforce of the children to fulfil the family’s everyday food needs, so he 
grown maize, black beans and kept some chickens. He did not attended 
school as child and when he was teenager he decided to go to the United 
States of America (USA) to look for a well paid job as gardener, farmer or 
worker in a factory.  He crossed the USA border with his uncle 25 years 
ago illegally and he lived in the USA for all these time as illegal 
immigrant. Two years ago he came back to his home town to visit his 
parents. During his visit a community assembly took place in the plaza 
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pública (main square of the community), the purpose of the meeting was 
to elect the new representatives of the community –the new local 
government—for the following two years and according to the traditions 
the participants of the assembly make proposals and the participants 
raise their hands to show if the candidate has the approval of the 
majority. Somebody propose him as candidate to become the major of 
the community without his consent and the majority voted for him, he 
said that members of the community told him that he has been absent of 
the community for many years so it is now time to serve the community. 
He had to accept because if he refuses he would not be welcome again in 
the community.  
 
So at the moment he was elected major of the community he barely 
knew how to read. He knew noting about public administration and the 
regulations to rule a municipality. He said that functionaries from other 
levels of government were visiting him almost everyday to request 
signatures and documents that they required to operate the federal or 
state programmes they manage. He accepted that the beginning was 
frightening and he got confused, he felt understanding nothing. A year 
later he started to feel more confident because he already knew the 
functionaries and the basic procedures to receive public resources for 
his municipality. According to him, the freelancer called asesor municipal 
was a very important support for him to manage the basic 
administrative needs of the municipality. 
 
The situation in the other municipality, San Miguel Coatlán, is not so 
different. The municipal authorities had no idea of the LDRS and the 
municipal council. Like San Miguel Suchixtepec, San Miguel Coatlán is 
ruled by indigenous customs and traditions and all members of the local 
government hold honorary appointments. There are no fixed posts in the 
local administration. To give an idea of how informal these 
administrative settings are it is enough to mention that when I arrived at 
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the local government office the mayor of the municipality and others 
were playing cards even when a day before the appointment was 
confirmed they were not ready for the interview, they called at that right 
moment the members of the municipal council using the official 
communication system via loudspeakers distributed throughout the 
community. The council members arrived 20 minutes later. This is only 
mentioned to illustrate the style of local management in such rural 
settings. 
 
According to the INCA Rural municipal advisors interviewed for this 
research, every two years there are new municipal authorities whose 
members all have to learn how to operate in the council. The municipal 
advisors have become more important in recent years as they ease the 
learning process for newly-local elected authorities by explaining how 
SAGARPA’s programmes operate through the municipal councils. 
 
This lack of capacity in the municipal authorities to deal with federal 
programme regulations is an important factor in the attempt to 
incorporate community participation in the operation of the PAAP. The 
municipal council members interviewed were not aware of the 
principles of the LDRS but they understood the usefulness of the council 
regarding the possibility of receiving ‘something’ from the government – 
whether money or other resources. They did not see participation in the 
council as a guarantee that they would receive what they requested, but 
were participating ‘to see what happens’. So they saw it more like a 
lottery, and would not complain if state or federal government did not 
respect the council’s deliberations as they saw government support as a 
gift rather than an entitlement. 
 
Community participation is not an issue for municipalities such as these 
as they traditionally use public assemblies to make collective decisions. 
However, when notions of community participation come from outside 
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as part of the requirements for receiving resources from state or federal 
government, the mechanics are quite different to what these rural 
communities are used to.  The PAAP’s formal administrative and logistic 
procedures overwhelm the municipal authorities, who barely 
understand the system stated in the operational rules of the PAAP. The 
way community participation is state in the operational rules has a more 
passive connotation than one associated to deliberate action; in the 
context of PAAP regulations the municipal authorities just follow the 
instructions of the municipal advisors without understanding the 
purpose of the council as they already always deliberate public issues 
collectively.  
 
For example, in San Miguel Suchixtepec the criteria for the composition 
of the municipal council was based on inviting the better-educated 
members of the community, this was a criteria decided by the 
community. So the municipal authorities called a primary school 
professor, a young girl with a high school certificate and a young peasant 
who had been successful growing fruit trees. Why them? From the local 
authority’s perspective they have had contact with the external world 
and so have can communicate with people from outside the community 
in such a council. Thus both authorities see the municipal council as an 
extravagance of the federal and state governments. 
 
A thousand kilometres from Oaxaca are the municipalities of Chapala 
(population 48,839) and Jamay (22,881) in the State of Jalisco. Their 
political, economic, geographical and social conditions are different to 
those in Oaxaca discussed above. First, they are ruled by the common 
law. In general terms this means that municipal authorities are elected 
every three years via formal electoral institutions and procedures. 
Second, being an elected authority is a full-time job with monetary 
compensation. Third, these municipalities are categorised by the 
National Population Council as having very low and low levels of 
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marginalisation with rankings of 2306 and 2049 respectively out of the 
2440 states (INAFED, 2012). 
 
The local bureaucracies’ interpretations of community participation are 
very different to those observed in Oaxaca. For instance, Chapala’s 
mayor of the municipality is a former municipal advisor who worked as 
a ‘broker’ explaining federal programmes to the rural population. When 
questioned about how he became mayor of the municipality from his 
previous position as municipal advisor, he openly explained that that as 
municipal advisor he had helped a lot of people to access federal 
programme resources, supporting many agricultural projects and small 
business through his management of the programmes and his 
negotiation skills. He does not identify the LDRS as a referent of national 
rural development policy, instead seeing rural development 
programmes no different to how they were before the LDRS was 
enacted; the only difference he observes is that now there more 
requirements in applications for resources such as the presentation of a 
feasible productive project.  
 
He does not see the municipal council as a space where Chapala’s rural 
society can influence public decisions but as an informative space where 
authorities and the community get together to talk about general 
problems and potential solutions. From his experience as a municipal 
advisor, he is familiar with the way federal and state governments 
traditionally allocate programme resources based on the political power 
of the producers and peasants organisations or on compadrazgo 
relationships. This is why he sees the council sessions as no more than 
spaces for contact with local people. He did not complain about this but 
expressed his view that it would be good if the municipal council had the 
power to decide about the allocation of certain resources. He did not 
complain because he has friends in federal and state government who 
supported his election as Mayor of Chapala, so from his perspective 
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complaining would be not polite to them. He preferred to negotiate with 
them in person to secure SAGARPA programme resources for his 
municipality. 
 
Chapala and Jamay’s rural development offices are responsible for 
linking rural society with municipal, state and federal governmental 
programmes. In Chapala the head of this office is a personal friend of 
Chapala’s mayor of the municipality. In his interview he said that he had 
no experience as a public servant and was not familiar with the LDRS or 
SAGARPA programme directives because he was only starting to learn 
about them. He had been in the post for a year. Here is expressed other 
compadrazgo relationship that influences the appointments in local  
public administration and how this can affect the implementation of a 
development policy. 
 
In Jamay, the head of the office of rural development was appointed 
because there is an informal rule in the municipality that all elected 
majors of the municipalities have to respect, that is, appointing all those 
who participated as staff in his/her political campaign as part of the 
municipal cabinet. He said that he would have preferred to be the head 
the construction office: 
 
I would prefer to be in charge of the construction office because there’s a 
lot of money in it. This rural development one is a bit boring for me because 
it’s not my field, you know. I’m the owner of a car tyre business here in 
Jamay, so I am mostly involved with the industry and local businesses. 
 
His expression ‘there’s a lot of money in it’ means that it is one of the 
administrative units that manage large amounts public resources, so 
managers have the chance to influence the allocation and receive 
‘commissions’ (bribes) from it. This functionary does not find the rural 
development office attractive because state and federal governments 
directly decide what the public resources to allocate to Jamay or rural 
development. He openly expressed that he would like to compete in the 
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next local elections for the position of mayor, so he is clearly more 
concerned with his political career than with running the rural 
development office in his municipality.  
 
As might be expected from this short-term view, neither head of the 
municipal rural development offices knew the purpose of the LDRS or 
the real objective of the municipal councils as a democratic and 
transparent tool for allocating public resources. Both were of the view 
that they would be in their posts only while the administration lasted; 
that is, for three years. So they felt that there was no need to put undue 
effort into learning all the responsibilities of the office and were content 
with the basics. Hence this post, which in theory should be filled by a 
person with the appropriate technical profile, is occupied by political or 
personal commitments of the mayor of the municipality or his or her 
political group.  
 
The mayor of the municipality of Jamay had a more accurate view of the 
role of the municipal council in the context of LDRS and particularly of 
the operational directives of SAGARPA’s programmes; however at the 
same time she was aware that many of the resolutions of the municipal 
council were being neglected by state and federal authorities, so for her 
the municipal council represented an opportunity to be involved in local 
politics and in touch with local leaders to carry out local rural 
development and other projects. Members of Jamay’s municipal council 
appeared to be very keen to participate in this body despite the fact that 
its decisions are disconnected from national rural development policy. 
 
The bureaucracy in between: municipal advisors fostering community 
participation 
As mentioned above, the bureaucratic position of municipal advisor is 
connected to the three levels of government; it was created as part of the 
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design of Alianza para el Campo in 2003 and continued in 2008 with the 
change to the PAAP. This post was created to help local councils and 
municipal authorities to understand how federal programmes 
addressing rural development projects work administratively. Municipal 
advisors are freelancers who provide professional consultation services 
to the municipalities. INCA Rural worked as a kind of NGO to provide 
training about the basics of the LDRS and how municipal councils should 
work. The main role of the municipal advisor is to support municipal 
authorities in the creation of the municipal council and make it work 
according to the principles of the LDRS and the particular regulations of 
individual SAGARPA programmes.  
 
As freelancers, municipal advisors receive neither a salary nor social 
security benefits. Their honorariums are paid on trimestral basis in 
exchange for specific outputs. These conditions mean that most 
municipal advisors are single young people with no family 
responsibilities, as is the case in San Miguel Suchixtepec and San Miguel 
Coatlán in Oaxaca and Jamay in Jalisco. The three municipal advisors are 
young professionals with no previous experience of public 
administration and are strongly committed to helping with the creation 
of municipal councils.   
 
However, their experiences have been contradictory. While they have all 
been successful in informing and advising municipal authorities about 
how to carry out administrative procedures and requirements, the 
results do not correspond to their efforts. It has been frustrating for 
them all to find that after persuading local civil society leaders to take 
part in the municipal council, state and federal governments have not 
respected the agreements of the council in relation to SAGARPA 
programme resource allocation.  One said: 
 
I am ashamed. I cannot look members of civil society in the eye because I 
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told them that the municipal council had the power to determine which 
projects should be funded by SAGARPA’s programmes, but in practice it 
never happened. The state and federal governments never respected the 
will of the council […] In one week we worked very well in the council; we 
analysed all the citizens’ applications, we discussed the relevance and 
merits of each project and collectively decided which should be funded with 
the money SAGARPA have budgeted for our municipality. We sent our 
deliberations to SAGARPA and SEDER administrative units and when we 
received the answer, they simply did not respect our will. Many of the 
council members were disappointed and never came back. 
 
The consequences of this lack of commitment to respect the spirit of the 
LDRS on the part of federal and state government disappointed the civil 
society leaders who had taken part in the municipal councils and they 
withdrew. The councils lost focus as they became less representative of 
the general population; suddenly they were no more than a formality. 
The municipal advisors were disappointed, but they found new 
motivation to continue working with local government facilitating the 
everyday administrative responsibilities of the municipal governments 
as most municipal advisors are professionals with an academic profile 
related to public administration. Hence there has been a shift from the 
functions that they were originally meant to perform. 
 
Interface encounters of state bureaucracy at local level  
The view of community participation in SAGARPA’s strategy to foster 
rural development is seen by the Oaxaca’s State Government as a 
strategy of the federal government to create their political clientele in 
Oaxaca’s rural sector. Here is again the view of the head of Oaxaca’s 
Secretariat of Rural Development, he expressed this in the following 
terms:  
 
The federal government knows that we [state government] have all the 
producers and social organisations in Oaxaca’s rural sector in on our side; 
they all support our party [the PRI] and we have always won the elections 
in this state, so this strategy of creating municipal councils is just a 
desperate attempt to create a parallel structure similar to what we have 
with producers and social organisations. 
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The upper state bureaucracy see the federal government’s aim of 
community participation as a sham as they consider that federal 
government wants access to organised rural population to confront the 
social base keen to the state government. The political party to which the 
governor of the State of Oaxaca belongs is the main opposition to the 
party ruling the Mexican Republic. Thus the rationale of the head of the 
Secretariat of Rural Development for the State of Oaxaca is attached to 
electoral politics, as explained by the historic role of governmental 
programmes at electoral times to influence election results (see Chapter 
2). So while the state government does not support the federal strategy 
of forming municipal rural development councils, neither do they 
boycott it. The state’s upper bureaucracy feels that SAGARPA 
functionaries directly approaching majors of the municipalities is a very 
aggressive act, as they consider they are overseeing the leadership of the 
state government in the local realm. 
 
On the other hand, in the State of Jalisco the federal and the state 
government all belong to the same national political party. From 2000 to 
2011 there have been three heads of SAGARPA, the two most recent of 
whom were born in Jalisco and had experience as top functionaries in 
the upper state bureaucracy. Jalisco’s Secretariat of Rural Development 
has created a state coordinator of municipal councils for sustainable 
rural development who is in charge of coordinating the municipal 
advisors and monitoring the resources allocated to each rural 
development project in each municipality.  
 
The existence of the coordination office of municipal councils, as 
bureaucratic structure, would suggest that municipal councils are 
working well in the state to improve efficacy and transparency in the 
allocation of public resources, but this is not the case. According to the 
upper bureaucracy, the mayors of municipalities of political parties 
other than that which rules the state are irresponsible. In their view, 
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these majors of the municipalities exclude the true leaders of the 
communities from taking part in the council and call in their friends or 
people to whom they have political commitments; that is to say there is a 
capture from the municipal government of certain municipal councils. 
For this reason Jalisco’s Secretary for Rural Development took the 
decision to reduce the autonomy of certain municipal councils and give 
full support to those that respect the spirit of the LDRS. Curiously, all the 
municipalities supported are governed by mayors of the same political 
party as the state government, the PAN. New administrative restrictions 
were created in the operational rules of PAAP to avoid municipal 
councils having the final say in the allocation of PAAP’s resources. 
 
Interpretations of PAAP regulations made by the upper bureaucracy of 
the State of Jalisco are similar to those of the State of Oaxaca; however, in 
Jalisco political interests are more difficult to identify as the state and 
federal governments are in the same party. While this means that there 
are no political disputes between governments of opposing parties, in 
Jalisco there are political disputes between internal groups of those who 
support the state governor versus supporters of the President of the 
Republic, each with a different development agenda for the state. At the 
time this fieldwork was carried out, there were two rival groups from 
the same political party in Jalisco’s Secretariat of Rural Development: 
one supported by SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy and the other by the 
state governor. They had already started the battle for the election of the 
next state governor, and control over the allocation of public resources 
for rural development is a very important electoral asset for creating the 
traditional electoral clientele.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described a chain of bureaucratic actors’ 
interpretations of community participation in the context of rural 
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development policy in Mexico. It has shown how the policymakers 
conceived the idea of incorporating community participation in the 
design of the LDRS, how the upper bureaucracy interpreted this notion 
to create operational prescriptions such as the integration of the 
Mexican Council with municipal councils; and how the implementation 
network at local, state, and federal levels interpreted the programmes’ 
directives to produce development practice. 
 
The result of this chain of interpretations reveals the abandonment of 
community participation as a strategy for rural development in Mexico. 
Eleven years after the introduction of the LDRS and eight years since its 
implementation, today community participation through municipal 
councils is just a fiction. In the first place the upper bureaucracy created 
a battle between different factions in SAGARPA headquarters to prove 
which has the most important ideas about shaping rural policy. 
SAGARPA’s Sub-secretariat of Rural Development pushing on the 
Secretary of SAGARPA to incorporate a new approach to development 
based on community participation, a notion compatible with 
international trends in development such as participative governance. If 
community participation were successfully implemented SAGARPA’s 
Sub-secretariat of Rural Development would gain an influential position 
in SAGARPA and its head might become the future Secretary of 
SAGARPA. 
 
Second, there are factions in SAGARPA headquarters that do not agree 
about the incorporation of innovative development ideas: the traditional 
Agriculture and Livestock Sub-secretariats have a more economic 
approach than their rural development counterpart. To them, SAGARPA 
should not be addressing the rural poor as there is a federal secretariat 
to address that in the form of the Secretariat for Social Development. 
These bureaucrats see SAGARPA’s main role as helping large and 
medium-sized rural producers and looking only after national 
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organisations with the political power to create problems for SAGARPA, 
so small rural households are not a priority for them. From this 
perspective, municipal councils are a waste of time and threaten their 
control and allocation of public resources which they currently negotiate 
directly with producers’ organisations.  
 
Third, the state secretaries for rural development are not part of the 
federal bureaucracy but of its counterparts at state level; as explained, in 
Oaxaca, the state and federal government are in opposing political 
parties, which generates strong distrust between the bureaucracies at 
the two levels. For those in state government, supporting the creation of 
municipal councils would help federal government to create a their own 
political structure at the municipal level as are SAGARPA programmes 
the ones that will be operated through such councils. Oaxaca’s Secretary 
for Rural Development openly expressed that state government does not 
need municipal councils as they manage their rural development agenda 
with local producers’ organisations and civil organisations. He asserted 
that most majors of the municipalities follow his instructions and ‘most 
of them are ours’, by which he was referring to their political affiliation 
or loyalty. This view distorts the original meaning of community 
participation as an effective and democratic method of allocating public 
resources and is interpreted as a threat to sub-national governments’ 
control over certain public decisions. 
 
In the State of Jalisco the federal and state government are both of the 
same political affiliation, which gives them an advantage over Oaxaca in 
implementing the creation of councils in each municipality. In fact there 
is a specific administrative units for coordinating the municipal councils 
at the state level. Although, there are no political disputes between 
opposing parties in Jalisco there are disputes between the state 
governor’s people and those of the President of the Mexican Republic, 
each of which have a different development agenda for the state. This 
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reproduces what happens at SAGARPA’s headquarters: two different 
views about rural development, one that sees rural development just in 
terms of producers with potential to generate profit in their activities. 
Behind this view it is the rationale that seeks strength the political 
capital of State Government with the local producers –the latter, the ones 
with economic power to fund electoral campaigns. The other view, 
fostered by the group of the federal government seeks to strength the 
rural livelihoods of the vulnerable habitants of rural areas to consolidate 
a national electoral clientele. These differences about the extent of rural 
development have disconnected the parties concerned from the head of 
Jalisco’s Secretariat of Rural Development and administrative unit that 
coordinates the municipal councils in the state. 
 
As it is possible to observe, there is a particular rationale in the 
behaviour of secretariats of rural development at Federal and State level 
in relation to the notion of community participation. This idea of 
including citizens in the public decisions challenges their traditional 
view of allocating public resources to rural producers organisations to 
create political commitments in electoral times. In Mexico, is evident that 
upper bureaucracies are more interested in creating an electoral than a 
political clientele. I differentiate electoral clientele form political 
clientele basically in terms of seeking voters in electoral times and the 
idea of convincing people about specific development ideas or projects. 
So, electoral clientele is about politics, but not such kind of ‘healthy’ 
politics in debating different ideas and projects of government but the 
one that just look at the short run, when the elections come, they look for 
their programmes beneficiaries as a clientele that has to pay ‘favours’ 
back. 
 
Fourth, it is the lower bureaucrats who are in charge of putting these 
complex ideas of development into practice. Many of these actors are 
simply overwhelmed by the operational complexity of creating a 
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representative council and generating mechanisms of participation but 
even more difficult for them has been to make SAGARPA and SEDER to 
respect the decisions made by the municipality councils over the 
allocation of PAAP resources at municipal level. This level of bureaucracy 
includes majors of the municipalities, heads of the municipal offices for 
rural development, municipal advisors and council members. Here 
electoral politics barely influence the actors’ decisions; majors of the 
municipalities have been unable to see the benefits of empowering the 
people to make public decisions and most of them do not understand the 
role of the municipal council in local governance so they use a very 
limited version of citizens’ councils.  
 
The case of the heads of the municipal offices for rural development is 
very particular, as in theory, these positions must by occupied by people 
with expertise in and knowledge of the administration of rural 
development programmes; however, they are allocated as a reward for 
high-level support as staff at local elections. Hence their decisions 
address satisfying not the demands of the community but those of the 
mayor of the municipality, while the majors of the municipalities are 
more concerned about repaying ‘donors’ financial support for their 
election from public resources. One way of doing this is by appointing 
them to local administrative positions; this is an example of the 
compadrazgo relationship. So the idea of empowering local people to 
influence the allocation of public resources is not compatible with 
majors of the municipalities’ rationale as much as the councils work just 
as informative bodies for the community. 
 
The municipal advisors as freelancers are the only actors who are in line 
with the LDRS’s policymakers’ intentions since they formally are not part 
of the bureaucratic structure of the municipality. Most understand the 
purpose of the councils in the context of the LDRS and know that the 
councils must have the attributes necessary to be able to decide on the 
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allocation of federal programme resources, but they do not have the 
power to make municipal councils work as they were intended. 
Municipal advisors are just facilitators who make a great effort to create 
councils and organise their sessions, but they are not able to produce 
tangible results. Thus they too have adjusted their role in the local public 
administration. Unlike most municipal functionaries that are appointed 
as political retribution, municipal advisors have became an important 
human resource through which majors of the municipalities accomplish 
their administrative tasks at the local level, many of which have nothing 
to do with rural development policy. 
 
Civil society plays a key role in the municipal councils. In Oaxaca it was 
clear that the communities are used to participating in local assemblies, 
but most found community participation in the format proposed by the 
LDRS difficult to put into practice. They felt intimidated at being seated 
around a table with strangers such as government representatives. In 
such cases the mechanisms of participation simply lose all effectiveness, 
as not all the members can participate equally. In indigenous 
communities, their traditional assemblies are more effective 
mechanisms for eliciting the community view on public issues. 
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Chapter 7. Understanding Development Bureaucracies: 
Mexico’s Development Bureaucracy 
 
Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 presented a case study of how bureaucratic actors in 
Mexico make choices in the process of implementing a rural 
development policy, and how those choices shape development practice. 
They described the chain of bureaucratic actors’ translations and 
strategic behaviour to show how unexpected outcomes can arise as 
result of a variety of interpretations of one object: the policy. I reported 
what actors of Mexico’s development bureaucracy consider when 
making their decisions every day, and what factors influence those 
decisions.   
 
This chapter goes beyond policy implementation from the perspective of 
each actor involved and investigates the rationale behind actors’ 
decisions. It seeks to understand bureaucratic actors’ choices in the 
political and cultural context and the institutional and organisational 
settings of development policy. This inevitably reveals the reasons of 
why unexpected outcomes arise in some specific contexts of developing 
countries. The case study revealed how members of Mexico’s 
development bureaucracy interpret the directives of Mexico’s Ley de 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable in particular ways which lead to an outcome 
different to that intended by the policymakers, exposing the relevance of 
bureaucratic actors. 
 
The second main conclusion is that the bureaucratic actors involved, 
including the programme beneficiaries, play a kind of game mainly based 
on a political-electoral rationale; but politics is not the only driver 
influencing actors’ decisions the implementation of the LDRS. This was 
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clearly seen in the behaviour of the lower bureaucracy, whose incentives 
are as simple as keeping their job or being on good terms with the 
community, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Some upper-bureaucracy 
decisions are linked to symbolism associated with personal feelings or 
history, as in the case of the SAGARPA’s Head of Finance who arbitrarily 
pushed for the allocation of development resources to his home town, as 
described in Chapter 5. So the notion of democratisation in this 
bureaucratic context expands the gift-giving culture in the social system 
to patron-client relations. 
 
The first section points out the relevance of development bureaucracies 
in the implementation of development policies. It accounts for the most 
important facts of the case study developed in this research that show 
the relevance of bureaucratic actors in delivering development. The 
second section reflects on the potential of actor-oriented approaches for 
understanding development practice. It goes back to the arguments 
presented in Chapter 4 to show the kinds of findings that were possible 
to reach using actor-oriented research approaches. The third section 
presents the dichotomy observed between the political and non-political 
drivers that influence bureaucratic actors’ decisions in the 
implementation arena and emphasises how development outcomes are 
the product of a diversity of interpretations by bureaucratic actors 
shaped by the wide range of political, cultural, social, organisational and 
personal motivations in Mexico’s rural setting. 
 
7.1 Development bureaucracies matter 
My main aim in studying development bureaucracies was to learn how 
these organisational structures interpret rural development policies and 
how their interpretations shape development practice and outcomes. I 
use the term ‘development bureaucracies’ because I wanted to know if 
there is a particular rationale behind bureaucratic actors’ decisions that 
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requires attention in the field of development studies for a better 
understanding of development practice. The case study developed in this 
research reveals that Mexican development bureaucracies can be very 
influential actors in the shaping of development outcomes. 
 
The role of development bureaucracies is largely overlooked by most of 
the development studies literature (Bebbington et al., 2007; Heeks and 
Stanforth, 2011. Most development scholarship focuses on analysing the 
‘big’ problems such as gender inequity, poverty, unsustainable 
productive practices, social violence, political disparities and so on, and 
comes out with ‘big’ solutions such as empowering local communities, 
involving women in household decisions, incorporating sustainable 
productive practices, decentralising government systems and so on 
(Mosse, 2004: 640). From this traditional perspective the dominant idea 
is that once the ‘solution’ is transformed into policy directives, the next 
step is ‘just’ to implement it.  
 
The argument of this research is in the opposite direction: it reveals that 
bureaucratic actors involved in the implementation of policy cannot be 
seen as a monolithic entity as the same policy can be interpreted in 
different ways by different actors, leading to a chain of interpretations 
that shape the policy outcomes. In contrast, the perspective that ‘once 
the policy is designed it just needs to be implemented’, unexpected 
outcomes can be just the result of wrong implementation which may be 
explained by the inadequate management of human or physical 
resources, corruption, bad leadership or lack of human capital, among 
many other factors, so the aspects to address from this viewpoint are 
building capacity, fighting corruption, appointing high-profile managers, 
making management accountable and so on; all managerial solutions. 
However, the Mexican case shows that unexpected outcomes may not 
simply be the result of managerial issues.  
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The case of Mexico’s rural development policy has provided analytical 
elements by which to understand how ‘promising’ development policies 
with strong support from politicians and authorities, extensive financial 
resources and adequate organisational and human resources have not 
fulfilled their brief and have produced unexpected outcomes. The case 
study reveals how members of Mexico’s development bureaucracy 
interpret the directives of the Mexican Ley de Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable in particular ways that lead to an outcome different to that 
intended by the policymakers.  
 
Although the bureaucratic actors investigated here did not engage in 
illegal action or contravene any of the directives in the official 
operational rules, they found ways of adapting the directive to suit their 
interests, organisational routines and cultural and political contexts, 
eventually diverting the course of the new policy. This was the case for 
functionaries of federal and state government who engaged in informal 
negotiations to make it appear that they were making collective 
decisions about the use of PAAP’s resources. As explained in Chapter 5, 
both accepted this dissimulation on the part of the other because neither 
was willing to lose their power to allocate the PAAP’s resources to 
specific places or persons. The federal functionaries considered that the 
resources belonged to federal government and so state governments 
should be given PAAP resources according to federal priorities and 
criteria; state governments considered that the PAAP’s decentralised 
mode of operation should mean that all decisions should with them and 
that federal government should not intervene in the operation of the 
programme. They both created an apparently irreconcilable scenario to 
justify their informal agreement to divide the PAAP’s resources into two, 
one to be allocated under SAGARPA’s criteria and the other, under those 
of the state government. This is not illegal since they achieve collective 
agreements but the way they reach such agreements does not respect 
the spirit of the Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 showed how Mexico’s bureaucratic actors behave 
strategically to satisfy the demands of the Mexican Congress, 
policymakers and even beneficiaries of the programme without 
compromising their group interests at different levels.  However, doing 
this makes it difficult to achieve the expected outcomes announced when 
the LDRS was created. Using Crozier’s language (1964), Mexico’s 
bureaucracy found a way to maintain and create the necessary 
discretionary powers to elaborate their own detailed rules and 
procedures so that they could influence decisions about the allocation of 
public resources for rural development. This strategic behaviour was 
observed in all the types of bureaucratic actors that participated in the 
study as well as in congresspersons and applicants to and beneficiaries 
of rural development programmes. 
 
The actors that compose the LDRS implementation network made 
decisions about policy process in a way that affected the main purpose of 
this planned intervention. Below I summarise the chain of events and 
actors’ practices observed at different points and stages of the 
implementation of the LDRS to show how the influence of bureaucratic 
actors can produce unexpected outcomes.  
 
As was explained in Chapter 2, one of the main reasons of creating a Law 
as the LDRS was to put a stop to the allocation of public resources for 
rural development based on political-electoral criteria, mainly around 
elections. To some extent the LDRS was created as a response to PRI 
governments’ traditional electoral practices. After the PRI’s loss of the 
presidential elections of 2000, the Mexican Congress unanimously 
approved the LDRS as a promising policy instrument to allocate public 
resources for rural development efficiently, avoiding any political-
electoral bias and addressing the most vulnerable population of the rural 
sector.  
                  Chapter 7. Understanding Development Bureaucracies: Mexico’s Development Bureaucracy 
 222 
 
However, the present research finds that from 1994 to 2006 about 25 
per cent of Congress had a particular agenda for the rural development 
budget. This percentage comprises congresspersons linked to civil and 
producers’ organisations in the rural sector. I had the opportunity to 
interview the presidents of the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) 
and the National Smallholders’ Association, both congresspersons who 
knew very little about the implications of the new model of rural 
development behind the LDRS. When I asked if they were worried about 
losing power as rural organisations to decide over the use of federal 
rural development programme resources, the CNC president was clear 
that he would not allow a reduction of the organisation’s customary 
allowance from the federal budget. He let me know that the 
Confederation uses informal negotiation channels such as social 
mobilisation to put pressure on the federal government to give them 
what, from their perspective, is fair. The response of the leader of the 
National Smallholders’ Association was similar; she told me that she 
negotiated directly with the Federal Secretary for Finance and Public 
Credit (SHCP) for her organisation to secure a fixed amount of the 
approved rural development budget, and so was not concerned because, 
according to her, ‘SAGARPA is aware of the negotiations with the Federal 
Secretary for Finance and must respect them. 
 
This reaction reveals the contradictory role in the implementation of the 
LDRS of congresspersons linked to the rural sector. As congresspersons, 
both leaders supported the decentralisation of the operation of the rural 
development programmes and the incorporation of a productive 
approach, but both prioritised the interests of their organisation over the 
principles of the LDRS, even to the extent of using non-technical 
arguments to secure public funding. A change in the institutional 
arrangement is observed in the relations between the producers’ 
organisations compared to those under the PRI regime. It is true that 
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those organisations do not have a corporatist relationship with the 2000 
government ruled by the PAN as they did in the past under PRI, but they 
showed resilience in the new political era and, instead of offering their 
political loyalty to the regime, offered their support to legitimise the PAN 
government in the informal spaces that they control. In other words, 
they did not offer the PAN government public support but instead social 
peace by withholding protests by the groups they controlled in exchange 
for public resources from federal programmes addressing the rural 
sector such as the PAAP. This is a new route offered by producers 
organisations to legitimise governments. 
 
The allocation of public resources for organisations of this nature does 
not take place with the implementation of rural development 
programmes but a year earlier, when the national budget is defined by 
the Secretariat of Finance and Public (SHCP). The congresspersons feel 
so powerful that they negotiate the amount their organisations will 
receive from federal programmes directly with the Secretariat. This is 
just one example of clientelism in Mexico’s rural development arena. 
When all of these negotiations are completed, SHCP informs SAGARPA of 
the terms set with national rural-sector organisations. When 
organisations do not have enough political power to secure the 
representation of a congressperson they negotiate directly with 
SAGARPA, exerting pressure by blocking roads and invading SAGARPA 
offices. These are the first constraints that SAGARPA’s functionaries have 
to deal with in the implementation arena and create informal 
commitments to avoid any political crises that could affect the image of 
SAGARPA or the federal government. So paradoxically, the diversion of 
the intentions of rural development policy and the unexpected outcomes 
begin at the top with policy-makers and planners.  
 
SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy knows the technical rationale of the LDRS 
and understands that allocation of PAAP’s resources must be carried out 
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according to the LDRS regulations; however, as described in Chapter 5, 
they act strategically to protect the political interests of the party in 
power in Mexico. Most members of the upper bureaucracy appointed 
from 2000 onwards have a personal or political link to the Secretary of 
SAGARPA which engenders a strong sense of loyalty to him or her which 
takes the form of the traditional compadrazgo relationship explained in 
Chapter 2. The main aim of these upper bureaucrats is to control 
decisions about SAGARPA programme resources and prevent state 
governments from getting hold of them.  
  
For the upper bureaucracy structure, supported by informal 
compadrazgo relationships, it is easy to create relationships of 
clientelism with the beneficiaries of the PAAP programme.  When the 
upper bureaucracy stratum selects beneficiaries it considers their 
economic and political influence in the region to ensure a degree of 
certainty that when elections or organisational changes take place the 
beneficiaries will support them. At this level most of the beneficiaries are 
individual producers with a high income, businesspersons in the rural 
sector or big organisations with an important presence in specific 
regions or states. Although since 2001 the PAAP should have been 
focusing on the most vulnerable rural population, its resource allocation 
has not reflected this. As FAO’s evaluation reports show, from 2002 to 
2006 most Alianza para el Campo resources were allocated to producers 
with high incomes with only about 20% going to low-income producers 
(FAO, 2003; 2003a; 2003b; 2004; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2005a; 2005b; 
2006; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; 2007a; 2007b)., After the programme was 
renamed the PAAP in 2008 this trend continued (FAO, 2008). 
 
The way SAGARPA’s upper bureaucrats make decisions about important 
productive projects affects how the middle and lower bureaucracy carry 
out the PAAP’s operational rules. Since the upper bureaucracy does not 
use the formal process of technical analysis to allocate resources, the 
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middle bureaucrats, represented by programme directors and sub-
directors, and lower bureaucrats, represented by operadores de 
ventanillas (government front desk attendants), have to generate 
paperwork that makes it look as if the allocation process has been 
carried out according to the operational rules. They formulate a 
productive project using data collected from the selected future 
beneficiaries and take these to the technical commissions for approval 
and the signature of both federal and state government –both signatures 
a formal requirement in the decentralised mode of operation of PAAP. 
All this is made possible by informal agreements between federal and 
state governments. 
 
At state level, state governments accepted a role in the implementation 
of the PAAP because it gives them access to federal resources. This is a 
strong incentive, as most state governments are highly dependent on 
federal resources to run public programmes. In the decentralisation of 
rural development policy, state governments have deployed their own 
political and social power to influence decisions about the PAAP’s 
resources in their own political interests.  
 
Neither in Oaxaca nor in Jalisco did the PAAP’s decentralised mode of 
operation work according to the spirit of the LDRS. The government of 
Oaxaca did not want to follow the operational rules, specifically in 
relation to making joint decisions with the federal government, because 
it considered that if the PAAP’s resources were to be decentralised all 
decisions about the allocation of its resources should be the 
responsibility of states without interference from the federal 
government. Thus Oaxaca’s government boycotted the technical 
commissions at which federal and state governments were supposed to 
make joint decisions about the eligibility of applications by withholding 
their signatures, which were needed to release PAAP resources to the 
beneficiaries, until projects proposed by Oaxaca’s state government 
                  Chapter 7. Understanding Development Bureaucracies: Mexico’s Development Bureaucracy 
 226 
were also accepted by the federal government. Withholding their 
signature from the approved projects put pressure on federal 
government because the PAAP’s operational rules state that resources 
must be allocated in specific months of the year, so the closer the 
deadline for distributing the resources, the more likely the federal 
government is to accept the of the state government’s demands. This is 
where informal agreements to split PAAP resources for allocation 
between the two levels of government take place. This solution is not in 
the spirit of the LDRS. 
 
The antagonistic behaviour of the Oaxaca government responded 
basically to differences between political parties from which federal and 
state governments come from, Oaxaca being governed by the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the federal government by the 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). However, in Jalisco, although both state 
and federal government are ruled by the same political party, PAN, there 
were also struggles between the political group supported by the state 
governor and that of the President of the Republic. Thus while in Oaxaca 
there is open antagonism between the two levels of government, in 
Jalisco the antagonism is subtle and takes place in private; but as in 
Oaxaca, the two groups fix the percentage of PAAP’s resources that each 
will allocate for distribution. 
 
As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, two strata of bureaucracy were 
identified in state governments. The upper bureaucracy is composed of 
the Secretariats and sub-secretariats for agricultural development and 
the lower bureaucracy, of the directors and operators of state 
programmes. The first stratum is strongly linked to the political elite that 
rules the state and is principally connected to the state governor’s 
political group. Its main concern is to build political capital for use in 
elections to keep the government in their hands.  
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The members of the lower State bureaucracy are mainly unconditional 
servants of upper bureaucrats since they got and keep their job thanks to 
the personal relationship they maintain with their superiors.  So the 
most important concern for this bureaucratic level is to keep their jobs, 
so they try to fulfil the whims of upper bureaucrats even when many of 
them are unethical such as carrying out political-electoral practices to 
create political clientele with public programmes. As at this level there is 
no civil service guaranteeing their posts and so they are willing to put 
their bosses’ priorities before citizens’ needs. 
 
Fourth, there are two important points to highlight regarding 
community participation and the involvement of municipal governments 
in the allocation of PAAP resources: a) the exclusion of municipal 
governments in decisions over the allocation of PAAP resources by state 
and federal governments, and b) the exclusion of civil society in 
decisions related to allocation of PAAP resources by municipal 
governments and the attempts to create ad hoc councils in the mayor of 
the municipality’s interests. In relation to the first, it was observed that 
even when the LDRS have a decentralisation mode of operation of rural 
development programmes to go up to the municipal governments, these 
are not empowered to do so by the state or federal government; instead 
upper state and federal bureaucracy fight to persuade municipal 
governments to become their political allies, offering resources for the 
municipality. Again, the political-electoral rationale takes place in the 
implementation arena, this time locally. Presidents of municipalities are 
expected to provide political support for the state or federal 
functionaries that provide them with the most public resources for 
development programmes. The mayors of the municipalities do not 
realise that the LDRS empowers municipal governments to decide on the 
use of federal resources for rural development, so state or federal 
governments act strategically to make it appear that they are providing 
special help to local government in order to create political loyalty. 
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A second phenomenon observed at the municipal level is that municipal 
authorities’ use of citizens’ councils to make collective decisions about 
the allocation of PAAP resources is a threat to their political and 
personal interests because majors of the municipalities feel that they 
lose power to make decisions over public resources and risk not fulfilling 
their political and personal commitments they did in the electoral 
campaign they were elected. Hence they people the municipal council 
with members who do not necessarily represent the community of the 
municipality, inviting instead people that are politically or personally 
close to them to take part in the Municipal Council for Sustainable Rural 
Development, which ensures that council decisions are made according 
to the will of the mayor of the municipality. However, as we have shown, 
this effort by municipal authorities to constitute ad hoc citizens’ councils 
is useless because federal and state governments do not allocate the 
PAAP’s resources according to the will of local councils but for their own 
personal and political gain. Discontent and disappointment was 
observed among members of the municipal councils when they realised 
that their resolutions had been ignored in the PAAP allocation process. 
  
Thus states and federal bureaucratic actors involved in the 
implementation of the policy have developed a structure that simulates 
the inclusion of community opinions through the integration of local 
councils. The policymakers sought to decentralise the operation of rural 
development programmes through the LDRS; they tried to reduce the 
amount of central bureaucratic red tape through the delegation of 
decisions and functions and by effectively identifying local needs, but in 
fact it was the federal bureaucracy itself that created barriers to state 
and local government participation in the final decisions on how federal 
rural development programme resources are allocated. Hence neither 
democratisation nor community participation have been included on the 
implementation of the LDRS. 
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These key aspects, analysed in the case study, show that in practice the 
LDRS does not function as intended. The rural development policy is not 
creating any of the benefits that decentralisation and community 
participation should produce according to the paradigm of development 
on which this national policy is based. All the actors involved, including 
programme beneficiaries, play a game mainly based on a political-
electoral rationale; but politics is not the only driver influencing actors’ 
decisions in the implementation of the LDRS. This is clearly seen in the 
behaviour of the lower bureaucracy, whose incentives are as simple as 
keeping their job or being on good terms with the community, as 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Some upper-bureaucracy decisions are 
linked to symbolism associated with personal feelings or history, as in 
the case of the SAGARPA’s Head of Finance, who arbitrarily pushed for 
the allocation of development resources to his home town, as described 
in Chapter 5. So the notion of democratisation in this bureaucratic 
context expands the gift-giving culture in this social system to patron-
client relations. While section 7.3 explores the drivers behind 
bureaucratic actor’s decisions, it is important to highlight their influence 
on the generation of development policy outcomes as their bureaucratic 
practices can shift the original objectives of a policy. 
 
7.2 Actor-oriented approaches to understanding development 
bureaucracies 
Chapter 4 presented the actor-oriented approach which was used to 
analyse Mexico’s development bureaucracy. Two streams of this 
research approach were considered to understand bureaucratic practice 
in the context of the implementation of Mexico’s new rural development 
policy. Norman Long’s research approach centres on actors rather than 
processes, using the latter only as referents to analyse actors’ decisions 
in specific arenas and contexts, whether social, political, cultural or 
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organisational. It provides an analytical framework within which to 
explore planned interventions based on the lifeworlds of the actors 
involved in implementing development policy, and sees as important the 
identification of the social fields, arenas and domains in which actors 
make decisions. 
 
Actor network theory was used to build conclusions about how the 
implementation actors’ network generates outcomes, how different 
actors interpret one another and how different meanings are produced 
from the interactions between the different human and non-human 
actors. ANT’s nature led us to know who produces development practice, 
which actors influence it, how actors interpret each other to make 
decisions, what those decisions are and how they produce development 
practice. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the two approaches are used in this 
research as complementary to reach whole explanations since ANT alone 
is unable to fully explain the rationale behind actors’ decisions.  
 
ANT does not question the nature of decisions or whether a specific 
interaction between two actors is pertinent to producing the expected 
outcomes of a policy. It only describes how actors interact in the 
network to produce the network’s outcomes. ANT’s approach sees some 
actors as ‘black boxes’, as it is easier to focus on the interactions between 
actors than on the causes of those interactions. For this reason Long’s 
(2001) analytical framework is employed to carry out microanalysis of 
actors’ lifeworlds and contextualise their decisions in order to open the 
‘black box’ of some actors to understand development practice. 
 
In building the case study, considering the foundations of actor-oriented 
approaches allowed the identification and analysis of different types of 
bureaucratic actors and the elements of their lifeworlds, and to 
understand their decisions in specific context. It was possible to identify 
some objects that produced different meanings for different actors in 
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different situations and some whose meaning has changed over time to 
satisfy the needs of other networks’ actors. 
 
The case study presented in the two previous chapters has shown that 
the bureaucratic structure responsible for carrying out the LDRS’s 
directives is not a monolithic entity or a huge machine that works 
steadily to implement policy. On the contrary, Mexico’s development 
bureaucracy is composed of a diversity of administrative units, which 
are themselves composed of a diversity of actors, such as operators, 
supervisors, managers, directors and external personnel, responding to 
different organisational, political and personal interests. Even people in 
similar positions at different levels of government behave differently and 
respond to different motivations and rationales. 
 
The main lesson here is that not all bureaucrats understand policy and 
programme directives in the same way as they can represent different 
things to each. Hence bureaucratic practice is shaped by a chain of 
independent interpretations of the PAAP’s directives. Upper bureaucracy 
is motivated by the political aspirations and careers of the Secretary of 
SAGARPA itself and of its sub-secretariats. On one hand this upper 
bureaucracy seeks to project an international and national image of a 
Secretariat of State that bases its programme design on top-notch 
development approaches in which anti-politics discourse is used as a 
resource to build a good public image of SAGARPA as an organisation 
and of its top functionaries.  
 
The Secretary of SAGARPA privately confided that applying the 
principles of decentralisation and community participation could 
interfere with SAGARPA’s hidden agenda of keeping the social peace in 
the rural sector through the creation of political alliances with producers 
and peasants’ organisations. Hence it is possible to see how SAGARPA’s 
upper bureaucracy pretends that their programmes comply with the 
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principles of decentralisation and community participation of the LDRS. 
This strategic behaviour is possible by setting up a double game in the 
implementation of PAAP; one game played by SAGARPA’s Sub-
secretariat for Rural Development which addresses strategically the 
poorest population of the rural sector and the other by the Sub-
secretariats of Agriculture and Livestock taking advantage of their 
discretional powers to allocate PAAP resources to organisations and 
individual producers that represent whether a political clientele for 
SAGARPA or political allies for the political aspirations of upper 
bureaucrats.  The interview with the Secretary of Oaxaca’s SEDER 
illustrates the encounters between state and federal government and the 
strategic behaviour of both as they seek to fulfil their respective 
interests.  
 
In this interview ‘black-boxed’ entities arose, such as the Secretary of 
Oaxaca’s SEDER in his luxurious office. In the context of Oaxaca’s local 
politics it is meaningful that a state Secretary is able to show his power 
through the luxuries displayed in his office and his personal property. At 
described in Chapter 5, on the walls of his office were pictures of the 
Secretary with ex-presidents of Mexico and with the Mexican political 
elite. His big desk of fine wood sends the message to everyone who goes 
to his office that he is a powerful actor in the state government and plays 
with the institutional rules of the PRI regime, so all visitors understand 
how they are expected to behave in front of the Secretary: that is, 
submissively.  
 
The lower bureaucracy is mainly composed of functionaries of whom 
most have been working at SAGARPA for more than 15 years in the 
same. These actors have seen functionaries coming going from the upper 
bureaucracy. They are the visible face of SAGARPA and act as its 
representatives on the ground. Their general view of SAGARPA 
programmes is that over time they have all been very similar; the only 
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change that they perceive being in the requirements that an applicant 
has to fulfil to be eligible for public resources. That is to say lower 
bureaucrats do not identify the different ideas or paradigms of 
development that have shaped SAGARPA’s programmes over the years, 
and see the changes as the whims of upper bureaucrats. 
 
The main concern at this level is not political or electoral, as in the upper 
bureaucracy. The lower bureaucracy is concerned with administrative 
issues, and particularly with adapting the new regulations to its 
established administrative practices and procedures. Making it 
compulsory for applicants to present a productive project in their 
applications simply represents more workload for the same salary. 
Members of the lower bureaucracy saw the PAAP’s new rules as highly 
demanding procedures, so instead of adopting them they tried to adapt 
the new procedures to the existing ones (Merino and Macedo, 2006). 
This stratum has the feeling that there will soon be another change to the 
operational rules or to the names of the programmes, so there is no need 
to put too much effort into radically changing the way they have been 
operating the programmes.  
 
Another important factor identified in the lower bureaucrats’ 
interpretations of the policy is the fact that they have to compete 
between them if they belong to different levels of government, e.g. 
federal lower bureaucrats vs state lower bureaucrats. As the PAAP is a 
decentralised programme, its applicants can decide whether to apply at a 
federal or a state office or even, where applicable, at a municipal office. 
Theoretically the assessment of each application must be the same, 
independently of where it was received, but in practice we found that the 
results differed as each level of government has its own commitments 
and procedures. When dissimilar results are produced by middle 
bureaucrats the lower bureaucrats have the job of explaining to some 
applicants why they have been rejected. This face-to-face contact 
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between lower bureaucrats and citizens establishes personal links with 
the rural population which involve personal pressure from local 
inhabitants that also shape bureaucratic practice. The lower bureaucrats 
prefer to publicly discredit lower and middle administrative procedures 
in order to be accepted as trusted members of the local community.  
 
Using the actor-oriented approach allowed the mapping of the diversity 
of actors involved in the implementation of the LDRS and the drivers 
that influence their decisions. Here is the summary: 
 
Federal government: SAGARPA 
Federal upper bureaucracy 
Represented by Secretary of SAGARPA and sub-secretaries and general directors 
at SAGARPA’s headquarters; heads of SAGARPA’s local branches. 
Drivers: Political-electoral clientelism, personal sentiments (compadrazgo) 
 
Federal middle bureaucracy 
Represented by programme directors and administrative unit sub-directors at 
SAGARPA’s headquarters, programme directors and administrative unit sub-
directors at SAGARPA’s local branches, Directors of Rural Development Districts 
(DDR) 
Drivers: Organisational 
 
Federal lower bureaucracy 
Represented by CADER and DDR operadores de ventanillas (front-desk attendants) 
Drivers: Organisational, cultural, compadrazgo 
 
State government: State Secretaries of Agricultural and Rural Development 
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State upper bureaucracy 
Represented by State Secretary for Agriculture and Rural Development 
Drivers: Political-electoral, personal sentiment, compadrazgo. 
 
State lower bureaucracy 
Represented by state programme directors and operadores de ventanillas 
Drivers: Compadrazgo, economic (keeping their jobs) 
 
Municipal government 
Municipal upper bureaucracy 
Represented by the mayors of the municipalities 
Drivers: political-electoral clientelism, compadrazgo 
 
Municipal lower bureaucracy 
Represented by Rural Development directors, municipal advisors 
Drivers: Political-electoral clientelism, compadrazgo, economic (keeping their 
jobs) 
 
Consejos Municipales para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (Municipal 
Councils for Sustainable Rural Development) 
Represented by peasants and agribusiness owners 
Drivers: clientelism, compadrazgo, cultural. 
 
Differentiating all these actors allowed the setting up of different 
encounters that revealed the various rationales behind bureaucratic 
actors’ everyday decision-making. All of these actors converge in the 
implementation of the LDRS and specifically in the implementation of 
the PAAP. The diversity of drivers identified for each type of actor 
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reveals possibilities for different understandings of policy, whether 
political-electoral, cultural constraints or personal, and these cannot be 
neglected where the objective is to understand how development 
practice is produced and its outcomes. Understanding the nature of 
those drivers could reveal the actors’ rationale behind their decisions 
and clarify how unexpected outcomes arise. 
 
Equally important has been the identification of some non-human 
entities that have been ‘black-boxed’, to use the term from the actor 
network theory framework, such as the rural development programmes, 
the PRI regime and even the Mexican Revolution. None of these three 
entities are material objects such as the office or the desk of the 
Secretary of Oaxaca’s SEDER, but they all have a particular meaning in 
the context of the implementation of PAAP. The Mexican Revolution is 
well known to have been caused by several historic facts that are 
commonly accepted in Mexican society. Of course some of the facts are 
matters for of debate for academics and historians, but that is not 
relevant to the role of the image of the Mexican Revolution in the rural 
development policy realm.  
 
The Mexican Revolution is used by peasantry organisations as a flag to 
claim that they have the right to public resources to foster rural 
development. As pointed out in Chapters 2 and 6, peasants’ 
organisations feel that they represent the ‘sons of the Mexican 
Revolution’ and that Mexican State is in debt with them for the 
development of Mexico after the revolution. This traditional relationship 
between the federal government and national organisations generates 
inequity in relation to peasants who do not belong to any organisation. 
In this field of rural policy the notion of the Mexican Revolution has 
evolved over time to be used as a tool that is adjusted according to 
circumstances, as if it has its own agency. 
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In general terms, rural development policy is another non-human entity 
that interacts specifically with bureaucratic actors in different ways. For 
the lower federal bureaucracy, which has been in operation for more 
than 15 years, the rural development programmes continue to have the 
same objectives independently of changes to the formal regulations. 
These bureaucrats have witnessed different modifications to the 
programmes’ operational rules without observing a change in their 
superiors’ approach to allocating resources. So despite the fact that 
PAAP’s design was backed by a new national rural development law, the 
LDRS, the lower bureaucracy did not make any great effort to change 
their internal administrative processes to manage the programme, with 
the rationale that this was just another whim of another new upper 
bureaucrat, and everything would continue as always at SAGARPA.  
 
For the upper federal bureaucracy the rural development policy 
represented a very important tool for maintaining the peace in the social 
sector. So despite PAAP’s operational rules allowing everybody to apply 
for the resources, the upper bureaucracy already had a list of the 
producers’ organisations and individual producers that were to receive 
PAAP resources, whether in exchange for their political power or for 
their historic symbolism in the sector.  Although the PAN government 
tried to implement the PAAP following the spirit of the LDRS at the 
beginning of its administration, it quickly understood the relevance of 
fulfilling the expectations of some producers and social organisations of 
the rural sector in order to avoid protests against their administration 
which might affect their political image at the national level. So the 
meaning of the rural development policy has taken a very different form 
from that laid out objectively in their programmes’ operational rules.  
 
Finally, the 70-year PRI regime, represented by a strong president with 
more power even than Congress and the Court, created a set of formal 
and informal institutions representing the decision-making frameworks 
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for all members of the society. As explained in Chapter 2, at the end of 
the regime there was an image of PRI as antidemocratic and corrupt, 
using clientelism and compadrazgo to win elections and hold onto 
power.  This research is set post-PRI with a PRI opposition party, PAN, 
ruling the country. The case study presented in Chapters 5 and 6 shows 
how even though PAN intended to govern without the corruption, 
clientelism and informal institutions of the PRI regime, by the end of 
2005 the electoral system was so connected to clientelistic practices that 
PAN had to use the PRI regime’s informal rules to interact with the rural 
sector and implement its rural development programmes without a 
political cost. The conclusion here is that even after the PRI lost the 
presidential elections and with the many changes that occurred until it 
appeared that the PRI regime was finished, bureaucrats of the PAN 
government strategically and efficiently used informal PRI-regime 
institutions to fulfil the political interests of its upper bureaucracy.  The 
PRI regime institutions were interpreted situationally and their meaning 
was transformed to legitimise the new government. 
 
7.3 Drivers of development bureaucracies 
This section explains the rationale behind bureaucratic actors’ decisions 
on the implementation of the LDRS. The research confirmed that the 
development arena is highly influenced by the political interests of the 
different actors involved in it (Ferguson, 1992; Escobar, 1995; Chhotray 
2011), and in the case of Mexico this political-electoral factor is 
explained by informal institutions such as clientelism. But political-
electoral drivers are not the only influences on bureaucratic actors’ 
decisions. Other drivers are organisational, cultural and personal 
reasons and historic informal institutions such as compadrazgo. The 
following subsections explain how two of these dimensions – the 
political and the non-political – influence bureaucratic actors’ decisions 
and produce unexpected outcomes, mostly unconsciously. 
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7.3.1 Political drivers of development bureaucracies 
The first important thing to explore to understand Mexico’s development 
bureaucracy is the meaning of the word ‘politics’. It is important because, 
as Chhotray points out, for a wide range of people ‘politics’ is a means of 
solving social conflict without the use of violence or authoritarian 
mechanisms. Chhotray says: 
 
I understood politics to be the gateway to a fascinating world of 
collective decision-making of which we were inescapably a part. The 
result of this broad-based focus has been to bring nearly every 
conceivable aspect of human existence into the fold of the study of 
politics: rule and resistance, social organization and disintegration, faith 
and disenchantment, access and exclusion, identity and violence. 
(Chhotray, 2011).  
 
In Mexico the above notion of politics is used in the academic sphere; in 
the development arena the connotation of politics is quite different. 
 
In development policy the term ‘politics’ has been shaped in Mexico by 
the notion of the type of corporative politics that the Mexican 
government has used to create relationships between the governmental 
and the social sphere. The post-Mexican Revolution era was marked by 
strong social organisations such as the Peasantry’s National 
Confederation, National Workers’ Unions, the Smallholders National 
Association, the National Organisation of Public Functionaries and 
National Teachers’ Unions, which had strong links to the regime. In 
electoral times candidates made political promises to the leaders of such 
organisations rather than to the population as a whole, each the member 
of Mexican society being represented by at least one of these national 
organisations, whose leaders were members of the Institutional 
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Revolutionary Party (PRI), the political party in power. 
 
With the decline of the PRI, the social demand for the democratisation of 
the political system and the poor performance of the Mexico’s economy, 
international organisations played an important role in the 
stigmatisation of the term ‘politics’. The image of development 
programmes as instruments used by government to exchange its 
support for electoral votes was used in the discourses of the opposition 
and international organisations as an undesirable practice in democratic 
systems. As was explained in previous chapters, this exchange of favours 
was sometimes an explicit act of buying votes on the day of the election 
and at other times was implicit through corporative clienteles in the 
form of social organisations which the regime saw as their political 
strength in electoral times. 
 
Thus, the idea of depoliticising the management of development 
programmes, and mainly those oriented to social and rural development, 
was one of the main ideas that the opposition used in their political 
campaigning to foster the change that Mexico needed: a government that 
would distribute public resources with no political bias. In 2000 the 
opposition won the presidential election, and with it several changes 
were expected in the management of development programmes were. 
The LDRS, created in 2001, was meant to be an iconic national law 
revolutionising the way rural development programmes work. The 
technical rationale behind its design was to prevent governmental 
agencies from handling public resources in such a way as to create or 
maintain electoral clienteles. 
 
This research has shown that despite the apparent consensus achieved 
between key actors of the Mexican State including the Congress, the 
Office of the President, state governors and representatives of national 
rural producers organisations to create a new law guaranteeing equality 
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and neutrality in the allocation of public resources, such principles are 
barely recognisable in its implementation (see chapters 5 and 6). Actors 
in top positions have particular agendas shaped by their ‘political’ 
interests.  
 
In the Mexican context the term ‘political interests’ has a negative 
connotation –politics is a ‘nasty business’, as Chhotray (2011) names this 
face of it – with actors using their position to influence or manipulate the 
allocation of public resources for the benefit of the social organisations 
they patronise. In most cases such patronage seeks the votes of the 
members of these organisations for a particular candidate or political 
party in return. In this way rural organisations maintain their 
prerogative in the allocation of rural development programme 
resources. 
  
The rationale behind this practice rests on a complex chain of actor’s 
interpretations of the LDRS. The role of the Mexican Congress in the 
early stage of the policy-making process, and later in its implementation, 
reveals the aims of the actors at this level. Standard Mexican Congress 
procedure was followed in creating the LDRS in a process where 
technical commissions of experts in the field, congresspersons from 
different political parties and members of civil society participate in 
formulating the directives of the new law; then the Congress votes to 
pass or reject the bill. The LDRS was unanimously voted in, so no major 
obstacles were expected in the implementation arena. 
 
However, settled rural development practices created difficulties in 
implementing the LDRS as intended. First, it is important to mention that 
nearly 80 of the 500 congresspersons come from the rural sector; most 
being representatives of rural producers or peasant organisations. 
Interviews with some of those linked to the rural sector revealed that 
they had supported the LDRS bill because after informal negotiations 
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they had received a guarantee from top federal government 
functionaries that the organisations they led would receive resources 
from these federal programmes. So while they are aware of the 
objectives of the new law, they see them as idealistic and impossible to 
achieve. They feel that the needs of the rural sector cannot wait to be 
addressed until the LDRS is fully implemented; thus despite the 
consensus that decentralisation and community participation are 
important factors in the improvement of public resource allocation, 
congresspersons representing the interests of rural organisations 
support its implementation only to the extent that it does not affect the 
support they expect their organisations to receive from SAGARPA’s 
programmes. 
 
If the federal government tries to allocate SAGARPA resources based on 
the spirit of the LDRS, many organisations represented by 
congresspersons will not receive public resources. This happened  in 
2003 and 2004 when the LDRS was new and SAGARPA tried to allocate 
resources based only on technical analysis of the applications. The result 
was a chain of demonstrations which included actions such as roads 
blockages and the taking over of its offices. Social pressure was exerted 
on federal government not only in the streets but also at the top level of 
the bureaucracy as congresspersons linked to the rural sector directly 
demanded that Secretariat for Finance and Public Credit make the 
necessary budget adjustments to fulfil the demands of the rural sector 
organisations. Here congresspersons acting as if the organisations they 
are linked with were ‘the’ civil society of the rural sector with no 
political-electoral interests while in fact these organisations were led by 
members of the Mexican Congress and linked to specific political parties. 
 
After two years of trying to implement the new development approach 
the federal government realised that applying technical criteria to 
allocate public resources with no previous informal negotiations with 
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influential rural sector organisations was creating a ‘nightmare’ for 
government as public demonstrations affected the economic activities of 
the regions where they were held and the image of the government was 
affected. So the new federal government, which for the first time had 
been elected from the opposition since Mexican revolution times, learnt 
that they must return to informal negotiations to keep the social peace in 
the country and build a good image for the government for the next 
elections, which entailed creating electoral clientele to keep them in 
power. Without this they had no chance of being competitive in elections 
as most of rural society saw the electoral process as a time for 
exchanging economic incentives with the government. For most 
peasants this is the only time they can get something they want from the 
government. 
 
In the federal elections of 2006 the opposition party that won the 
election in 2000, PAN, kept the presidency of Mexico, but now, with more 
experience of national governance, it decided to quit the LDRS’s new 
approach to rural development. Community participation mechanisms 
were no longer funded by SAGARPA and the decentralised mode of 
operation dispensed with the joint action of federal and state 
governments. The reasoning behind this retreat was mainly associated 
with the ‘politics’ of development. The newly-elected federal government 
understood that the poor represent the easiest vote they can get; they 
are the least educated and have more material needs than the rest of the 
country so can easily and cheaply be manipulated with small amounts of 
funding and material ‘gifts’ through the rural development programmes. 
 
The interface encounters at the process of the decentralisation of 
governmental responsibilities from federal and state governments to the 
municipal level illustrate the federal and state bureaucracies’ apparent 
rejection of community participation as a key element in the 
improvement of the allocation of public resources. SAGARPA’s 
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bureaucratic units appeared stubbornly unwilling to change their 
established procedures. However, at the level of the upper bureaucracy 
the boycott of the Sub-secretariat for Rural Development’s efforts was 
based on the hidden mission of SAGARPA’s Secretary: maintaining the 
social peace in the rural sector to retain the federal government’s 
political capital for future elections. 
  
As if rural development organisations were a market, SAGARPA and 
SEDER’s officers compete for their electoral support in exchange for 
financial contributions from the programmes they operate. In the case of 
the PAAP they promised certain resources or funding for the acquisition 
of productive assets in exchange for their support in electoral processes. 
Politics in the context of Mexico’s development policies is associated 
with two practices: the government securing votes for a particular 
political party, candidate or person seeking a party post, and social 
organisations seeking benefits from government programmes in 
exchange for social peace. 
 
The opposition was very critical of the old regime’s use of government 
programmes for electoral purposes, but we observed that in practice this 
new government –that came from PRI’s opposition—does not have 
enough patience to wait for the results of the new approach to 
development. We identified two different mindsets in SAGARPA’s upper 
bureaucracy: the understanding that decentralisation is a development 
strategy on the international agenda and its potential benefits through 
allocating public resources more efficiently; and, synchronously, 
knowing that effectively decentralising the operation of SAGARPA’s 
programmes would put the federal government at a disadvantage in 
relation to state governments to promote politically the federal 
government image at national level.  
 
SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy is aware that the decentralisation 
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process is a mid- to long-term process, but their political aims as a group 
are set in the short term at no more than five years, as the elections are 
every six years. Despite all the inconveniences and risks of managing 
programme resources discretionarily, the new opposition party decided 
to do so because they saw it as the most effective way of creating a 
clientele for elections. Thus the notion of decentralisation as a 
development approach was used only as a tool in public discourse to 
create the image of a responsible and reformist federal government at 
international diplomatic events and in internal debates with the 
opposition. 
 
Federal functionaries lost the sight when they asserted that Alianza para 
el Campo resources belong to them –as federal government—so state 
governments should no have right to decide over those resources. Thus 
SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy disagree with the idea of decentralising 
the operation of federal programmes because they think it is unfair to 
incorporate other levels of government in the decisions over the 
allocation of federal resources. Hence SAGARPA  created a control 
system to make state governments accountable to federal government 
but not to society. The intention of controlling state governments was 
maintained in the sense that most state governments were led by the 
PRI’s members, which would intentionally spoil the PAN federal 
government’s new rural development policy. There was no trust in PRI 
state governments to comply with the assumptions of decentralisation, 
as they were seen as led only by their own political interests, so the new 
aim was to depoliticise rural development in Mexico. That was the 
official discourse in 2003   
 
Unfortunately for SAGARPA’s Sub-secretariat for Rural Development the 
community-driven rural development strategy was never thoroughly 
implemented, at least as intended. The idea was simply absorbed by the 
upper bureaucracy as the whim of a bureaucrat with no knowledge of 
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the sector. Most of the functionaries at SAGARPA’s headquarters shared 
the view that municipal governments do not have the capacity to manage 
public resources efficiently and giving them such power would end in a 
waste of public resources. Of course the official discourse from the office 
of the President of the Mexican Republic expressed the opposite, 
stressing the importance of local government and community 
participation in the development agenda. 
 
Civil society is involved everywhere in the political discourses of 
Mexico’s federal government. Its inclusion has been interpreted as the 
discretional inclusion of what are called ‘representatives’ of civil society. 
The analytical description of how the bureaucratic network has 
translated the notion of community participation cannot be seen as 
wrongly implemented as such an idea was never implemented at all. We 
can conclude that the bureaucratic rationale is diverse at each level; the 
drivers of bureaucratic behaviour are different at each bureaucratic level 
so the justification of their decisions. The clash of all these views, 
interests and representations of reality shape the bureaucrats’ decisions 
in ways that have little to do with the original intention of the policy. 
 
The notion of community participation through the use of municipal 
councils is mentioned as one of the drivers of the decentralisation of 
governmental responsibilities from federal and state governments to 
municipal level. In 2006 the head of SAGARPA’s Sub-secretary for Rural 
Development said at an international conference: ‘Mexico has 2,393 
rural municipalities; 2,110 already have Consejos Municipales para el 
Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (municipal councils), and 1,858 of these 
already have a Municipal Rural Development Plan, which was made by 
the municipal authorities with the consensus of rural representatives of 
each region’ (Ruiz García, 2006). 
 
Of course these figures presented by SAGARPA’s Sub-secretary for Rural 
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Development are very useful for creating an image of Mexico progressing 
into decentralisation and integrating of civil society in public decisions. 
What the speaker did not mention was the view of the programme 
operators interviewed for this research, who see that while 99% of 
municipal councils have been created, they have not yet achieved their 
purpose of taking effective decisions over the allocation of PAAP’s 
decentralised resources. He also did not say that most of the Municipal 
Rural Development Plans do not match local needs and lack 
methodological rigour and accurate data. Most of these plans were 
formulated just as a formality to make municipalities eligible to receive 
resources from SAGARPA’s programmes.   
 
An external observer believing officials’ claims would get the idea that 
the use of municipal councils is a successful strategy for rural 
development. However, our analysis shows that to understand the 
outcomes of development policies one must know how bureaucratic 
actors translate development notions and how these are transformed 
into practice. Knowing this may provide plausible explanations for the 
different results produced by similar development policies in different 
locations. 
 
My main argument here is that in developing countries where 
democracies are incipient, politics is not a mean to achieve social 
consensus but to concentrate power in a specific group or person. So in 
the rural sector of Mexico the use of politics it is generally understood in 
the light of the electoral processes and nothing else. The rationale is not 
along the lines of economic efficiency and social justice but of an artificial 
legitimisation of the governing bodies. The principle followed is one of 
not making waves (no hacer olas) in the social arena, keeping the peace 
and winning followers using traditional mechanisms to create political-
electoral clienteles. 
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7.3.2 Non-political drivers of development bureaucracies 
Theories of bureaucracy, reviewed in Chapter 3, state that bureaucratic 
organisations produce and reproduce specific patterns of behaviour in 
ways that lead to unexpected outcomes. Many of these patterns are the 
result of factors that influence the choices of bureaucratic actors, but 
unlike those associated with political interests discussed above, the 
emphasis here is on showing that non-political factors also shape 
bureaucratic actor’s decisions and influence the outcomes of Mexico’s 
rural development policy.  
 
Bureaucracy theorists such as Gouldner (1952), Merton (1952), Selznick 
(1949) and Crozier (1964) challenge Weber’s classic administrative 
paradigm of the theoretically neutral standpoint taken by bureaucracies 
to achieve their organisational, administrative and policy objectives. All 
of these authors provide important insights into why bureaucracies do 
not – or cannot – perform neutrally.  
 
Selznick (1949) stresses that where unexpected outcomes occur there is 
a presumption that sociological forces are at work, so bureaucratic 
actors may face constraints, tensions and dilemmas in making everyday 
decisions. According to Selznick, they deal with this by establishing 
commitments, which are the main source of unanticipated consequences 
of bureaucratic organisations. The commitments bureaucratic actors are 
attached might be not compatible to organisational or programmes’ 
goals. 
 
Merton (1952) says that bureaucratic organisations present 
dysfunctions produced by the nature of their structure; Gouldner (1952) 
stresses that there is ‘something’ about bureaucratic organisations that 
makes the personalisation and routinisation of procedures difficult to 
avoid. In SAGARPA’s lower bureaucracy, represented by the front desk 
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attendants some of these factors influenced the implementation of the 
PAAP. The latter adapted the new directives to old practices, and 
routinisation and personal styles of management influenced their 
development practice further.  
 
Some of the arguments put forward by bureaucracy theorists provide 
plausible explanations for how the unexpected outcomes were produced 
in the Mexican case. Some individual actors and administrative units 
implicitly agreed to pretend that decisions related to SAGARPA’s 
programmes were based on technical arguments when in practice they 
knew that they were the result of the whim of a top functionary. The 
encounter presented in Chapter 5 describing how a top SAGARPA 
functionary influenced the allocation of public resources based on a 
romantic view of his hometown illustrates how, in developing countries, 
non-political interests can influence the outcomes of development 
policies. The functionary was not seeking political or economic gain – his 
intention was to help the rural producers in his home community to 
progress economically and socially, but in doing so he automatically 
produced inequity in the access to public resources of this and other 
communities. 
 
The relevant question here is why this SAGARPA functionary did this, 
knowing that such allocation of programme resources is not considered 
in the programme regulations. The answer is connected to the personal 
commitments of upper SAGARPA bureaucrats and symbolic links in an 
exchange called compadrazgo, which performs as another actor in the 
institutional and organisational setting of this development bureaucracy. 
The top bureaucrat has a personal relationship with the Secretary of 
SAGARPA: both were born in the State of Jalisco and one is the godfather 
to the other’s child. They are thus linked through compadrazgo and call 
one another compadre as a mutual sign of respect. Beyond the religious 
and personal meaning of compadrazgo it is a link of respect and self-
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protection.  
 
While this top SAGARPA functionary knows well that his post is very 
influential in the organisation, he also knows that his personal 
relationship with SAGARPA’s Secretary makes it very difficult for other 
members of SAGARPA to question his decisions. The political position 
that he thus holds is recognised by all of SAGARPA’s administrative units, 
which see the exposure of his actions as risk to lose their jobs. So the 
heads of the programmes and the middle bureaucrats that operate them 
prefer to create a strategy to fulfil his demands. They look for people that 
live in the area in question to invent applications and present them as 
having been evaluated by a technical commission and assessed as 
priorities in the region.  
 
The risk to the middle bureaucrats of not complying with the demands of 
the top functionary are exclusion from the Secretary of SAGARPA’s close 
circle where institutional decisions are made and from participating in 
future projects as well as being seen as disloyal. In this sense, 
‘institutional’ behaviour means supporting the decisions of the 
organisation heads rather than putting the goals of the organisation 
before those of any individual. As many bureaucracy theorists have 
suggested (see Bardach, 1977), organisations have to fight to survive and 
in doing so they sometimes shift away from their original aims.  
 
 
Another way to explain the non-political rationale is through the 
practices identified in SAGARPA programme front-desk staff, who 
reported that the discretional way in which state governments allocate 
resources is turning the community against them and generating an 
image of SAGARPA functionaries working only to help their friends. 
Front-desk staff spends many hours each day explaining the federal 
government’s rural development priorities to applicants and clarifying 
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that decisions on their applications are made at the upper levels, denying 
any responsibility for the final decision. For front desk functionaries it is 
very important to maintain good relations with the local population 
because they have created a personal link with them over the time they 
have been in charge of the local SAGARPA office.  
 
As the position of these functionaries does not depend on their personal 
relationship with top bureaucrats they prefer to point SAGARPA 
headquarters as responsible for decisions about the allocation of 
programme resources in their dealings with the local population. When a 
new development approach is applied to the design of SAGARPA’s 
programmes, as the case of the LDRS, those working on the front line see 
it as the whim of the current Secretary of SAGARPA or technocrats of 
upper bureaucracy. They are very reluctant to believe that new 
programme regulations are responding to a legitimate decision to 
change how rural development policy has been managed in recent years. 
So rather than informing potential beneficiaries about the change of 
approach in the development programmes they explain the changes in 
terms of the administrative requirements and procedures now they –as 
potential beneficiaries—have to fulfil to apply for programmes’ 
resources. 
 
The behaviour of SAGARPA’s front desk functionaries is aimed at 
avoiding the ‘social punishment’ of rejected applicants accusing them of 
corruption. This is because some applicants think that front desk 
functionaries have greater influence over the allocation of resources, so 
some applicants think that they need to give a bribe to the front desk 
functionaries to have more possibilities to be successful in the 
application process. To some extent front desk attendants do not 
implement the new development approach because they understand 
that most decisions about programme resources are made based not on 
technical criteria but on the political commitments of upper bureaucracy 
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to particular rural organisations. So they adapt the processes of the ‘new’ 
programme design to the existing ones that have been performing over 
the years. 
 
Chapter 6 analysed the ‘political’ rationale behind federal and state 
bureaucracies’ adoption of community participation as a key element for 
improving the allocation of public resources. However, there are 
bureaucratic practices that show that the Sub-secretariat for Rural 
Development was boycotted by other SAGARPA Sub-secretariats due to 
internal competition between administrative units for the attention of 
SAGARPA’s Secretary. As much as the ‘new’ approach of rural 
development does not produce the expected results the more influential 
will be the Sub-secretariats of Agriculture and Livestock to manage and 
allocate SAGARPA’s programme resources, since they would have 
demonstrated their point that the new approach does not deliver 
development.  The head of the Sub-secretariat that most effectively 
keeps the social peace in the rural sector and provides evidence that can 
be used to improve the political image of SAGARPA is the one who will 
receive the support of the overall Secretary of SAGARPA to advance his 
or her career in the organisation: those that fail in this are removed or 
isolated from the big decisions. 
 
The analysis in this section focuses on the non-political drivers that 
shape the decisions of bureaucratic actors. In this research these drivers 
are called non-political, as all of them are based on personal or cultural 
commitments in which aspects such as compadrazgo, social recognition 
or career progress behave as incentives in the implementation network, 
influencing the decisions of human actors who behave strategically to 
fulfil their personal or professional aspirations. Crozier (1964) tells us 
that there may be commitments, as Selznick proposes, or inner aspects 
of big organisations such as routinisation, as Merton (1952) proposes, 
but in all of this bureaucratic behaviour the actors try to control the 
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decisions in which they are involved. Crozier (1964) sees this control as 
the discretional power than an actor can have over a decision as result of 
the uncertainty that other actors over the outputs of making certain 
decisions. As much uncertainty surrounds a decision more the power the 
actor has over the rest of the participating actors. So the power lodged in 
individuals and groups is used rationally to fulfil diverse interests and 
conflicting goals. 
 
Crozier (1964) sees conflict as a source of stability rather than a 
dysfunction of bureaucratic organisations. All the actors play a game in 
which they pretend to be interacting on a new basis in asking for and 
allocating SAGARPA’s programme resources, but in fact they are playing 
by the old rules, which are meaningful for most of the actors of the LDRS 
implementation network.  
 
Conclusion: What must be understood about development 
bureaucracies 
Ten years after the LDRS was created, nobody in Mexico is talking about 
a ‘failure’ of the ‘new’ strategy of rural development even though there is 
no evidence that today rural development has been decentralised or that 
local Councils for Rural Development are including citizens in decisions 
about the allocation of SAGARPA programme resources. Since 2003, 
when the first attempts to implement the LDRS through the redesign of 
SAGARPA’s programmes took place, the LDRS has been missing from the 
public agenda and the actors that should be interested – peasants, rural 
organisations, SAGARPA, the State Secretariats for Agriculture and Rural 
Development and congresspersons – have not raised it, even when there 
is evidence, as observed in the fieldwork for this research, that the 
implementation of the LDRS, as it was meant, has been abandoned. 
 
This thesis has shown how a rural development policy that created great 
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expectations simply has not produced the planned outcomes, even with 
enough resources to implement it. The emphasis has been put on the 
role of development bureaucracies in producing development outcomes 
with the main research question posed as How does Mexico’s 
development bureaucracy produce development practice and influence the 
outcomes in rural Mexico? A macro-analysis of Mexico’s case has shown 
how the President of the Mexican Republic, congresspersons and 
SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy’s notions of decentralisation and the 
community participation of development actors have been used in 
official discourse to create an image of depolitisation of Mexico’s rural 
development policy and empowerment of  municipal governments and 
civil society. 
 
Beyond the official discourse it has been possible to observe that many 
congresspersons are leaders of rural producers’ organisations that have 
traditionally put political pressure on federal government to give them 
fixed amounts of resources from federal programmes run by SAGARPA. 
SAGARPA’s upper bureaucracy constrains the decisions of state and 
municipal governments about the allocation of its programmes’ 
resources in order to retain control of it. In the same way, state 
governments boycott some of SAGARPA’s programme regulations that 
were created to implement the LDRS in order to get discretional power 
to allocate the resources of these decentralised federal programmes 
themselves. Federal and state governments neglect the Municipal 
Councils for Rural Development because such councils could hinder 
Federal and State preferences to allocate decentralised PAAP’s resources 
based on clientelism and compadrazgo criteria. So, as described in 
Chapter 6, the empowerment of civil society has not occurred in the 
implementation of SAGARPA programmes, at least regarding decisions 
to influence the allocation of public resources. 
 
The federal bureaucracy sees the decentralisation of rural development 
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programmes as a threat to SAGARPA’s political power to distribute 
federal resources for rural development and have therefore opted 
instead to split SAGARPA programme resources with state governments 
and retain control of their portion rather than share control of all of it. 
This allows SAGARPA to retain the electoral clientele in which they are 
interested, and gives state governments a tool by which they can 
maintain their own electoral clientele to compete with other electoral 
forces. Hence the implementation network has not respected the spirit of 
the LDRS, there are no intergovernmental relations, no identification of 
local problems and no more effective allocation of public resources.  
 
The other key development idea behind the LDRS was the inclusion of 
civil society in public decisions. Its design included the creation of local 
councils in each municipality where citizens could participate in 
decisions on the allocation of SAGARPA’s programmes. The councils 
were officially created, but barely functioned as intended. Today they are 
imaginary councils in the official statistics; in practice they are not 
composed of representatives of civil society and have no say in decisions 
about SAGARPA programmes. 
 
Nobody is complaining about the way the LDRS is being implemented 
and there is no apparent reason for this indifference since there were 
high expectations about the LDRS when it was created. We argue that 
there are no complaints because the actors in the implementation 
network would be affected –according to their own bureaucratic 
rationale – if public resources were allocated, as intended based on 
technical rural development arguments, so most prefer to pretend that 
the LDRS is operating as planned while rural producer and peasant 
organisations, SAGARPA and state and  municipal governments play by 
their own rules.  
 
Thus at the macro level, the main conclusion about the Mexican case is 
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similar to Ferguson (1992) and Chhotray’s (2011) ideas. There are 
pieces of an anti-politics machine embedded in the Mexico’s rural 
development policy. Both authors have arrived at the general conclusion 
that using anti-politics language nullifies the institutional channels 
provided by politics to solve social conflict. When the LDRS was 
approved it faced barriers to its implementation as the new institutional 
channels were unable to reduce social conflict around the issue of 
allocating public resources for rural development. Hence the expected 
policy output was hindered by traditional practices associated with 
established political institutions such as clientelism and compadrazgo. 
The anti-politics discourse has helped the Mexican State to legitimise its 
decisions about rural development towards the population of urban 
areas and outsiders, such as foreign governments and international 
organisations, which know and understand little of the social, economic 
and political dynamics of Mexico’s rural sector. 
 
Understanding the meaning that non-human actors produce on human 
actors and the rationale behind decisions made in the implementation of 
Mexico’s rural development policy has been an important object of this 
study. These non-human actors – for example Mexican Revolution 
discourses and history; rural development programmes in generic terms 
as a steady political instrument; and the peasantry as a social entity – all 
produce meaning that the actors implementing the LDRS have used 
strategically to produce discourses and debates to fulfil and justify their 
specific interests. 
 
The findings from the case of Mexico’s rural development policy provide 
insights about the rationale that can be behind development 
bureaucracies and how bureaucratic practice can influence development 
outcomes. The policymaker must understand that bureaucratic practice 
is the result of a chain of interpretations by individual actors, each with a 
different history and motivation, and the success of a development policy 
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is directly associated with how the development ideas behind it can be 
interpreted in terms of the risks and benefits that they represent to each 
actor. Thus a basic principle of the design of a development policy must 
be to know the bureaucratic rationale of the operational and 
administrative structures that are to be involved in the policy’s 
implementation. 
 
A development policy design must be tied not just to certain paradigms 
of development but also to the nature of network of actors that will 
implement it. The various rationales that converge in the 
implementation arena, and where these are not negotiable, must be 
identified. As shown in the case study, the importance lies not so much in 
the policy’s comprehensive technical design as in providing the right 
incentives for bureaucratic actors to understand and execute the policy 
as it is intended. 
 
In Mexico’s case, what moves bureaucratic actors to participate in 
international funding is the chance provided by global programmes to 
manage monetary resources and use them to reinforce their political and 
social network created in the rural sector. Mexico’s upper bureaucracy 
needs to be visible in the international and national arena. Anonymity 
does not incentivise heads of federal secretariats, state governments and 
municipal governments to participate in development programmes that 
require administrative effort to allocate public resources. They need 
public recognition to fulfil their political aspirations. 
 
In this sense, corruption is not an undesirable anomaly of the system but 
a key element in the system, an element that has a function to act 
strategically in the rural development arena. Informal agreements that 
affect the expected operation of development programmes make it 
possible to allocate public resources that would otherwise become 
paralysed in the bureaucratic apparatus; hence the paralysis of Mexico’s 
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rural development public spending.  
 
We have learnt that Mexico’s development bureaucracy is neither as 
mechanical nor as efficient as the Weberian model, but paradoxically the 
discourse of neutrality of this Weberian model is used strategically by 
upper bureaucracy to create the notion of anti-politics discourse to 
legitimise their political decisions. Politics as Ferguson (1992) and 
Chhotray (2011) have studied it is a very important engine of 
bureaucratic rationale in developing countries, mainly in upper 
bureaucratic structures that work based on the electoral cycle.  
 
But bureaucracies are composed of human actors who base their 
decisions on drivers of a different nature, such as the personal, the 
professional and the cultural. Whatever the nature of the driver, the one 
must not see these motivations as steady factors that make actors’ 
decisions predictable. Actors behave strategically according to the 
situation, so development practice is the result of a dynamic chain of 
interpretations. Hence at the micro level it is possible to observe that the 
bureaucratic apparatus is not monolithic but composed of a network of 
actors with a wide range of interests, who make individual or group 
decisions based on several criteria that do not necessarily attend to a 
political rationale. Crozier’s (1964) view of individuals capable of 
interpreting and manipulating the components of the social system to 
achieve their particular interests is evident in the Mexican case. It is 
possible that the social system, in which bureaucratic decisions take 
place, is divided into several social arenas and domains where actors’ 
decisions have different dimensions and consequences and acquire 
different meanings for different actors, as Norman Long (2001) has 
documented in the Mexican case. 
 
Finally, the evidence presented in this work has shown that development 
bureaucracies can influence the outcomes of development policies. 
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Traditional approaches based on the reviewed managerial views have 
argued that when the bureaucratic structures produce undesirable 
outcomes it is product of dysfunctions.  Many of the dysfunctions have 
been qualified as such because political decisions were made rather than 
the intended technical ones. As was shown, in the Mexican case the 
political decisions of development bureaucrats are not dysfunctions but 
functions of coherent rational behaviour that respond to the incentives 
embedded into the institutional setting. 
 
In general terms this work is a small contribution to the view of Mosse 
(2005) and Lewis and Mosse (2006) on how development practice in 
produced, and its general conclusion points in the same direction: in the 
first place, development projects may work not because they are 
perfectly designed but because there is already an actor’s network in 
there, working with one or another policy, embedded into particular 
institutional, cultural, social or economic settings; and second, imposing 
policy prescriptions without taking institutional settings into account 
can be futile, as the probability of inducing the expected change is 
surrounded by uncertainty. Bureaucracies matter more than has been 
recognised in the field of development studies, where they are usually 
taken for granted. 
 
This work has considered the case of Mexico’s rural development policy 
to describe and explain how development practice is produced in 
specific contexts. The main argument is that development outcomes are 
far from what policymakers plan because development practice is 
shaped by several bureaucratic rationales that converge in the 
implementation of a development policy, some based on political and 
others on non-political drivers, which give the actors a framework 
within which they behave strategically to fulfil their own interests. While 
the study of development bureaucracies is not yet common in the field 
development studies, this research is a contribution to the work 
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developed by Fox (1993; 1994; 1996), Long (2001); Rap, Wester and 
Pérez-Prado (2004) and Rap (2006) to understand the role of Mexico’s 
development bureaucracy in the arenas of the formulation and 
implementation of policies addressing the rural sector, mainly in relation 
to those that produce apparent unexpected outcomes. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. List of interviews 
Interviewee position Organisation Place of interview City State 
Livestock Office Manager  Sagarpa  (Jalisco branch) Interviewee's office Tlaquepaque Jalisco 
Coordinator of Programme Evaluations Sagarpa/Seder (Jalisco) Interviewee's office Tlaquepaque Jalisco 
Rural Development District Chief (Tomatlán) Sagarpa  (Jalisco branch) CTEE Jalisco Coordinator's Office  Tlaquepaque Jalisco 
Rural Development District Chief (Ameca) Sagarpa  (Jalisco branch) CTEE Jalisco Coordinator's Office  Tlaquepaque Jalisco 
Programme officer (Rural Development) Sagarpa  (Jalisco branch) Interviewees' office Tlaquepaque Jalisco 
State Coordinator of the Sustainable Rural 
Development Councils 
Sagarpa/Seder (Jalisco) Functionary's office (Seder) Guadalajara Jalisco 
Planning Manager with his work team Statal Secretary of Rural Development 
(Seder) 
Interviewee's meeting room Guadalajara Jalisco 
Planning Manager's Assistant Statal Secretary of Rural Development 
(Seder) 
Interviewee's meeting room Guadalajara Jalisco 
Intermediate clerk/Programme operator Statal Secretary of Rural Development 
(Seder) 
Interviewee's office Guadalajara Jalisco 
Coordinator of Programme Evaluations Sagarpa/Seder (Jalisco) "Kamilos" Restaurant Guadalajara Jalisco 
Head Officer of Jalisco branch Sagarpa  (Jalisco branch) Interviewee's office Tlaquepaque Jalisco 
ASERCA's functionary Sagarpa  (Jalisco branch) Interviewee's office Tlaquepaque Jalisco 
Clerk/Programme operator Indesol Interviewee's office Guadalajara Jalisco 
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State Coordinator of the Sustainable Rural 
Development Councils 
Sagarpa/Seder (Jalisco) Car Carretera La Barca Jalisco 
Municipality advisor (PSP, Freelance) Freelance Hallway (Sagarpa, local branch) La Barca Jalisco 
Jamay Municipality advisor (PSP, Freelance) Sagarpa/Seder/Municipal Gov. (Jalisco) Sagarpa, Regional office  La Barca Jalisco 
Rural Development District Chief (La Barca) Sagarpa  (Jalisco branch) Sagarpa, Regional office  La Barca Jalisco 
Coordinator of Programme Evaluations Sagarpa/Seder (Oaxaca) Interviewee's office (Sagarpa 
local branch) 
Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Municipality advisor (PSP, Freelance) Freelancer Garden bench (Sagarga, local 
branch) 
Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Clerk, Chief Officer of a CADER (Subject: 
technology transfer and research) 
Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Garden bench (Sagarga, local 
branch) 
Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Clerk, Chief Officer of a CADER (Miahuatlán) Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Garden bench (Sagarga, local 
branch) 
Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Planning and Rural Development Manager Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Interviewee's office Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Clerk/Programme Operator Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Interviewee's meeting room Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Planning and Rural Development Manager Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Interviewee's office Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Rural Development District Chief 
(Tehuantepec) 
Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Sagarpa offices  (Oaxaca branch) Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Fisheries Office Manager Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Interviewee's car Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Fisheries Office Manager Statal Secretary of Rural Development 
(Seder) 
Interviewee's office (Seder, 
operational offices) 
Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Technology Transfer and Research Manager Statal Secretary of Rural Development "Casa Oaxaca" Restaurant Oaxaca Oaxaca 
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(Seder) 
Secretary of Rural Development  Statal Secretary of Rural Development 
(Seder) 
Secretary's office Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Technology Transfer and Research Officer Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Interviewee's office Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Rural Development Manager Statal Secretary of Rural Development 
(Seder) 
Interviewee's office (Seder, 
operational offices) 
Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Clerk/Programme Operator Indigenous Development Comission Indigenous Development 
Committee's Regional Offices 
Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Project Director FAO Mexico "Vips" Restaurant Celaya Guanajuato 
Former Agriculture and Livestock Sub-
secretary 
Sagarpa Headquarters Functionary's current office 
(Sagarpa, Guanajuato branch) 
Celaya Guanajuato 
State Sub-secretary (Agriculture Manager) Statal Secretary of Rural Development 
(Seder) 
Meeting room (Sagarpa, 
Guanajuato branch) 
Celaya Guanajuato 
Clerk/Programme Operator Fira-Firco-Aserca Meeting room (Sagarpa, 
Guanajuato branch) 
  Guanajuato 
Section Manager (Ex-Programme Operator) Semarnat Semarnat (Guanajuato branch) León Guanajuato 
Dean of Instituto de Tecnologia Roque Instituto de Tecnologia Roque Interviewee's office Celaya Guanajuato 
Meeting with scholars Instituto de Tecnologia Roque Interviewee's meeting room   Guanajuato 
Clerk/Programme Operator FIRCO Interviewee's meeting room Tlaquepaque Jalisco 
CIATEJ Research Centre Dean CIATEJ Interviewee's office Guadalajara Jalisco 
Clerk/Programme Operator SEMARNAT Local Office Interviewee's meeting room Guadalajara Jalisco 
Regional Head Officer CONAFOR Semarnat (Jalisco branch) Guadalajara Jalisco 
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Researchers INIFAP Interviewee's meeting room Zapopan Jalisco 
Coordinador Regional de Consejos de DRS Seder Jalilsco Car Guadalajara Jalisco 
CMDRS Member (Women Group Leader) Citizen CMDRS's meeting hall Acatán de Juárez Jalisco 
CMDRS Member (Maize Producer Leader) Citizen CMDRS's meeting hall Acatán de Juárez Jalisco 
CMDRS Honorary Member Citizen CMDRS's meeting hall Acatán de Juárez Jalisco 
CMDRS Member (Political leader) Citizen CMDRS's meeting hall Acatán de Juárez Jalisco 
President of the Municipality Acatlán de Juarez CMDRS's meeting hall Acatán de Juárez Jalisco 
Agriculture and Livestock Director Acatlán de Juarez CMDRS's meeting hall Acatlán de Juárez Jalisco 
Municipality advisor Sagarpa/Seder (Jalisco) Car Acatlán de Juárez Jalisco 
State Coordinator of the Sustainable Rural 
Development Councils 
Sagarpa/Seder (Jalisco) Car Guadalajara Jalisco 
CMDRS Member Citizen Municipality offices Jamay Jalisco 
Municipality advisor Sagarpa/Seder (Jalisco) Municipality offices Jamay Jalisco 
Jamay Farmers Citizens Municipality offices Jamay Jalisco 
Director of Agriculture and Livestock and 
Rural Development 
Acatlán de Juarez Municipality offices Jamay Jalisco 
State Coordinator of the Sustainable Rural 
Development Councils 
Sagarpa/Seder (Jalisco) Car Jamay Jalisco 
President of the Municipality with local 
farmers 
La Manzanilla de la Paz Municipality offices Manzanilla de la 
Paz 
Jalisco 
Clerk/Programme Operator FIRCO-FIRA Interviewee's meeting room Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Subdelegado and Programme operators Semarnat (Oaxaca branch) Interviewee's office Oaxaca Oaxaca 
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Subdelegado and Programme operators Semarnat/Conafor (Oaxaca branch) Meeting room (Semarnat, Oaxaca 
branch) 
Oaxaca Oaxaca 
CTE Coordinator Sagarpa/Seder (Oaxaca) Car Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Farmer Leader (Grains Farmer Association) Citizen Association's offices Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Coordinator of Programme Evaluations Sagarpa/Seder (Oaxaca) Car Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Planning and Rural Development Manager Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Interviewee's office Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Coordinator of Programme Evaluations Sagarpa/Seder (Oaxaca) Car Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Farmer Leader (Coffee Association) Citizen Association's offices Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Fisheries Office Manager Sagarpa  (Oaxaca branch) Interviewee's office Oaxaca Oaxaca 
Members of the CMDRS (Teacher, Juan, 
Secretary, County Advisor) 
San Miguel Suchixtepec Municipality offices San Miguel 
Suchitepec 
Oaxaca 
Municipality advisor (PSP, Freelance) Independent PSP Car San Miguel 
Coatepec 
Oaxaca 
Members of the CMDRS San Miguel Coatepec County Municipality offices San Miguel 
Coatepec 
Oaxaca 
Municipality advisor (PSP, Freelance) Freelance PSP Car San Miguel 
Coatepec 
Oaxaca 
Municipality advisor (PSP, Freelance) Freelance PSP Local restaurant Miahuatlán Oaxaca 
Planning Manager Statal Secretary of Rural Development 
(Seder) 
Interviewee's office Metepec Estado de 
México 
INIFAP Researcher INIFAP Interviewee's office Zinacantepec Estado de 
México 
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Planning and Rural Development Manager Sagarpa  (Estado de Mexico branch) Interviewee's office Zinacantepec Estado de 
México 
Clerk/Programme operator Probosque Car Metepec Estado de 
México 
Budget General Director Sagarpa Headquarters Interviewee's meeting room México D.F. México D.F 
Programme operators Group 1 (responsible 
of regulations) 
Sagarpa Headquarters Interviewee's meeting room México D.F. México D.F 
Programme operators Group 1 Sagarpa Headquarters Interviewee's meeting room México D.F. México D.F 
Programme operators Group 3 (responsible 
for the Physical Capital Acquisitions 
Programme) 
Sagarpa Headquarters Interviewee's meeting room México D.F. México D.F 
Programme operators Group 4 (Rural 
Development Programme) 
Sagarpa Headquarters Interviewee's meeting room México D.F. México D.F 
Coordinators of programme evaluations 
Group 6 
Sagarpa Headquarters Interviewee's meeting room México D.F. México D.F 
CEDRSSA Forum: Presentation of participants Mexican Congress Conference room México D.F. México D.F 
CEDRSSA Forum: Territoriality presentation Mexican Congress Conference room México D.F. México D.F 
CEDRSSA Forum: FAO presentation Mexican Congress Conference room   México D.F 
Congresswoman: President of the 
Commission of Budget Surveillance 
Mexican Congress Her Office México D.F. México D.F. 
Former SAGARPA  Director of Rural 
Development. Central structure 
Sagarpa Headquarters His office at University of 
Chapingo 
Texcoco Estado de 
México 
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Former SAGARPA  Director of Rural 
Development. Central structure 
Sagarpa Headquarters His office at University of 
Chapingo 
Texcoco Estado de 
México 
Former assistant of the Secretary of  
SAGARPA  
Sagarpa Headquarters Meeting room (Sagarpa, 
Headquarters) 
México D.F. México D.F. 
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Appendix 2. Interview guide questions 
 
Addressing upper bureaucracy  
What is the LDRS about?  
What was the origin of the LDRS?  
How the LDRS modified the rural development policy in Mexico?  
What are the most important implications to implement the LDRS 
(organizational, political, or economical)?  
In your organization, where can we identify the LDRS?  
What programmes are based on the principles of the LDRS?  
What is the objective of the programmes that your organization 
manages?  
Do you think that decentralising the operation of the programmes it will 
be possible to obtain a more efficient use of public resources?  
What is your experience of operating the programmes under a 
decentralised model?  
What are the advantages and disadvantages of decentralising rural 
programmes?  
What are the main problems that your organization has had in the 
coordination of activities with other levels of government?  
What are the mechanisms that your organization uses to let the people 
know the way that public resources are being applied under a 
decentralised strategy? 
Do you prefer a centralised or a decentralised model to carry out the 
rural development policy in Mexico?  
What is the rationale of decentralising the programmes?  
What is you conclusion about the LDRS and its decentralised strategy to 
foster rural development?  
 
 
Addressing middle and lower bureaucracy 
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Do you know the objectives of rural development stated by the federal 
government?  
Which are the main objectives of the programme you manage?  
Do you think this programme is compatible with the national objectives 
of rural development?  
How the LDRS modified the operation of the programme you 
manage/operate?  
What are the most important implications of considering the LDRS in 
your programme (organizational, political, or economical)?  
In your programme, where can we identify the principles of the LDRS?  
Do you think that decentralising the operation of the programme you 
manage/operate it will be possible to be more efficient in the use of 
public resources?  
What is your experience of manage/operate the programmes under a 
decentralised model?  
What are the advantages and disadvantages of decentralising rural 
programmes?  
What are the main problems that your organization has had in the 
coordination of activities with other levels of government?  
Do you prefer a centralised or a decentralised model to manage/operate 
your programme?  
What would be the best incentive to prefer a decentralised model of 
operation?  
What is the rationale of decentralising the programmes?  
What are the mechanisms that your organization uses to let the people 
know the way that public resources are being applied under a 
decentralised strategy? 
What are the most important implications for you (organizational, 
political, economical) of decentralising the operation your programme?  
What do you win and lose in the two models of operation?  
What is you conclusion about the process of decentralisation of rural 
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development programmes?  
Do you prefer a centralised or a decentralised model to manage your 
programme?  
What are the mechanisms that your organization uses to let the people 
know the way that public resources are being applied under a 
decentralised strategy? 
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Appendix 3. Organisations of the Social and Private Sectors that 
take part in the Consejo Mexicano para el Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable 
Organisations that belongs to the private sector: 
 
AMEG 
Asociación Mexicana de Engordadores de Ganado Bovino, A.C. 
(Mexican Association of Bovine Meat Producers) 
ANGLAC 
Asociación Nacional de Ganaderos Lecheros, A.C. 
(National Association of Dairy Cattle Producers) 
CANACINTRA 
Consejo Coordinador de las Industrias de Alimentos, Bebidas y tabacos 
Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Transformación 
(National Bureau of Transformation Industry: Council of Food, Drinks and 
Tobacco) 
CMF 
Consejo Mexicano de la Flor 
(Mexican Council of the Flower) 
CNA 
Consejo Nacional Agropecuario 
(Agricultural National Council) 
CNOG 
Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Ganaderas 
(National Confederation of Cattle Organisations) 
CNPR 
Unión Nacional Ganadera de la CNPR 
Confederación Nacional de Propietarios Rurales, A.C. 
(National Confederation of Rural Owners: Meat Producers Union) 
COCESAVE 
Coordinadora de Comités Estatales de Sanidad Vegetal, A. C. 
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(Union of State Committees for Vegetal Safety) 
COFUPRO 
Coordinadora Nacional de las Fundaciones Produce, A. C. 
(National Union of Produce Foundations) 
COMECARNE 
Consejo Mexicano de la Carne 
(Mexican Council of Meat) 
CONCAMIN 
Confederación de Cámaras Industriales 
(Confederation of Industrial Bureaus) 
CONPAPA 
Confederación Nacional de productores de Papa de la República 
Mexicana 
(National Confederation of Potato Producers of the Mexican Republic) 
CPM 
Confederación de Porcicultores Mexicanos, A.C. 
(Confederation of Mexican Pork Meat Producers) 
CVA 
Organismo Nacional de Certificación y Verificación Agroalimentaria, A. C. 
(National Organisation of Certification and Verification of Agricultural 
Food) 
FUNDAR 
Fundación Mexicana para el Desarrollo Rural 
(Mexican Foundations for Rural Development) 
REDRS 
Red para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable 
(Sustainable Rural Development Network) 
UNA 
Unión Nacional de Avicultores 
(National Union of Poultry Farmers) 
 
Organisations that belongs to the Social Sector: 
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ADS 
Titular: Rubén Antonio Rebollo Vázquez 
Secretario General 
Alianza Demócrata Social, A. C. 
Suplente: C. Tómas de Jesús González Rodríguez 
 
ALCANO 
Titular: C. Juan Leyva Mendivil 
Presidente de la Alianza 
Alianza Campesina del Noroeste, A.C. 
Suplente: Lic. Raúl Pérez Bedolla 
 
AMUCSS 
Titular: Lic. Isabel Cruz Hernández 
Directora General 
Asociación Mexicana de Uniones de Crédito del Sector Social, A.C. 
Suplente: Lic. Juan Mario Meléndez 
 
ANACC BU 
Titular: C. Alfonso Ramírez Cuellar 
Secretario General 
ANACC Barzón Unión 
Suplente: C. Martín Solís Bustamante 
 
ANCIAM 
Titular: Lic. Rolando Valentín Benítez Sánchez 
Secretario Técnico Nacional 
Asociación Nacional Campesina e Indígena de Adultos Mayores, A. C. 
Suplente: C. Margarito Cruz Cruz 
 
ANEC 
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Titular: Ing. Víctor Suarez Carrera 
Presidente 
Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras de Productores del 
Campo, A.C. 
Suplente: Ing. Sergio Ivan Polanco López 
 
ANSAC 
Titular: Ing. Alfredo García Solís 
Presidente de la Asociación 
Asociación Nacional del Sector Agropecuario y Campesino, A.C. 
Suplente: MVZ. José Antonio Cerda Salazar 
 
CAM 
Titular: Prof. Humberto Serrano Pérez 
Secretario General 
Confederación Agrarista Mexicana, Prof. Francisco Hernández Mercado, 
A.C. 
Suplente: Ing. Humberto Serrano Novelo 
 
CCC 
Titular: Lic. Max Agustín Correa Hernández 
Secretario General 
Central Campesina Cardenista, A.C. 
Suplente: Ing. Santiago Domínguez Luna 
 
CCI 
Titular: Lic. Rafael Galindo Jaime 
Secretario General 
Central Campesina Independiente, A.C. 
Suplente: Lic. Antonio Jiménez Portillo 
 
CCNCS 
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Titular: Ing. Heriberto Santana Rubio 
Presidente 
Consejo Coordinador Nacional de Cajas Solidarias, A.C. 
Suplente:  
 
CIOAC 
Titular: C. José Dolores López Barrios 
Secretario de Planeación y Desarrollo Rural 
Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos, A. C. 
Suplente: C. Gilberto Silvestre López 
 
CNC 
Titular: Dip. Lic. Gerardo Sánchez García 
Presidente del CEN de la CNC 
Confederación Nacional Campesina 
Suplente: Dip. Ing. Fermín Montes Cavazos 
 
CNPA 
Titular: Dr. José Narro Cespedes 
Miembro del Consejo Consultivo 
Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala 
Suplente: Sr. Carlos Ramos Alva 
 
CNPA MN 
Titular: C. Alberto Galindo García 
Titular 
Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala "Movimiento Nacional", A. C. 
Suplente: C. yuri Zareth Uribe Montero 
 
COCYP 
Titular: C. José Socorro Jacobo Femat 
Presidente 
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Central de Organizaciones Campesinas y Populares, A.C. 
Suplente: Sr. Rafael Jacobo García  
 
CODUC 
Titular: C. Marco Antonio Ortíz Salas 
Secretario General 
Coalición de Organizaciones Democráticas Urbanas y Campesinas A.C. 
Suplente: C.J. Refugio Quintana Vera 
 
CONSUCC 
Titular: C.P. Guadalupe Martínez Cruz 
Secretaria General 
Consejo Nacional de Sociedades y Unidades de Campesinos y Colonos, 
A.C. 
Suplente: Lic. Alfonso Garzón Martínez 
 
COUC 
Titular: Ignacio Iris Salomón 
Presidente  
Coordinación Organizadora de la Unidad Campesina A.C. 
Suplente: MVZ. Javier Cruz Vega 
 
FEPUR 
Titular: Marco antonio godoy Rodríguez 
Titular 
Federación de Pueblos Rurales, A. C. 
Suplente: José Dagoberto Ordoñes Rabanales 
 
FNDCM 
Titular: C. Rangel Espinoza López 
Presidente 
Frente Nacional para la Defensa del Campo Mexicano 
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Suplente: Sr. Manuel Antonio Cázares Castro  
 
FRCTM 
Titular: C. Juan Rojas Pérez 
Secretario General del Comité Ejecutivo Nacional 
Frente Revolucionario de Campesinos y Trabajadores de Mexico, A. C. 
Suplente: C. Oscar Rojas Reyes 
 
MAIZ 
Titular: C. Alejandro Cruz Juárez 
Presidente 
Movimiento Agrario Indígena Zapatista, A. C. 
Suplente: C. Juan Olmedo Daza 
 
PRO MAZAHUA 
Titular: Mtra. Jeannette Arriola Sánchez 
Representante Titular 
PATRONATO PRO ZONA MAZAHUA, A.C. 
Suplente: C. P. Jorge Familiar Haro 
 
RED-MOCAF 
Titular: Ing. Gustavo Sánchez Valle 
Director Ejecutivo 
Red Mexicana de Organizaciones Campesinas Forestales, A. C. 
Suplente: Ing. Juvenal Rodríguez Maldonado 
 
REMUI 
Titular: Lic. Amparo Gutiérrez Reyes 
Presidenta 
Red de Mujeres Indígenas Mexicanas 
Suplente: C. Miguel Díaz Arias 
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RENAMUVI 
Titular: Lic. Guadalupe Ivonne Solís Sandoval 
Presidenta 
Red Nacional de Mujeres Vigilantes 
Suplente: Ing. Armando Domínguez Pérez 
 
UCD 
Titular: C. Antonio Tirado Patiño 
Presidente 
Unión Campesina Democrática, A.C. 
Suplente: Dr. Eugenio E. Santacruz de León 
 
UFIC 
Titular: C. Isidro Pedraza Chávez 
Presidente del Consejo de Administración 
Unidad de la Fuerza Indígena y Campesina, A. C. 
Suplente: C. Rocío Miranda Pérez 
 
UGOCM-JL 
Titular: Lic. José Luis González Aguilera 
Secretario General 
Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México, "Jacinto López 
Moreno", A. C. 
Suplente: Dr. José Antonio Euán Martínez 
 
UGOCP 
Titular: Lic. Luís Gómez Garay 
Representante Titular 
Unión General Obrero, Campesina y Popular, A.C. 
Suplente: C. Miguel Ángel Barón García 
 
UGOCP-CN 
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Titular: Prof. Miguel Angel Castro Cosío 
Representante Titular 
Unión General Obrero, Campesina y Popular, A.C. Coordinadora Nacional 
Suplente: Ing. Efren Agustín Portuguez Miranda 
 
UNIMOSS 
Titular: Lic. Javier Eduardo López Macías 
Presidente 
Unión Nacional Integradora de Organizaciones Solidarias y Economía 
Social A.C. 
Suplente: Lic. Gregorio Viramontes Pérez 
 
UNOMDIE 
Titular: Ing. Beymar López Altuzar 
Presidente 
Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Mexicanas para el Desarrollo Integral 
de la Ecología 
Suplente: Sr. Ricardo Férnández Calderón 
 
UNORCA 
Titular: C. Rogelio Alquisiras Burgos 
Comisionado Ejecutivo Nacional  
Unión Nacional de organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas, 
A.C. 
Suplente: Lic. Marcos Pinedo Hernández 
 
UNPP 
Titular: Mvz. Juan Arizmendi Hernández 
Presidente 
UNIÓN NACIONAL DE PRODUCTORES PECUARIOS, A.C. 
Suplente: Lic. Pablo Sánchez López 
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UNTA 
Titular: Prof. Álvaro López Ríos 
Presidente 
Unión Nacional de Trabajadores Agrícolas, A.C. 
Suplente: Lic. José Luis López Cepeda 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms  
 
ASERCA   Apoyos y Servicios a la Comercialización Agropecuaria 
(Subsidies and Services for Agriculture Commercialisation) 
WB    The World Bank  
CADER     Centros de Capacitación para el Desarrollo Rural  
CDDRS   Consejo Distrital para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable 
CEDRS   Consejo Estatal para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable 
CIDRS   Comisión Intersecretarial para el Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable 
CMxDRS   Consejo Mexicano para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable 
CMDRS   Consejos Municipales para el Desarrollo Rural 
Sustentable 
CNC    Confederación Nacional Campesina 
CONAGO   Conferencia Nacional de Gobernadores 
COPLADE   Comités de Planeación para el Desarrollo Estatal 
COPLADEM  Comité de Planeación de Desarrollo Municipal 
DDR    Distritos de Desarrollo Rural 
FAO    Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la 
Alimentación y la Agricultura 
FIRA   Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la Agricultura 
FIRCO   Fideicomiso de Riesgo Compartido 
FOFAE   Fideicomiso de Fomento Agropecuario Estatal 
INCA RURAL  Instituto Nacional de Capacitación Rural 
INAFED  Instituto Federal para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo 
LDRS  Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (Sustainable Rural 
Development Act) 
ONG   Organización No Gubernamental  
OPORTUNIDADES Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades 
PAN   Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party) 
PAAP   Programa para la Adquicisión de Activos Productivos 
PEA    Población Económicamente Activa 
PEC    Programa Especial Concurrente para el Desarrollo Rural 
PRD    Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the 
Democratic Revolution) 
PRI   Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) 
PROCAMPO  Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo 
PRODESCA  Programa de Desarrollo de Capacidades para el Medio 
Rural 
PROFEMOR  Programa de Fortalecimiento de Empresas y 
Organizaciones Rurales 
PROGRESA  Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación  
PRONASOL  Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 
UTOE   Unidad Técnica Operativa Estatal 
SAGARPA   Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, 
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Pesca y Alimentación (Secretariat of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food) 
SEDESOL   Secretaría de Desarrollo Social  
SEMARNAT  Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
SEDER   Secretaría de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Rural Estatal 
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